Кузнецов Михаил Юрьевич : другие произведения.

The Problem of Being through the Readings of Herman Cohen

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  • Аннотация:
    Submitted a paper to the "Phenomenologies of Mental Health, Well-Being and Flourishing conference" (September 19-20, 2025, Lehigh University, College of Health), but it was not accepted.


   Abstract: This study is dedicated to exploring the philosophical perspectives of Herman Cohen, the founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, concerning the problem of being and his reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant"s critical philosophy. The primary aim of the research is to analyze how Cohen construed being as a construct emerging from the process of thinking rather than as an independent reality. The article undertakes a comparative analysis of Edmund Husserl"s critique, as the founder of phenomenology, in relation to Cohen"s ideas. It focuses on Cohen"s original "infinitesimal method" and its significance for philosophy, the differences between Cohen"s and Husserl"s approaches to ontological issues, and their respective connections to Kantian thought.
   The relevance of this topic lies in the importance of Cohen"s ideas for understanding the evolution of Neo-Kantianism and its influence on contemporary philosophy, particularly in the contexts of the philosophy of science and epistemology. The comparison with Husserl"s phenomenology highlights the variety of approaches to ontological questions in the 19th and 20th centuries. Furthermore, Cohen"s concepts find resonance in modern discussions about the nature of scientific knowledge and artificial intelligence, where his method of constructing reality through thought aligns with algorithmic frameworks.
   Keywords: Herman Cohen, Edmund Husserl, Neo-Kantianism, infinitesimal method, pure thought.
  
I. The Philosophy of Herman Cohen

  
   The German philosopher Herman Cohen (1842-1918), founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism (from 1870 onward), approached the problem of being from the standpoint of Immanuel Kant"s (1724-1804) critical philosophy, while radically rethinking Kantian ideas. Cohen focused on the issue of cognition and its relation to being, asserting that being does not exist independently of thought but is constructed through the logical and scientific categories of cognition [Noras 2020: 516-545]. As a professor of philosophy, Cohen argued that being is a product of human thought-specifically, that being is nothing other than a correlate of thinking. It does not exist "in itself" but arises solely within the process of cognition. Thinking does not merely reflect being; it actively generates it.
   Cohen"s views, as a German-Jewish thinker, on the problem of being can be characterized as follows: logic and mathematics serve as the foundation for understanding being. In his work Kant"s Theory of Experience (1871), Cohen declared that Kant"s transcendental method extends beyond categories (such as causality and substance), not merely organizing experience but creating the very possibility of being through the transcendental deduction of categories and their role in constituting experience [Cohen 1885: 3-35]. In Logic of Pure Cognition (1902), he advanced the idea that being results from "pure thinking" (Reines Denken), grounded in logical and mathematical laws [Cohen 1922: 1-17]. Cohen further posited that being is not a static entity but a dynamic phenomenon, giving rise to concepts and ideas of freedom and justice. In his Ethics of Pure Will (1904), he argued that being shapes moral and ethical orientations within human consciousness [Cohen 1921: 79-156].
  
II. The Infinitesimal Method in Cohen"s Philosophy

   Herman Cohen departed from traditional ontology in favor of a transcendental approach, developing his distinctive "infinitesimal method" (Infinitesimal-methode) to investigate and comprehend being. The infinitesimal method occupies a central place in the philosophy of this German thinker. Infinitesimal calculus (differential and integral calculus), developed in the 17th century by the English materialist Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), became a powerful tool for describing change and motion, as well as solving complex problems in physics and mathematics. An infinitesimal is an infinitely small quantity, smaller than any finite number yet greater than zero. Cohen philosophically reinterpreted this mathematical approach [Cohen 1883: 52-138].
   The Infinitesimal-methode is a method of apparent noumena, understood as units of eidos (eschewing traditional epistemology in favor of the transcendental method), or a priori representations and experiences that occur to us and are subsequently perceived as a posteriori experience [Giovanelli 2016: 9]. For example, consider attempting to grasp an abstract concept such as "justice" (Gerechtigkeit) or "freedom" (Freiheit). Cohen might argue that one begins with the most basic, almost imperceptible elements of experience or reasoning (akin to infinitesimals) and then "integrates" them through a logical process to form a coherent concept. This process is continuous and dynamic, comparable to summing infinite small parts (e.g., the area under a curve) to yield a total result. Thus, any concept is broken down (dichotomized) into specific moral situations, logical principles of equality, or acts of choice. Each element may seem insignificant in isolation, but through thinking, they coalesce into a holistic understanding of justice that evolves over time rather than remaining fixed.
   Cohen critiqued mechanical empiricism (vulgar materialism) for reducing cognition to sensory experience and the notion of tabula rasa. He maintained that infinitesimal calculus demonstrates that scientific cognition rests on a priori principles irreducible to experience. In Cohen"s philosophy, the infinitesimal method is not merely an abstract idea but a tool illustrating how thinking constructs reality through successive, nearly imperceptible steps, analogous to mathematical limits and integrals. This leads to a syllogistic conclusion that thinking is not inherently given (Gegebenheit) but is tasked (Aufgegebenheit) through education and the lens of personal experience.
   Human consciousness cannot fully grasp the breadth and extent of being (surrounding reality) or our actions (impulses, drives, or desires), so it fragments them into manageable parts, appropriating them as needed through intentionality. Cohen resolved the ontological question of being by demonstrating that infinitesimals are not merely mathematical abstractions but the means by which thinking apprehends reality. This German scholar "brought philosophy into the light" from the stale confines of metaphysics, transforming it into a rigorous science built on hypothetical principles, deriving conclusions from practical evidence or refuting observed phenomena.
   The dynamic conception of being in Hermann Cohen"s philosophy, understood as a process constructed through pure thought, and Edmund Husserl"s emphasis on the "lived world" (Lebenswelt) as the foundation of phenomenological experience, offer valuable perspectives on human flourishing. Cohen"s infinitesimal method, by framing being as an evolving product of logical and ethical reasoning, suggests that well-being emerges not as a static state but as an active, continuous achievement of meaning and moral orientation-principles that resonate with contemporary notions of flourishing as purposeful engagement with life. Similarly, Husserl"s focus on intuitive apprehension of lived experience underscores the significance of subjective awareness and intentionality in shaping a meaningful existence, providing a framework for understanding well-being as deeply rooted in the individual"s relation to their lifeworld. Together, these approaches illuminate how thought and experience intertwine to foster human flourishing, bridging historical philosophy with modern inquiries into mental health and fulfillment.
   In his Ethics of Pure Will (1904), Hermann Cohen establishes a profound connection between being and moral-ethical orientations, positing that being is not merely an abstract ontological category but a dynamic process that shapes human consciousness through the emergence of ethical ideals such as justice and freedom. This perspective can be interpreted as a foundational framework for human flourishing, where well-being transcends passive contentment and becomes an active realization of moral agency and purposeful existence. For Cohen, being emerges through the rigorous application of pure thought, guided by logical and mathematical principles, which in turn fosters ethical constructs that enable individuals to engage meaningfully with their social and personal worlds-an idea that aligns with contemporary conceptions of flourishing as a state of purposeful fulfillment rather than mere absence of distress. Complementing this, Edmund Husserl"s phenomenology, with its focus on the "lived world" (Lebenswelt), enriches this framework by grounding well-being in the intuitive apprehension of lived experience. Husserl"s emphasis on intentionality and the lifeworld suggests that flourishing arises from a reflective awareness of one"s subjective relation to the environment, offering a counterpoint to Cohen"s emphasis on intellectual construction by highlighting the immediacy of experience. Together, Cohen"s ethically oriented dynamism and Husserl"s phenomenological sensitivity to lived reality provide a dual lens through which flourishing can be understood as both a constructed achievement and an experiential reality, bridging Neo-Kantian and phenomenological traditions to address modern questions of mental health and human fulfillment in an era of complexity and change.
  
III. Edmund Husserl"s Critique of Herman Cohen"s Ideas

   The Austrian philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) critiqued Cohen"s infinitesimal method for its failure to account for phenomenology and intuition. Husserl faulted Cohen"s approach for being overly formal and abstract, neglecting the importance of phenomenology (the study of immediate experience) and intuition (the direct apprehension of essences).
   Husserl contrasted Cohen"s Neo-Kantian framework with his own ideas, articulating his critique in works such as the two-volume Logical Investigations (1900-1901) [Husserl 2001: 9-28], Philosophy as Rigorous Science (1911), Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913), and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). Husserl argued that intuition and phenomenological reduction (the method of "bracketing" all presuppositions of the epoch) for directly apprehending essences, rather than Cohen"s infinitesimal method, serve as the "key" to understanding essences [Husserl 1922: 7-56].
   Husserl contended that Cohen, by focusing on the infinitesimal method and logic, overlooked the lived experience of humanity (Lebenswelt). Husserl emphasized the intuitive apprehension of essences (Wesensschau), arguing that Cohen relied excessively on mediated cognition (via logic and mathematics) while ignoring the direct perception of essences (phenomena). Building on Cohen"s worldview, Husserl proposed an alternative resolution to the ontological problem of being, urging the scholarly community to adopt the phenomenological method and return to "things themselves" (Dinge an sich). Husserl, an Austro-Jewish professor, asserted that things and the world, through phenomenology, must begin with an analysis of the lived world rather than abstract scientific or logical constructs.
  
IV. Comparison of Herman Cohen"s Worldview with Immanuel Kant"s Philosophy

  
   Immanuel Kant effected a "Copernican revolution" in philosophy, framing the problem of being as a transcendental issue concerned with the conditions of its cognition. For Kant, being was not an essence but a category and form of sensibility (space and time). He maintained that we can know only phenomena, not things-in-themselves (noumena). Kant"s resolution of the ontological problem of being involved applying a critical method that confines cognition to the realm of phenomena, rejecting metaphysical intrusions into being, which exists "in itself" and objectively.
   For Kant, "causality" (causalis) is an a priori category of experience, whereas for Cohen, it is a product of pure thinking wholly dependent on logic. Cohen argued that being is individual to each person, existing solely within specific consciousness. He advocated restricting philosophy to the framework of natural science to pursue the comprehension of being, asserting that only what is provable has a right to exist, while anything beyond empirical grounding remains speculative. The more individuals engage in research and substantiate their findings, the closer they come to resolving the fundamental question of being-this was Cohen"s stance.
   In Kant"s metaphor, the world is a theater where we see only the stage (phenomena), with noumena hidden behind the curtains. For Cohen, the entire theater is the stage, with nothing behind the curtains, and reality is created by the actors (our thinking). Cohen adds that the stage is not static: the actors continually rewrite the script, guided by logic, mathematics, and ethical principles.
   Edmund Husserl synthesized the "traditional" Kantian perspective with Cohen"s Neo-Kantian approach to the problem of being, calling for a return to "things themselves" (zu den Sachen selbst). Husserl proposed that resolution lies through the lens of consciousness, advocating a phenomenological approach wherein being is disclosed through descriptions of phenomena given in consciousness, subsequently returning to the lived world via lived experience.
  
V. Conclusions

  
   1. Herman Cohen"s ideas significantly influenced the development of the philosophy of science, particularly Neo-Kantianism and early analytic philosophy.
   2. Cohen reinterpreted Kantian philosophy, asserting that being is constructed by thinking.
   3. For Cohen, being does not exist independently but emerges in the process of cognition.
   4. Edmund Husserl criticized Cohen for excessive formality and abstraction, emphasizing the importance of the "lived world" (Lebenswelt).
   5. Husserl, in developing his phenomenological approach, drew upon the ideas of both Kant and Cohen.
  
VI. Bibliography

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