ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE COAL CONCESSIONS IN NORTHERN SAKHALIN.

The occupation of Northern Sakhalin by Japanese troops could not leave indifferent the leaders of the Land of the Soviets, who took a number of diplomatic steps to achieve the liberation of the island from the Japanese interventionists. The question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin was raised by the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic (which included Northern Sakhalin) at the conference in Dairen (11.07.1921 16.04.1922), where Japan was offered to withdraw troops from Primorye and Northern Sakhalin within a month in exchange for obtaining concessions and economic benefits. However, the Japanese delegation rejected the draft agreement. In turn, representatives of the RFE rejected the proposal to lease the entire Northern Sakhalin to Japan for 80 years. As a result, the negotiations ended in nothing. The Sakhalin issue was actively discussed at the Washington (1921) and Changchun conferences, at the negotiations between representatives of the USSR and Japan in Tokyo (1923). The Japanese side's proposals to buy the island for 150 million yen were rejected. The decision on the liberation of Northern Sakhalin continued at the Beijing negotiations of 1924-1925, during which the USSR began to pursue a tough course towards Japan: limiting benefits for Japanese fishermen, limiting the issuance of entry visas. The business circles of Japan began to exert pressure on the central authorities in order to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. The same demand was made by many workers, supported by part of the intelligentsia. As a result, both the Japanese and Soviet sides made mutual concessions, and at the Beijing negotiations in 1924-1925, the issue of the liberation of Sakhalin was resolved.

On January 20, 1925, the "Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and Japan" was concluded in Beijing, on the basis of which the evacuation of Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin was to be completed by May 15, 1925. One of the key concessions of the USSR to the Japanese was the provision of concession contracts to Japanese firms for the exploration and production of minerals on the island. At that time, Japan experienced great difficulties in importing foreign coking coal from England and America. This pushed it to obtain a coal concession on Sakhalin.

On the other hand, the signing of concession agreements with Japan was beneficial not only to the Japanese, but also to the Soviet side. As early as the beginning of the 1920s, at the dawn of the New Economic Policy (NEP), in an environment of deep decline in production, disruption of economic life and destruction of productive forces, the top officials in the leadership of the USSR proposed to use foreign capital in the form of concessions in addition to internal reserves and opportunities. In addition to the economic policy of the USSR in the Far East (attracting investment, improving the distribution of productive forces in the country, etc.), the concession policy of the USSR also included a political aspect the need to use the contradictions between America and Japan to prevent a new intervention.

According to Protocol B of the Beijing Convention, the Government of the USSR agreed to grant a concession to Japanese concerns recommended by the Japanese Government for the exploitation of coal deposits on the west coast of Northern Sakhalin. Concession contracts were to be concluded within five months from the date of the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin.

On June 17, 1925, a special meeting of the Main Concession Committee of the USSR on the concession issue in the Far East was held. The main attention was paid to the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin and the development of the basic principle of the state's policy towards them: "Concessions should be profitable for the Japanese, but at the same time not too much curtail our interests."

To discuss the terms of the concession agreements and other problems that arose in the course of negotiations with the Japanese side, a special commission was created under the Main Concession Committee, consisting of representatives of the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariats of Agriculture, Finance, Foreign Trade, Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Dalrevkom, and positions were worked out that had to be strictly adhered to in relation to the concessionaires, namely: 1) to concede in trifles, but to adhere to a firm position on the main issues (mandatory observance of the Soviet legislation, strict compliance with the terms of concession agreements, etc.); 2) not to encourage the Japanese to develop the fields more intensively, taking into account their already extreme interest and the danger of their economic conquest of Northern Sakhalin; 3) in case of organization by concessionaries of any auxiliary enterprises (harbors, roads, etc.), to achieve their joint use; 4) to establish the norm of foreign workers not more than 25%.

In the summer and autumn, coordination meetings and meetings of the Soviet and Japanese delegations were held, at which the details of the articles of concession agreements were worked out, and various aspects of relations were determined. The Soviet side was represented at the negotiations by A.A. Ioffe, I.O. Shleifer, M.G. Gurevich and others, the Japanese businessmen were represented by Admiral S. Nakasato, the representative of the Union of Japanese Miners Okumura Masao, Kawakami Toshihiko and others.

In view of the special conditions that have arisen in Northern Sakhalin, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has agreed to exempt from the existing right (exchange of notes between the Ambassador of the USSR to China, L. M. Karakhan, and the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Japan in Beijing, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, annexed to the Beijing Convention) to allow Japanese concerns that exploited oil and coal deposits in Northern Sakhalin to continue work, But only before the conclusion of concession contracts. During this time, firms were also exempt from operating fees, taxes and duties until the conclusion of a concession agreement.

It should be borne in mind that on the basis of the Beijing Convention, the export of coal from the island before the conclusion of the concession agreement was prohibited (as an exception, from August 4, 1925, the export of coal from the North Sakhalin mines was allowed, but with the obligation to pay duties and fees immediately after the conclusion of the contract, as well as the duty-free import of 250 tons of cargo to the Douai mine), and therefore the incentive for mining, which was carried out in Douai and Rohat only in order to preserve the main nucleus of workers and employees, disappeared. Therefore, the delay in signing the concession contract was not in the interests of the Japanese. Subsequently, firms that did not enter into concession agreements were allowed to export the mined coal to Japan with the payment of taxes and share deductions provided for in the concession contracts.

On Friday, December 11, 1925, in the afternoon, Okumura Masao, a representative of the Japanese syndicate of North Sakhalin coal enterprises "Kita Sagaren Sekitan Kogyo Kumiai" formed in accordance with Law No. 37 of March 30, 1925, and the Sakai Kumiai company, in the presence of Kawakami Toshihiko and the head of the legal department of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR M. Stepukhovich, signed two concession agreements for the exploitation of coal areas in Northern Sakhalin. However, according to archival documents, the official signing of the concession agreements took place on December 14, 1925, but Okumura Masao had to leave for Germany on the evening of December 11, so he could not attend the official signing of the document and signed both copies of the concession agreements "in advance".

On Monday, December 14, 1925, at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, concession agreements were signed by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy F.E. Dzerzhinsky, which were signed by the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. Litvinov. The signing of the agreements and the photographing with the delegates were also attended by the adviser to the Japanese delegation T. Kawakami, the Japanese ambassador Tanaka Tokichi, as well as members of the Soviet commission for the conclusion of the agreements A.E. Minkin, M.G. Gurevich, A.V. Musatov and M. Yapolsky.

Under the first concession agreement, Kita Sagaren Sekitan Kogio Kumiai was granted the right to exploit three coal deposits with a total area of 5,505 hectares, including the Duisky allotment with an area of 1,293 hectares, the Vladimir allotment with an area of 1,634 hectares and the Mgachinsky allotment with an area of 2,578 hectares. The concession period was set at 45 years.

However, the Japanese side needed to amend its own legislation, which would allow Japanese companies to legally operate in Northern Sakhalin. Initially, the draft imperial decree regulating the creation and operation of concession joint-stock companies in Northern Sakhalin was developed for the creation of semi-state and semi-private joint-stock companies, and Article 3 of the draft stated that "shares are registered in the name of the imperial government and subjects of the empire."

The authorized capital of the company was supposed to be 15 million yen, of which 5 million yen was allocated from the budget, for 7.5 million yen individuals and legal entities could buy shares. Since the Sakhalin concessions were initially viewed by the Japanese as compensation for the "Nikolaev" incident, the emperor's advisers believed that the profits received from the concessions should be divided between the government and the general public.

It must be said that some Japanese reporters "got wind of" the insidious plans of the Japanese government and soon the pages of the newspapers were full of revelatory articles.

"Many Japanese semi-official concerns have performed very poorly in the past, partly because of their party connections, and partly because of the arbitrary management of their affairs by a few executives," the Japan Weekly Chronicle paraphrased an editorial in the Asahi newspaper. honestly...The newspaper also warned Japanese businessmen "against the illusion into which they may fall that there is every opportunity to make easy money in Northern Sakhalin."

As a result, the Government decided to "back down". At a conference of vice-ministers on February 13, 1926, it was decided to delete the original proposal in the above-mentioned imperial decree, which made the "imperial government" a shareholder, and to make the joint-stock companies purely private. At a cabinet meeting on February 22, 1926, preceding the issuance of the decree on concession companies, issues related to oil and coal production, which had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Navy, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

On March 6, 1926, the Official Gazette published Imperial Decree No. 9, signed by Prince Regent Hirohito the day before. The preamble stated that "the purpose of this law is to carry out business activities related to the extraction of oil or coal in Northern Sakhalin in accordance with the concession agreement on the basis of the Protocol on the Agreement Governing Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (Protocol B of the Beijing Convention)."

The decree stated that the Emperor allowed the establishment of joint-stock companies on the territory of Japan for the purpose of conducting oil or coal production in Northern Sakhalin on the basis of an agreement between Japan and the Soviet Republic. The founders of the companies are required to submit to the Ministry of Trade and Industry an application for permission to organize these companies, attaching to it the charter and business plan. The established companies are officially registered in the register of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which supervises the activities of such companies, approves changes in the composition of the board, the budget and business plans of the companies, the issue of shares, the list of shareholders, as well as the liquidation of these companies, if any. Shares of companies are registered. Only Japanese citizens and legal entities can hold them. If necessary, the Minister of Industry and Trade may order an audit of the financial condition and assets of joint-stock companies. The Minister may annul decisions of the board of directors of joint-stock companies if they are contrary to the law or the national interest. The preemptive right to purchase oil and coal from companies belongs to the Imperial Government. A certain part of the profit received from the sale of coal and oil is transferred to the state budget. The decree came into force on March 10, 1926.

On August 16, 1926, on the basis of this decree, a meeting of future shareholders was held, at which the Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Joint Stock Company (KKKK) was established, and on August 21, it was officially registered in the register of the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Japan. The main shareholders of the coal joint-stock company were Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Okura, Shibusawa, Sumitomo, and Asano. The company's fixed capital was 10 million yen (200,000 shares), of which 70,000 shares were transferred directly to the joint-stock company, 65,000 were distributed among the founders and 65,000 shares were offered for sale on the stock exchange. In 1927, the company issued a second issue of shares for 4 million yen (20 yen per share). shares for 1 million yen (5 yen per share). In total, in the amount of 15 million yen. By 1934, the company's capitalization was already 20 million yen.

Among the largest shareholders of the company were: Mitsubishi Gooshi (31143 shares), Mitsui Koozan (17925 shares), Okura Gumi (15425 shares), Okura Kishichiro (7500 shares), Kimura Kusuyata (7500 shares), Makita Takami (7500 shares), Asano Soichiro (3000 shares), Kadono Jukoro (3000 shares), Yugawa Kankichi (3000 shares). In total, the register of shareholders of the company at the end of 1928 included 1000 shareholders. At the end of 1934, there were already 2272 shareholders in the register of shareholders.

Kawakami Toshikiho, a former Japanese envoy to Poland, was elected president of the society, the managing directors were: Funada Katsuo, Suenobu Michinari, Hashimoto Kesuboro, Hayashi Ikutaro, Fujioka Jookichi. The members of the audit committee were Asano Sooichiro and Yugawa Kankichi. However, the true, albeit secret, founder of the oil and coal joint-stock companies and their main shareholder, who owned shares through nominees, was the Japanese imperial government. It is known that in March 1926, one of the companies received 1 million yen in cash from 2 army officials, thanks to which it was able to make a contribution of 2.5 million yen, which was necessary for the official registration of the society.

February 15, 1927 the Soviet government agreed to the transfer of the concession agreement from the syndicate of the North Sakhalin coal enterprises "Kita Sagaren Sekitan Kogyo Kumiai" to the joint-stock company "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha"

It should be noted that in addition to large firms, the Japanese government recommended to the Soviet side as potential concessionaires firms with relatively small capital. Under the concession agreement of December 14, 1925 with the Sakai Kumiai company, the latter was granted concession use of the area of 1, 2, 3 and 4 Kuznetsov allotments according to the 1917 land survey (with a total area of 463 hectares) on the west bank of the Agnevo River. used syndicate "Oriental". The concession agreement was almost identical to the contract with Kita Sagaren Sekitan Kogyo Kumiai, except for paragraph 14, in which the share of the Soviet side (royalties) was set at 5% for annual production of up to 50,000 tons of coal and increased by 0.25% for every 10,000 tons, reaching a maximum value of 8% for production of more than 160,000 tons of coal per year.

On February 23, 1926, on similar terms, the Soviet side signed a concession agreement with the Tsukahara Kumiai company (fixed capital of 1 million yen) for a period of 32 years (paragraph 15 of the Treaty).

It should be noted that Tsukahara Kaichiro did not have recommendations from the Japanese government and entered into a concession agreement not on the basis of the Beijing Convention, but as a private person. The concessionaire was granted a concession of an area of 6 square kilometers in the upper reaches of the Kostina River along the western coast of Northern Sakhalin, 65 km south of Aleksandrovsk. which managed to achieve a special tax regime for itself, the Tsukahara Kumiai corporation had to pay all taxes, fees and duties (including local ones) on the same basis as homogeneous Soviet state enterprises operating on the basis of commercial calculation.

Until November 1, 1927, the company was granted the exclusive right to conduct coal exploration in this territory, after which, after providing the received maps and data on explored coal reserves, the concessionaire had the right to apply for the allocation of appropriate areas for coal mining. The contract provided for mandatory financial costs for exploration work in the amount of at least 150 thousand rubles. For the use of the allotted plots, the concessionaire was obliged to pay the government of the USSR a fee of 1 ruble per year per hectare.

In 1926, a geological survey of the Agnevo mine took place. Geologists discovered 8 coal seams, 2.4-2.7 m thick. In 1927, the dormitories were renovated, which could accommodate a large number of workers and had the necessary amenities. However, the mine lacked fire-fighting equipment and safety lamps to illuminate the tunnels.

On June 30, 1927, the company appealed to the trade mission of the USSR in Japan with a statement, in which it indicated that during the summer season it planned to export 20 thousand tons from Northern Sakhalin. coal, for which it needs to use 80-100 workers in the work. On the basis of 17 of the Concession Agreement, the Sakai Kumiai company asked for the approval of a list of basic necessities, food, household items, medicines, etc., which were to be brought to the Agnev mine from Japan. In April 1928, the company signed a contract for the supply of 2 thousand tons. By June 1, 1930, there were 16 thousand tons of coal in the coal warehouse of the mine. Coal.

On September 29, 1927, the Japanese government received a petition from the president of Sakai Kumiai, Sakai Ryuzo. He wrote about the extremely difficult working conditions of enterprises in Soviet Russia. "Deductions for the lease of state property, social insurance of workers, delivery of company equipment to the mines and depreciation of property at high rates, as well as other issues, require coordination with the Soviet authorities at every step and impose extremely complex and troublesome procedures on concessionaires, which complicates their work. In addition to being subject to the tax burden in Russia, these businesses are also burdened by Japanese tax laws and suffer from double taxation as a result. However, the crisis in the domestic coal mining industry reached such an extreme level that we could not get funds for business through the placement of shares.. The financial crisis, the bankruptcy of domestic financial institutions, the closure of factories and the collapse of commercial enterprises have all destroyed the means of financing enterprises located in Russia, and now we are in a situation where we have no choice but to suspend all business. These concessions were obtained by our country as compensation for the "Nikolaev" incident and are of historical importance, so in the eyes of the people of Japan they must continue to exist. At the same time, the entrepreneur, one might say, blamed the Japanese government for providing financial support to two large companies - oil and coal - while being their main founder and shareholder, completely forgot about small companies and did not provide them with any financial subsidy for the development of the business. "We urge you to urgently consider providing us with the same benefits that were specifically granted to representatives of the KKKCC and KKKKK as a fair measure to ensure equal opportunities for all concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin."

However, the government did not hear "an honest entrepreneur who cares about state prestige and historical justice" and no subsidies were allocated to him. Therefore, the economic crisis that broke out in Japan in 1929 finally crippled the company. As a result, 7 permanent workers of the concession were left not only without cash payments, but also without food. For example, in June 1929, the workers of the Agnevsky mine borrowed 7 sacks of flour on a concession in Douai, and for a whole month it served as their main source of food. In order to cope with the financial deficit, in July, part of the concession equipment was illegally sold to a private person.

It got to the point that on August 8, 1929, the mine manager S. Kinoshita was forced to lease the only steam locomotive available under concession to the Sakhalin Regional Finance Department. Moreover, he did this without waiting for the permission of the board of the society in Tokyo, since it was necessary to pay insurance premiums to the social insurance department, and there was no money available. Moreover, to cover the debts of the society, the mine workers borrowed money from friends and acquaintances, but soon they stopped lending to them. The company's wage arrears to its employees on June 2, 1930 amounted to 23,247 yen. Including the head of the mine Kinoshita Shigenar - 9608 yen, engineer Ota Saichiro - 4258 yen, accountant Majima Katsuji - 2520 yen, worker Hashimoto Hitoshi - 743 yen, Chinese workers Yi Kamen Saku - 706 and Ji Zhenhe - 806 yen, translator H.E. Lysenko - 4606 yen. Moreover, on December 3, 1930, the latter was forced to address a letter to the Consul General of Japan in Alexandrovsk with a request to recover his salary from the bankrupt company.

In particular, he wrote: "On the recommendation of the head of the administrative department of the Japanese expeditionary forces, General Takasu Shunji, on May 15, 1925, I was invited as a Japanese translator to work in the office of the society with a salary of 150 yen per month. From the very first month of my work, the society did not accurately pay my salary, except for very small amounts and very rarely. As for the last 3 years before my dismissal, that is, until August 31 of this year, I did not receive a penny at all. So, from May 15, 1925, to August 31, 1930, the society is obliged to pay me a salary according to a certificate issued to me by the company's accountant, Mr. Majima, 5236 yen and 33 sen.

In spite of the fact that the society has not paid me my salary all the time, and in order to hope for the future of the society, I have tried in every possible way to conceal both the financial difficulties and the difficult situation of the society in general, and I have borrowed money for the society from my acquaintances and in my own name. and he himself promised to intercede for payment of my salary. But there is still no information from him..."

It must be said that in addition to the company's wage arrears to its employees, it also owes payments to the USSR budget. As early as February 13, 1928, the representative of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, M.L. Rukhimovich, filed a lawsuit with the Supreme Court of the USSR against the Sakai Kumiai society, in which he asked to recover from the latter 5367 rubles 68 kopecks as rent for the property transferred to the concessionaire, in accordance with 11 and 36 of the concession agreement for the period from December 14, 1925 to October 1, 1927. in which he pointed out that the issue of rights to the property of the Agnevo mine was a controversial diplomatic issue between the governments of the USSR and Japan and therefore the company could not submit to the court any explanations on the claim. By the way, in the ruling of the Supreme Council of the SSSU of November 2, 1928, it was indicated that the original act of transfer of the leased property from the representative of the USSR to the representatives of the concession did not have the signatures of the latter, which, according to 11 of the concession agreement, meant that the concessionaire had not formally accepted the property.

It should be noted that as early as July 1926, letters of notification were sent to representatives of concession companies on behalf of the Sakhalin Mining District about the need to assess the property located on the territories allocated to enterprises. From August 1 to August 5, 1926, the commission consisting of the chairman, assistant head of the Sakhalin Mining District M.S. Shutovsky, senior controller of the Sakhalin District Financial Administration G.I. Simonov and the Commissioner of the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the All-Russian Union of Miners G.N. Kuznetsov, as well as a representative of the concessionaire "Kita Sagaran Sekitan Kogyo Kumiai" Sano Shigeru and mining engineer Aimi Shuji, with the interpreter G.N. Zhuravlev, made an inventory and assessment of the property. On August 6, 1926, the same commission made an inventory and assessment of the Vladimir mine. But if the Vladimirsky mine was recognized by the Japanese as the property of the USSR and there were no problems with the assessment of its property in the amount of 5182 rubles 95 kopecks and the signing of the corresponding act, then with regard to the property of the Douai mine, the representative of the concessionaire S. Sano categorically refused to sign the act of evaluation and lease of the property, stating that the property in the territory of the concession belongs to the company by the right of succession. since it was bought from Mr. Kuznetsov during the occupation.

On August 13, 1926, the acting Consul General A. Suzuki turned to the agent of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Alexandrovsk Mikhailov with a request for a statement by the representative of the union, Mr. S. Sano, and demanded to clarify the grounds for the return of buildings and movable property to the USSR. "The first question on our part is whether the State owns property, buildings which have not been constructed or maintained by State institutions, and therefore the concessionaire cannot find a reason to agree to the proposal that these buildings and movable property should be returned to the Government of the USSR."

On August 27, 1926, the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Aleksandrovsk, M. Mikhailov, appealed to the Deputy Consul General T. Murase with the following answer: Everything that was built on the territory of Northern Sakhalin during the occupation is the property of the government of the USSR and will be leased to the concession during the term of the concession agreement in accordance with Article 10-11 of the agreement. We regret that Mr. Sano refused to sign the inventory and lease of State property, and it must be emphasized that article 11 of the treaty was misinterpreted by him. Mr. Sano's view that coal mine property should be owned is fundamentally wrong. The Soviet Government has legally recognized the North Sakhalin Coal Syndicate from the conclusion of the concession agreement, and Article 11 of the agreement provides that the concession is legally obliged to prepare an inventory of the property and a valuation table for submission to the Sakhalin Mining District, to lease and use the property of the Douai coal mine and to pay an appropriate fee for its use.

On September 8, 1926, the Consul General sent another message to the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Mikhailov, in which he stated that Mr. Sano would not change the views he expressed. Therefore, the Consul General considered it necessary to wait for the result of resolving this issue at the Embassy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.

On December 1, 1926, the Japanese Embassy in Moscow sent an official document to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, which said: "In accordance with the agreements concluded between the Soviet government and Japanese mining companies in 1925, the objects owned by the Soviet government and related to these companies have been transferred to the use of the interested parties. The Japanese government and Japanese businessmen showed their intention to consider property in Northern Sakhalin as belonging to the Soviet government. However, the provisions of the Concession Agreement do not grant the Soviet Government the right of ownership of Japanese property in the concession territory."

On December 21, 1926, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent the following response to the Japanese ambassador in an official letter: "According to reports from the local authorities of the Soviet Union in Northern Sakhalin, representatives of the Japanese concession companies for the development of oil and coal deposits refused to sign the acceptance certificate, since they refused to recognize the property in the concession territory as belonging to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cannot but admit that the said actions of the representatives of the Japanese concession companies are a violation of the corresponding terms of the concession agreement concluded by the said companies. According to paragraph 11 of the concession agreement... In the presence of the representative of the concessionaire, an inventory of the property and an appraisal report shall be drawn up, as well as special reports on the transfer, which shall be signed by the representative of the concessionaire. The actions of the representatives who refused to sign the inventory of the surrender of state property and the appraisal report are clearly illegal. there are no other owners in the concession territory except the Soviet Government... If the property inventory report and the valuation report are not signed, the concession agreements will be terminated..."

On January 19, 1927, the Japanese Embassy in note number 3 confirmed the receipt of note number 11923 of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated December 21, 1926. The Embassy stated that it could not agree with the assertion that, by virtue of the mere fact of the existence of certain acts, property which rightfully belonged to the Japanese Government and subjects, and which they had never renounced, should be deemed to have passed into the possession of the Government of the U.S.S.R. The Japanese Embassy wanted to know on what day and in what order the property changed hands without the knowledge of its owners. Leaving aside the discussion of the principles involved, however, the Embassy cannot but consider that the views of the People's Commissariat do not seem to take into account the notes exchanged at Peking between the delegates of the Japanese and Allied Governments on January 20, 1925, as well as the facts which have since been presented concerning the disposition of Japanese property in Northern Sakhalin.

The above-mentioned notes agree that the work then being carried on by the Japanese in North Sakhalin, both in the oil and coal fields, should continue until the conclusion of concession contracts, as provided for in the Protocol annexed to the Beijing Convention on the same date as the notes. This agreement is final, showing that the property owned by the Japanese in the oil and coal fields will continue to be their property. This property, which was not included in the inventory drawn up by the commander of the Japanese occupation army, changed hands without the knowledge of its owners.

In order to bring the matter to a peaceful settlement, the Japanese Embassy submits it to the People's Commissariat for reconsideration and earnestly requests a satisfactory answer to its previous note.

The Japanese Embassy wishes to add its view to the assertion of the People's Commissariat that the refusal of the concessionaires to sign the acts of transfer of facilities belonging to the Japanese in the concession areas constitutes a violation of the Concession Agreements." The People's Commissariat seems to believe that Article 11 of the Concession Treaties, referring to the facilities of the Union Government, covers all the facilities existing in the concession areas. The People's Commissariat seems to be thus postulating, if the Japanese Embassy understands correctly, on the one hand, that Japanese property in Northern Sakhalin in the oil and coal fields has come into the possession of the Union Government in accordance with Union law, and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the concession contracts themselves implicitly recognize the restitution of property in the concession areas.

The first point has been refuted above. With regard to the latter, the Japanese Embassy would like to point out, first, that the above-mentioned Article 11 does not expressly provide for the transfer of all property in the concession areas, but only that which belongs to the Allied Government, and further, that neither the article in question nor any other article of the concession contracts transfers to the Government of the U.S.S.R. the right to property belonging to the Japanese in the concession areas. Secondly, it should be noted that, given the fact that the concessionaires and the owners of the facilities in question were not identical persons, the issue of the disposal of Japanese property in the oil and coal fields is entirely beyond the competence of the concessionaires and could not, and indeed was not, considered by them during the negotiation of the Concession Agreements. It goes without saying that the oil and coal concessionaires should receive the property of the Federal Government in accordance with Article 11, but there is no reason why there should be any transfer of Japanese property from the Federal Government. Therefore, the embassy cannot agree with the request of the People's Commissariat to convey to the concessionaires the question of the expediency of signing documents on the transfer of property. The Embassy also considers unfounded the assertion that the refusal of concessionaires to sign such documents constitutes a violation of the Concession Agreements.

On June 27, 1928, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in a Note to the Embassy of Japan directly stated that "the terms of concession agreements are inviolable and cannot be subject to any cancellation or change, except in cases of mutual consent of both parties, formalized through the Main Concession Committee. In view of this, the People's Commissariat must note that it is deprived of the opportunity to interfere in the actions of a party that has resorted to the method of resolving a dispute with the other party provided for in concession agreements."

On May 20, 1929, the Japanese embassy sent note number 78 to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, which, in particular, said: "In the opinion of the Government of Japan, the existing disagreements regarding the ownership of some property of Japanese concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin can be resolved only through negotiations between the two Governments, and in fact these negotiations are underway."

In response to this note, on July 8, 1929, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent the following note to the Japanese embassy: "... The People's Commissariat considers it useful to note that the essence of the dispute between the Japanese concessionaires in Northern Sakhalin and the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR has never been and could not be the subject of negotiations between the Government of the USSR and the Japanese Government, since the latter is not the body provided for in the concession agreements with the corresponding Japanese firms as an instance for resolving disputes arising from the practical application of these agreements.

After long legal and diplomatic ordeals, on January 31, 1930, a meeting of the Civil Collegium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held under the chairmanship of M.I. Vasilyev-Yuzhin and members of the Collegium N.N. Ovsyannikov and F.V. Lengnik, which considered the claim of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR against the Sakai Kumiai society. In its decision, the court pointed out that on October 20, 1926, the property located in the area of the Agnevo mine was handed over by the government of the USSR to the Sakai Kumiai concession and accepted by the latter, which is confirmed by the witnesses I.K. Ruslanov, M.S. Shutovsky and K.E. Krasilnikov interrogated in the case. The value of the property in 1913 prices was determined at 65,637 rubles 94 kopecks. Based on this, the court determined that the rent for the period from December 14, 1925 to October 1, 1929 was 9,522 rubles 88 kopecks.

The arguments of the defendant in the application of September 18, 1928 that the issue of the right to property located on the territory of the concessionaire is disputable and that negotiations on this issue are being held in Moscow between the Embassy of Japan and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the court recognized as "unworthy of respect", since the procedure for resolving disputes and disagreements between the Government of the USSR and the Concessionaire under the agreement of December 14, 1925 is provided for in clause 35 of the agreement, according to which all these disputes and disagreements are resolved by the Supreme Court of the USSR.

On the above grounds, the Supreme Court of the USSR found the claim to be satisfied and decided to recover the specified amount from the concessionaire.

After the court decision, the opinion prevailed in Japanese business and diplomatic circles that the lawsuit filed against Sakai Kumiai had an ulterior motive: the desire to resolve the issue of property rights in Northern Sakhalin in favor of the Soviet government. Simply put, with this court decision, the government of the USSR wanted to break the resistance of concession enterprises and force them to sign documents on the lease of state property and payment to the state treasury for its use. And he did not have to wait long. On October 4, 1930, the representative of the Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, engineer Nakamura, signed an act of inventory and valuation of property, as well as an act of acceptance of this property for lease at the Douai mine in the amount of 196072 rubles and at the Mgachi mine in the amount of 619 rubles.

In the meantime, on February 5, 1930, the court issued writ of execution No. 140 and on its basis, on June 7, 1930, the head of the Sakhalin District Administrative Department and the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, A.I. Kostin, with the participation of the expert V.L. Drachev and the trustee of the company Majima Katsuji with the translator H.E. Lysenko, drew up an act of inventory of the company's products, consisting of 6457 cubic meters of coal, and took samples to determine its quality and cost. Separately, it was pointed out that all the coal available to the company was mined back in 1924 and contained traces of weathering. All coal reserves were seized. On June 27, 1930, an auction was scheduled for the arrested coal in the amount of 10243.98 rubles, to which the company protested, pointing out that an incomparably low price of 2.5 rubles per ton was set for coal, while in 1928 the company sold this coal to the Nikolaev port at a price of 7 rubles per ton. The company demanded an expert assessment of the cost of coal and asked to cancel the scheduled auction. Nevertheless, the auction took place, but was held without a single participant and was not successful.

In the end, due to a lack of funds, Sakai Kumiai began the transfer of concession rights to its fields to Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha on June 16, 1930, with the consent of the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade, and by August 31, the transfer process was completed. But this was done without the knowledge of the Soviet side, with the help of the transfer of rights to trust management. That is, from a formal point of view, the contract remained in the name of Sakai Kumiai.

The new owner did not hesitate and already in August 1930, the mine was inspected for half a month by the associate professor of the Imperial University of Hokkaido Sugiyama and his students Kisaburo Yashima, Hiroshi Ozaki, Ito Ichiro, Seichi Mabuchi, Junichi Iwai, Yuji Nagasawa. The results of the survey showed that the mine was completely abandoned.

As a result, work in Agnevo did not begin and only 2 watchmen and the "confidant" Katsuji Majima were at the mine for a long time. They lived exclusively on the money that was provided by the payment for a leased steam locomotive, which was operated by various Soviet organizations and in the end, in 1933, its last tenant - the Alexandrovsky port - burned the grate of the locomotive, as a result of which it was out of order. Over the repair and further lease, a whole diplomatic battle took place between the "trusted" and the head of the West Sakhalin Mining District, I.K. Leonhardt, in which the Japanese consulate and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR were involved. As a result, it turned out that the Sakai Kumiai company was almost liquidated as a result of bankruptcy back in 1929, and everyone simply "forgot" about its Sakhalin concession. And even after clarifying all these circumstances, the Soviet side did not annul the concession agreement, although there were all formal legal grounds for this.

Another concession, Tsukahara Kumiai, has never commenced operations and has not been able to exercise, at least partially, such as Sakai Kumiai, its concession rights by transferring them to third parties. What is known is that in June 1926, employees of the Shimomei Geological Company, inspecting the location of the concession area, found that it was one of the most densely forested areas on the West Coast, and it would take much longer than planned to survey and demarcate there. And, of course, a huge amount of money will be required later, which will need to be invested in clearing the site and new equipment for coal mining. According to the report compiled by engineer I.A. Preobrazhensky, the occurrence of coal in the concession area was determined in 6 seams, of which he had already discovered 3 seams.

As a result, at the request of the representative of the company, the Soviet side extended its permission for coal exploration until December 31, 1929, but did not undertake either the construction of buildings and structures on the island, or the delivery of workers and equipment to the island of Tsukahara Kumiai. It is only known that the total cost of conducting reconnaissance and paying administrative personnel from February 1926 to June 1930 amounted to 284 thousand yen. Therefore, according to 11 and 34 of the concession agreement, the Soviet side had every reason to terminate it. However, for political reasons, the Soviet side recognized the termination of the treaty earlier than 1930 as inexpedient. On October 10, 1929, the company received a notification that the concession agreement with it was terminated on January 1, 1930, but only on May 25, 1930, on the basis of a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the contract with this company began to be considered terminated. Thus, the only really working coal mining concession enterprise on the island was the Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha.

It should be said that the concession agreement brought great disappointment to the expectations of the Japanese concessionaires, since the Makarievsky allotments and the VI Semenovsky mine near Cape Rogatiy were excluded from the concession. And it was there that the Japanese carried out a lot of preparatory work. But the Soviet side found a legal excuse, declaring that these areas had already been concessioned to the firm "Kunst and Albers", which in 1923 registered the documents issued by the tsarist government for 4 Makariev allotments in the Douai area and 4 Anastasiev allotments in the Mgachi region in the commission of the Dalprombureau, thereby confirming its rights to them. Of course, this was just a ploy to prevent the Japanese from getting a "tasty piece of coal." The Japanese side decided to "buy" the rights to the Makariev allotments from Kunst and Albers and in 1927 reached an agreement with the latter on the assignment of rights. But on July 19, 1927, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR did not approve the agreement on the transfer of rights. In April 1931, the Makariev branches of Kunst and Albers and the Pilva branches of the Briner Trading House were nationalized.

By its decree of May 8, 1926, the Far Eastern Concession Commission (Dalkoncesssky), established under the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee by the resolution of the Bureau of the Dalrevkom of March 17, 1923, was entrusted with the general supervision of the implementation of concession agreements and informing the Main Concession Committee about the state of affairs on Sakhalin. For effective control over the activities of concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin, a special commission was formed under the chairmanship of a representative of the Sakhalin Revolutionary Committee. It included representatives of the People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Labor and Agriculture, as well as the head of the Sakhalin Mining District and his two deputies, who were engaged in supervising coal and oil enterprises in the Soviet part of the island. The commission was in charge of labor protection and organization of the delivery of workers, control of the import of equipment and supplies, development of deposits and organization of production, safety measures, supervision of the general situation at the concession, organization of assistance in relations with local authorities, etc.

After the conclusion of the concession agreement, the Japanese began to carry out preparatory work. Already in the summer of 1926, new mining equipment was delivered to Douai, and the repair of the pier and narrow-gauge railway began. In September 1928, "belt conveyors" (belt conveyors) were installed at the enterprise for the mechanical supply of coal to ships, which made it possible to increase the loading of coal by 20,000 tons per year.

During the period of the concession in the area of the Duiskoye deposit, the company developed 8 mines. Initially, coal was mined in mines number 1 and 2 (opened in 1920), mines 3 and 4 (started operating in 1924), then, in 1927, mine number 6 was laid, in 1928 mine number 7, in 1930 - mine number 8-1, in 1934 - mine number 8-2.

According to the production plan, from 1927 to 1932, the Japanese planned to extract and export to Japan 815 thousand tons of coal from the Douai mines, 305 thousand tons from the Mgachinsky mine and 75 thousand tons from the Vladimir mine. A total of 1195 thousand tons.

On May 30, 1927, a general meeting of shareholders of the company was held in Tokyo, at which a report on the company's work since its foundation was presented. In particular, in 1926 the company produced only 9048 tons of coal. According to the company's business plan, the annual production of coal was to increase from year to year and by 1935 to reach 300 thousand tons. However, the high cost of labor forced the company to make maximum use of drilling equipment and transporters in order to significantly reduce the use of manual labor and reduce the cost of coal mined. Already in the 4th year of operation, the Company's mines were to be equipped with all the necessary equipment.

However, the rapid rates of coal production in the mid-late 1920s slowed down significantly in the second half of the 1930s, and the dynamics of coal production during this period was subject to serious fluctuations. In Soviet archival documents there is data that in 1925 the Japanese concession enterprise in Northern Sakhalin produced 13,071 tons of coal, in 1926 42,700, in 1927 115384, in 1928 110,550, in 1929 111625, in 1930 120833, in 1931 131,050, in 1932 125555, in 1933 140,160, in 1934 160,160, in 1935 186700, in 1936 178800, in 1937 45823, in 1938 5170, in 1939 1571 tons of coal. In total, 1604815 tons were mined in 1925-1942.

Archival documents of Japanese statistics show that during this period, 1,664,010.37 tons of coal were mined and 1587301 exported to Japan.

Table XI

Coal Mining and Export by Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Coal Concession 1925-1942

For the first two years, the coal concession, according to the developed production plan, was supposed to work in a deficit mode, although, according to the documents of the Main Concession Committee, in 1926/27 the concession received a profit of 80 thousand rubles, while extracting coal for 431 thousand rubles and exporting it for 360 thousand rubles.

However, according to Japanese archival documents and accounting documents of the joint-stock company, in 1926-1928 the concession worked at a loss, but already from the 1929 operational year it began to make a profit (in yen), according to the table below.

Table XII

Profit and loss account of the joint-stock company in 30.08.1926/31.03.1927 - 01.04.1937/31.03.1938 operating years (in yen).

Exported coal was mainly supplied to the metallurgical plants of the Japanese corporation Nippon Steel. The table below shows the distribution of Du coal in 1928 and 1936.

Table XIII

Distribution of Export Coal from Northern Sakhalin in 1928 and 1936

According to the Concession Agreement, instead of general and local taxes, the concessionaire paid a single tax in the amount of 3.33 percent of the value of the extracted gross output, 4 percent for the lease of property, as well as a share deduction from 5 to 8 percent, depending on the amount of coal mined. In the 1926/27 operational year alone, the Soviet side received 19,325 rubles from the concessionaire in the form of various payments, and in the 1927/28 operational year 58,750 rubles. In total, in 1925-1930, the concessionaire's payments to the state amounted to 106,800 yen. In 1928-1934, the concession paid the Soviet side in the form of a share of 31.5 thousand tons of coal.

However, before it had time to start working, the concession faced a peculiar interpretation of the concept of a "single tax" by the Soviet side. Local authorities immediately demanded that the Japanese company pay customs, stamp, office and excise duties. Only after a long correspondence between the Japanese consulate and embassy with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Japanese entrepreneurs managed to "fight off" most of the tax payments. The issue of port dues was resolved for a long time. Only on June 4, 1926, the Main Concession Committee in its telegram number 6431611 confirmed that by the order of the TSUMOR NKPS given to the head of the Nikolaev port, the concessionaire was exempted from collecting port dues at the points of loading and unloading on Sakhalin Island. In the port points of mainland Russia, port dues were to be collected from the concession on a general basis.

Immediately, like the devil out of a snuffbox, an order from the local regional finance department jumped out of the box about the immediate payment by the concession enterprise of taxes on the consumption of tea, sugar, silk fabrics, knitwear, cigarettes and refined alcohol. Moreover, a demand was made to pay tax in foreign currency. The Japanese company immediately sent complaints to the consulate, the consulate to the embassy, and the embassy sent a note of protest to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, stating that if the local "tax authorities" did not abandon the concession, then all losses from the collection of such taxes, according to 6 of the concession agreement, the Japanese side would demand compensation to the Government of the USSR. Such a threat had a result, and society was exempted from tax claims for some time. But, leaving the legal person alone, the Soviet side took up individuals, that is, the workers of the concession. First of all, this concerned the income tax introduced on Sakhalin in October 1930, and if there were no problems with Soviet and Chinese workers, then Japanese workers preferred to receive only part of their wages. And the rest, at their request, was transferred to families directly in Japan. Of course, income tax was not paid to the Soviet budget from such a "hidden" part of the salary. In addition, the Japanese administration kept most of the accounting in Japanese, in accordance with the rules adopted in Japan. The Soviet side constantly demanded that the Japanese administration keep accounting records in Russian and according to the rules adopted in the USSR, and for failure to comply with this demand, it threatened to bring the administrative elite to criminal responsibility. But the Japanese declared that they kept records to the extent required of them by Japanese law, published them in the Japanese press and did not intend to make any changes in this regard.

In February 1932, the government of the USSR introduced a one-time fee for the needs of cultural and housing construction (cultural and housing collection), which also included employees of concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin. Depending on earnings, it ranged from 18 to 140 rubles, and with a salary over 500 rubles - 35%. The received salary of the fee had to be divided by 8, and the resulting amount (for example, 18:8 = 2.25) was subject to deduction from the employee's salary. In addition to Soviet workers and employees, the Japanese also had to pay the fee. It should be noted that from February 1, 1932, the concessionaire most carefully withheld and transferred the tax from the Soviet workers, but the withheld tax from the Japanese workers remained in the cash register of the enterprise "until the explanation of the Center." In just 1.5 years, the Japanese side "hid" 945 rubles 40 kopecks from the tax inspectorate.

On June 14, 1934, the Japanese concession enterprises received a notification from the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Alexandrovsk that a surcharge of 10% was established in favor of the Red Cross Society on consular fees paid both in the USSR and abroad. The company informed the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that according to paragraph 20 of the Concession Agreement, it was exempt from all kinds of taxes and fees. And of course, it will not make any additional payments either in favor of the Red Cross, or in favor of the children of Germany, etc.

The issue of insuring the concessionaire's property in Soviet insurance organizations was also painfully resolved. For a long time, representatives of concession enterprises did not want to recognize the property on the territory of their enterprises as the property of the USSR and considered it their property, acquired during the years of occupation. Therefore, they considered it "wrong" to insure this property in Soviet insurance institutions. Later, when the issue of property valuation and lease was resolved, the concessionaires again could not understand why they should insure property belonging to a foreign state, which was imposed on them as a lease. Since we are tenants and pay rent, then why should we also pay insurance, - the Japanese businessmen reasoned. Again, employees of the embassy and consulates general were involved. But this time, too, the Soviet authorities were adamant and almost poked the nose of the Japanese diplomatic representatives into paragraph 30 of the concession agreement, which clearly stated "all buildings and structures... the concessionaire is obliged to insure at its own expense and in the name of the Government." And if you don't like it, then why did you sign the contract??

Upon the expiration of the concession period, the enterprises of the concession company were to be transferred to the Soviet Government free of charge (together with all buildings and equipment) in such a condition that would make it possible to continue work at these enterprises without much effort and difficulty with the extraction of coal in the amount of the average production of the last five years at the concession enterprise.

But for the creation and development of mines and tunnels, equipping them with equipment, and bringing the necessary transport communications, very considerable capital investments were required. The central and local authorities of the USSR constantly emphasized that in the late 1920s and 1930s, the concessionaire's capital investments in the coal industry of Northern Sakhalin were inversely proportional to the extraction of coal. Thus, in 1926, the capital investments of Japanese merchants amounted to 598,600 rubles. in 1927 593100, in 1928 271400, in 1929 100 thousand rubles. P. Sletov explains such a peculiar investment policy of the concessionaire as follows: "The Sakhalin coal deposits, especially the Duyskoye deposits, are distinguished by extremely favorable natural conditions that ensure the profitability of development. The excellent quality of the coal, the thickness of the seams, the proximity of the sea and the terrain, which made it possible to use a natural slope to deliver coal to the shore - all this, obviously, put the Japanese entrepreneur in especially stable conditions... He had little interest in improving coal mining itself, in the mechanization of underground work. Developments are still carried out in primitive ways, not much different from the practice of pre-revolutionary Russian entrepreneurs... And is there any point in spending money on cutting machines, * when it is more profitable and easier to act as a contractor who has organized daily labor, a transporter of products obtained by the muscles of the Soviet and Chinese worker....

In January 1929, the chairman of the district revolutionary committee, E.V. Lebedev, speaking at the First Congress of Soviets of the Sakhalin District, noted: "In the work of concessions, we are constantly faced with the stubborn desire of the concessionaire - to invest as little as possible, and to get as much as possible... Hence our task is to stubbornly fight against these tendencies of the concessionaire..."

However, some Russian scientists believe that the available data on Japanese investments in coal concession enterprises are very contradictory and incomplete. In particular, N.V. Maryasova believes that the main volume of capital investments was made by the concessionaire before 1930 and amounted to 4-4.5 million rubles, and for the entire period of its existence, capital investments amounted to approximately 5.5-6 million rubles.

Japanese archival documents give us the following picture of the concession enterprise's investments in the island coal industry (in yen): 1926 - 3854291, 1927 - 1252828, 1928 - 224763, 1929 - 144543, 1930 - 95764, 1931 - 154098 yen. In total, for 6 years, 5726287 yen. Taking into account the exchange rate difference between the market value of the yen and the ruble, it can be argued that the capital investments of the concessionaire significantly exceeded the amount of 6 million rubles. Note that according to the statutory documents of the company, out of 10 million yen of the authorized capital, 6 million were to go directly to the development of the concession territory, namely: 2550000 yen for the development of the mine, 2150000 yen for the purchase and delivery of equipment for coal mining, 1300000 yen for the purchase, rental and charter of vehicles. Thus, by 1932, the funds provided by the Company as capital investments were almost completely spent.

On March 31, 1932, according to the act of audit of the joint-stock company, it was established that out of the 2430 thousand yen planned for expenditure on Sakhalin coal enterprises for 1925-1931, 7290 thousand yen were actually spent, including wages, purchase of goods for the supply of the company's employees, chartering of ships, purchase and felling of fastening timber, delivery of materials and equipment, etc. The costs exceeded the original estimate by 3 times.

By the beginning of 1933, according to the audit report carried out by representatives of the head office in Tokyo, the concession enterprise had three conveyors equipped with 800 meter vibrating belts with a capacity of 65 hp, one conveyor with an 800 meter vibrating belt with a capacity of 75 hp, one pneumatic press with a capacity of 25 hp, three drilling machines "Hammer", 8 pneumatic drilling machines for coal mining, 12 Hitachi coal mining units. The mines also had compressor units with a capacity of 20 hp, (2 pcs.), 10 hp (4 pcs.), 7 hp (2 pcs.) and 3 hp (3 pcs.).

In the early 1930s, jackhammers began to be used at the concession enterprises, which made it possible to significantly increase the labor productivity of miners, especially in comparison with state enterprises (6 tons and 4 tons of coal per shift, respectively).

For artificial ventilation of the mines, there were 7 local fans and 1 main Sirocco fan. When pumping groundwater from the mines, 18 drainage pumps were used. For the operation of electric motors both inside the mines and on the surface, a power plant built in November 1927 was used, equipped with 2 generator sets with a capacity of 300 kW each. Subsequently, another 300 kW was installed. generator.

For coal storage, the company had several coal warehouses. The first such coal depot with a capacity of 1000 tons was built on the coast in the summer of 1927. In October 1927, a 272-meter-long ramp with a maximum coal transportation capacity of 25 tons per hour was completed from the mouth of mine number 6 to the coal warehouse.

In 1928, for an uninterrupted supply of coal for loading, the concessionaire built a concrete warehouse with a capacity of up to 2000 tons of coal near the pier. And in July 1929, the construction of a coal loading station was completed, a belt conveyor went from it to the pier, from which coal was supplied to the barges through a forked telescopic trough. The capacity of this conveyor reached up to 150 tons per hour with a daily maximum load of 2550 tons. It should be noted that the loading of coal was very successful, reaching 2100 tons in 14 hours of work of Japanese loaders. As a result of its use, coal loading capacity has increased, and the risk of injury during loading operations has been reduced. Simultaneously with transportation, coal was also sorted.

Coal was transported from mines to warehouses through a network of narrow-gauge roads. Namely, the length of the narrow-gauge railway from barrack number 3 to the end of the berth was 4900 meters, to the coal depot of the third mine - 160 m, to the coal depot of mine 2 - 260 m, to the coal depot of mine 1 and mine 6 - 400 m, to the coastal coal depot - 160 m.

Trolleys were used to deliver coal from the mines to the warehouses. In 1925, their total number was no more than 200, with a capacity of 0.65 tons each. By 1933, there were trolleys in the following quantities: mine number 3 - 130 pcs., mines number 1 and number 6 - 150 pcs., mine number 2 - 150 pcs., mine number 4 - 150 pcs., coastal coal warehouse - 180 pcs. From 1924, the delivery of trolleys was carried out by two Orenstein & Koppel locomotives, with a capacity of 25 hp each.

The trolleys were loaded using belt conveyors. There were 2 conveyors with a capacity of 7 hp, one with a capacity of 5 hp, 3 with a capacity of 3 hp and one with a capacity of 1 hp.

For the shipment of coal by July 1931, the company also had two cable cars with a length of 2822 m and 2550 m. from the entrance to the mine to the coal warehouses, with a maximum capacity of 35 tons per hour.

To transport coal to large-displacement vessels, the company had at its disposal the steamers Sagaren-maru and Dattan-maru with a displacement of 40 tons each, equipped with duplex steam engines with a capacity of 110 hp, as well as the boat "Tomotoma-maru" with a displacement of 20 tons, operating on a diesel engine with a capacity of 25 hp. and the boat "Hokui-maru" with a displacement of 17 tons, with a diesel engine of 23 hp. 17 pcs.

In the first half of the 1930s, in addition to coal mining in Douai, the concessionaire prepared the Vladimirsky, Mgachinsky mines and other concession facilities for operation.

In June 1934, the Vladimirsky mine began its work. A number of preparatory works were carried out at the mine, including the construction of a 570-foot overpass and a coal loading wharf in September, as well as the construction of dormitories No. 48 and No. 166 with a total area of 554 sq.m. and other objects. During the navigation period, 4,000 tons were mined and by September 4, 3,100 tons of coal were shipped to the Dongfeng-maru vessel. The number of workers and employees was very small, about 100 people. In 1935, the company opened new galleries and built a coal warehouse. On September 1, 1935, 8 Japanese, 41 Russians, 2 Koreans and 122 Chinese worked at the mine, a total of 173 people. Coal production in 1935 amounted to 8 thousand tons.

On July 2, 1935, the manager of the company "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha" turned to the trade representative of the USSR in Japan, V.N. Kochetov, with a proposal to exchange coal from the Japanese Vladimir mine for coking coal from the Soviet Oktyabrskaya mine. However, the Soviet side refused.

As for the development of the mine in Mgachi, there is practically no information left in the archival documents. It is only known that from the beginning of coal mining and until 1934, 50,100 tons of coal were mined and 45 thousand tons were exported to Japan at the Mgachi mine. Living conditions there were worse than in Douai, there were about 4 square meters of living space per person. Many apartments were devices for overnight stays. People lived even in attics. They warmed themselves with ordinary brick stoves, and often with metal stoves-barrels. The apartments did not have any communal conditions. People provided themselves with water from wells, which froze in winter. perhaps this description refers to the living conditions of the Sakhalinugol trust, which also had coal mines in the Mgachi area.

The relations of the concession enterprise with its "subcontractors" - the Soviet enterprises "Glavugol", "ASO-ugol" and "Sakhalinugol" - were quite difficult. In connection with the start of work at the Makarievskoye coal deposit, on December 21, 1931, the manager of ASO-coal, Naranovich, in letter number 12-28-4425, notified his Japanese counterpart that, in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 22 of the concession agreement, ASO-coal was starting to lay a dekovil track along the Postovaya Valley to the sea parallel to the narrow-gauge railway of the concessionaire, and was also starting the construction of a pier 150 meters from the concessionaire's pier. The head of the coal enterprise proposed to the concessionaire to send his proposals on this issue no later than December 28, 1931.

The concessionaire did not hesitate to give a "respectful" reply. On December 27, the manager S. Murayama wrote in a letter to the coal industry department of the ASO, number 354: "As a result of a comprehensive discussion of the issue raised by you, we found, to our great regret, the impossibility of agreeing with your scheme, since the laying of a declanging track and the construction of a pier in the area planned by you is not only technically completely impossible, but they will intolerably restrict our work and will threaten the public improvement of our village."

On December 30, 1931, the chairman of the board of the society, I. Kato, wrote to the foreign sector of the Supreme Council of National Economy, the trade mission of the USSR in Japan and the Far Eastern Executive Committee: "Such undertakings not only hinder our operational work, but also trample on the rights granted to our Society on the basis of a concession agreement, and this, in turn, threatens our friendly relations with adverse consequences, to which we cannot but draw your favorable attention. The question of Makariev's recusals is not new. Our representative has repeatedly proved that they are unsuitable for independent profitable development. I tried to convince you of the same thing when I negotiated with the Main Concession Committee in 1930. The project of building a new track running parallel to our tracks is technically impracticable, and moreover, it runs counter to the interests of the ASO, because it is insane to lay new rail tracks just for the development of 300 thousand tons of coal, when for this purpose it is possible to successfully use our existing ones. The company hopes that you will not refuse to take appropriate measures to stop the construction of the road planned by the ASO. As for the export of coal extracted from the Makarievsky mines, in order to resolve this issue, you can, for example, sell us coal in your mine warehouses or hand over to our company the export of your coal, etc."

And, although the workers of the ASO began preparatory work on the construction of their narrow-gauge railway, after the intervention of the Consul General of Japan in Aleksandrovsk, the Soviet side was forced to curtail these works, because the narrow-gauge railway would pass through the territory of the concession, and the concessionaire did not and did not intend to give permission for its construction on its territory to the Soviet coal enterprise.

Thus, the concession "blocked" the possibility of the Soviet enterprise exporting coal from the Makarievsky mine. As a result, on May 2, 1933, an agreement was concluded between the Glavugol trust and Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha on the purchase of Makarievsky coal by the latter, and the Japanese considered this their huge victory. So, in 1936, 50 thousand tons of it were bought.

One of the Sakhalin officials wrote about this: "The question of our Makarievsky mine stands apart. This mine, with its rich reserves of fine coal, is located directly behind the concessionaire's Duya mine, and has no free access to the sea. Thus, in the present situation, the production of the Makarievsky mine can only be shipped through the territory of the Japanese concession, and in fact a situation has arisen in which all the products of the Makarievsky mine have to be sold to the concessionaires... The Makarievsky mine is, as it were, the second concession to the Japanese...

The coal mined and purchased from the Soviet side was exported to Japan on ships chartered by the concessionaire. To deliver it to the pier, a kind of railway was laid along the Duya Valley near the workers' settlement, which did not need any engine. Every 2-3 minutes, a train of 3-4 trolleys loaded with coal rushed along the rails. Due to the fact that the track had a slight slope, there was no need to resort to the services of a steam locomotive.

The trolleys stopped at a giant elevator set up near the pier itself. The elevator received coal simultaneously from the trolleys and from the suspension road stretched to the pier from another mine. The elevator was unloaded from coal, throwing it onto the conveyor belt led along the pier.

The description of loading operations given in the work of P. Sletov is interesting: "On the roadstead, half a kilometer from the shore, a steamer is standing and receiving coal from the kungas. A business-like, gray boat, dusted to black with coal dust, brings empty kungas under the front truss of the loading device, from which coal pours directly to the bottom of the kungas. An endless ribbon, about a meter wide, about a finger thick, moves with a strip of coal evenly poured on it, the steady thunder of heavy scree is heard... The conveyor belt stretches from the shore for almost half a kilometer. There is no end in sight. The spectacle is spectacular. It seems that steamships come from Japan to Sakhalin as to some kind of miraculous inexhaustible coal fall. Coal flows from the hills in a uniform river. The loading device stands on strong concrete bulls that can withstand the pressure of waves during spring and autumn storms. Its upper buildings are wooden, fastened with iron. Obviously, in case the conveyor stops, there is a narrow-gauge railway line around for supplying coal directly in the trolleys... Here is the beginning of the conveyor, which went underground. Here, near the elevator building, there is a rail circle blocked by an electromechanical drum. Trolleys launched from the hills run up here with a roar. They stop near the drum and wait to be grabbed and led two by two inside, into the clamps. The switch is turned on, the introduced trolleys are overturned along with the section of rails on which they stand, and a freshly emptied pair of trolleys appears from the ground, fixed, as an antipode, in the symmetrical part of the drum. With quick, habitual movements, the worker leads her away in order to introduce new and filled ones."

Under the concession agreement, it was envisaged to attract Japanese administrative and technical personnel and Japanese highly qualified workers in the amount of no more than 50 percent and unskilled workers in the amount of no more than 25 percent of the total number. In cases where the Soviet side was unable to provide the concessionaire with the necessary number of workers and employees from among the citizens of the USSR and foreigners residing in the territory of the USSR, the concessionaire was granted the right to hire the missing number of workers at his discretion, including foreign ones.

However, the recruitment of the labor force of concession enterprises began only in 1927, because the Far Eastern labor market was not able to provide the necessary personnel for the coal industry in the usual manner. That is why in the first years after the conclusion of the concession agreement, the percentage ratio was not observed for objective reasons, which can be seen from the table below.

TABLE XIV

Number and Percentage of Soviet and Foreign Workers and Employees in the Japanese Coal Concession in 1925-1928

Japanese archival sources give us slightly different data on the number of employees of the Duya concession, which can be seen from the table below. Moreover, by the word "Russians" the Japanese meant all workers of non-Japanese nationality, that is, both Russians and Chinese.

TABLE XV

Number of employees of Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha in 1926-1932

In addition, the agreement did not clearly stipulate: who should be accepted as foreigners? According to the interpretation of the concession agreement, the Soviet side took Union citizenship as the main measure. The Dui concessionaire considered only the Japanese, but not the Chinese, as foreigners, motivating his actions by the fact that the Soviet labor exchanges themselves sent the Chinese, and this was indeed the case. Therefore, the Soviet side considered that until the work of labor exchanges was straightened out and the supply of labor to Soviet enterprises was radically reorganized, it would be necessary to put up with the presence of Chinese foreign workers, considering them as the most acceptable foreigners.

Recruitment and delivery of labor for concession were carried out by Soviet recruiting bodies, to which the concessionaires submitted their applications in accordance with the established procedure. It must be said that the enterprises of Sakhalin were attracted by an element for the most part adventurous (lumpen-proletariat), and at best easy-going, young, poorly qualified. As noted in the documents of the Far Eastern Concession Committee, stored in the Khabarovsk Regional State Archives, "among all this rabble, there was a significant percentage of the criminal element, deliberately sent by Vladivostok to Northern Sakhalin."

The morale of the workers on the concession left much to be desired. Apart from minor violations of peace and order, only according to Douai, 100 people had a criminal record per 1000 workers. Drunkenness, brawl, mass absenteeism, greed in wages, theft of small items, various equipment, neglect of the sanitary condition of their homes - all this was used by the concessionaire as a means of justifying the preservation of an increased percentage of foreigners. Sometimes the concessionaire put forward direct demands to revise the percentage of Soviet and foreign labor at concession enterprises. The first demarche of this kind was made by the leadership of the concession in connection with the assassination of the Japanese employee Munemasa Isaburo on October 29, 1927. Soviet miner K.V. Streltsov killed the Japanese with a knife in the back when he refused to reinstate Streltsov at work.

This made a great resonance on the activities of the Japanese concession, whose employees massively declared their desire to leave for Japan. The case began to acquire the character of a diplomatic proceeding, in which the Japanese, taking advantage of this event, began to demand not only the pension of the relatives of the murdered man and an apology from the government of the USSR, but even a revision of the concession agreement in the direction of expelling Soviet workers from concessions, and the introduction of Japanese troops to protect the concession.

On November 2, 1927, the Consul General of Japan in Aleksandrovsk, S. Sasaki, wrote to an agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: "The unexpected news of the murder of Mr. Munemas, head of the workers' department of the administration of the K.K.K.K.K. Society in Douai, former worker Streltsov, aroused panic among the Japanese workers and employees in Douai, losing hope for the further development of the concession enterprise, especially since this murder took place in the afternoon during the performance of official duties in the Office in the presence of all employees... To my great regret, I must tell you that recently in Douai there were frequent thefts, hooliganism, about which articles were repeatedly written in the local newspaper on this matter, and in the end it came to murder."

On November 24, 1927, in the city of Aleksandrovsk, a Visiting Session of the Khabarovsk Nikolaev on the Amur District Court on Sakhalin was held under the chairmanship of People's Judge Lebedeva, which considered the criminal case of Streltsov. In the course of the judicial investigation, it was established that "Streltsov Konstantin Vasilyevich, working at the Due mine in the concession enterprise "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha" as a kickback, on August 19, being dismissed for absenteeism without valid reasons, After repeated appeals to the office for his rehiring, having received a refusal and wishing to avenge his dismissal, on October 29, 1927, at about 12 o'clock in the afternoon, having come to the office of the enterprise, he stabbed the Japanese Mr. Munemaso Isaburo in the back, who died from the said wound on the same day about half an hour later in the mine hospital, whose death followed, according to the conclusion of medical experts from hemorrhage, as a result of damage to the left lung, i.e. thereby Streltsov committed a crime under Article 136 of the Criminal Code... His "accomplice"... On October 26, Sergei Stepanovich Mekhov, knowing about Streltsov's repeated statement to take revenge on the Japanese for his dismissal, being sure that Streltsov would not carry out his threats, satisfied Streltsov's request, giving him his knife, with which Mr. Munemaso Isaburo was killed, i.e. by doing so he committed a crime under Articles 17 and 136 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and therefore, guided by Articles 47-48, the court sentenced: G. Streltsov Konstantin Vasilyevich on the basis of Article 136 of the Criminal Code to be subjected to imprisonment with strict isolation for a period of TEN YEARS with loss of rights, after serving the sentence, for a period of THREE YEARS and Mekhov Sergey Stepanovich on the basis of Articles 17 and 136 of the Criminal Code. Criminal Code to be subjected to imprisonment with strict isolation, for a period of TWO years and deprivation of rights for 8 months." But for us, the most interesting point in this sentence is that "the mine worker Sokolov, hearing Streltsov's repeated boasting of taking revenge on the Japanese, wrote a letter to the Society's Office, in which he warned the late Munemasa and Ogato Koreika about the possibility of an attempt on them by Streltsov with a request to be afraid of him. Thus, the Japanese knew about the impending assassination attempt on them, but did not take any measures and did not make a statement to the authorities. Why? The answer lies in the same sentence. "because they did not attach serious importance to this warning and, in addition, they did not receive proper assistance from the local mine militia (emphasis added)."

All these facts of crimes on the territory of the concession were well known to the party and Soviet authorities in Northern Sakhalin. Thus, on April 12, 1928, at a closed meeting of the Sakhalin Revolutionary Committee, the report of the district prosecutor Comrade Shershukov on the situation with crime at the concession enterprise was heard. It was noted that as a result of the measures taken (restriction of the import of alcoholic beverages, cultural and educational work) in the second half of 1927 there was a sharp reduction in crime and hooliganism, with the preservation of a significant number of property and domestic crimes caused by the lack of living space and extreme overcrowding of both family and single workers.

On April 23, 1928, at a meeting of the Sakhalin District Party Bureau, it was decided that it was necessary to evict the "criminal and maliciously hooligan element" from the concession, and the OGPU was asked to take the most decisive measures to prevent unverified workers from entering Douai.

Attempts by the Soviet authorities to improve the quality of the labor force recruited for concession were ineffective. In 1933, the concession supervision bodies noted that the theft of property, drunkenness, and hooliganism on the part of some Soviet workers did not stop. However, up to 80% of offenses and crimes remained unsolved.

Therefore, in the early 30s, the concessionaire sought to increase the percentage of imports of its labor force more and more and, thereby, actually change the ratio established by the concession agreement. This can be seen from the table below.

TABLE XVI

Number and Percentage of Soviet and Foreign Workers and Employees in the Japanese Coal Concession in 1931-1934

By the beginning of 1935, all administrative and technical personnel were exclusively Japanese, despite the treaty. The bodies of concession supervision repeatedly stressed that the concessionaire sought by all possible means to get rid of Russian workers. They were driven from job to job, financially oppressed. Receiving letters of resignation from the workers, the concessionaire refused them, thereby forcing them to absenteeism in order to dismiss them as truants. For example, in 1934, 112 people were dismissed for this reason.

On the other hand, it is important to emphasize the fact that some workers were "Italianila" (that is, when they went to work, carried out production operations as slowly as possible, the so-called "Italian strike"), refusing to work for the "imperialists". There were frequent calls to "break up the office and go on strike" or demands for concessionaires to "dress from head to toe and go on strike." Even the supervisory authorities noted that the concessionaires had no choice but to try hard and issue overalls even to those who, under the terms of the collective agreement and production, were not entitled to it.

Such actions and moods of the workers were difficult to overcome, since their unjustified demands often found sympathy among the party and trade union bodies, which saw in this a manifestation of the class struggle and considered it their duty to support it.

It should be said that even during the negotiations on the conclusion of concession contracts, the Japanese reacted extremely negatively to the idea of the Soviet side to introduce the norms of the Labor Code at Japanese enterprises on the territory of the USSR. On June 22, 1925, the Consul General of Japan in Aleksandrovsk, S. Shimada, appealed to the local authorities with a request for a lenient attitude towards the enterprises operating the coal mines of Northern Sakhalin, and asked not to introduce the norms of Soviet legislation there until the final settlement of this issue at the negotiations. However, the consul was categorically refused. Nevertheless, in 1925-1926, Soviet employees of the labor protection inspectorate had to get acquainted with such phenomena as beatings, a slap on the head at work, etc. Special soap was issued in 200 grams instead of the 400 grams prescribed by the norm.

As a result, the manager of the concession, Sano Shigeru, was prosecuted under Part 2 of Article 132 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and on April 19, 1926, the People's Court of Aleksandrovsk sentenced him to a fine of 3000 rubles. I consider it necessary to draw your kind attention to the following circumstances: The domestic and political aspects of the case did not receive attention and evaluation in court, and the above-mentioned guilty verdict, with a very insignificant content of the charge (failure to issue soap and failure to report to the labor inspectorate about minor injuries received by the workers), was pronounced on the basis of the formal material collected in this case without taking into account the very difficult situation - transitional period - in which Shigeru Sano found himself, as a foreigner who did not know the Russian language and found himself in the position of a person to whom a number of demands were immediately presented in a significant number with the prescription of their immediate execution.

The concession agreement was received by Shigeru Sano only in March of this year, and numerous demands of the labor inspectorate, based on numerous orders, resolutions and explanations of the Soviet government, began to be presented to him on July 20, 1925 and continued on September 8, October 15, November 24, December 2 of the same year, 1925, and resumed on February 16 and March 6, 1926. When the question of concession in one sense or another had not yet been settled, its basic principles and the new relations arising from them were not known.

The insignificant staff of the administration, their lack of knowledge of the Russian language, the often absence of a real interpreter at the mine, created a huge, almost insurmountable difficulty for Shigeru Sano in carrying out sudden various laws and orders, which suddenly fell on him all at once with the order to immediately comply with all these demands. The latter included, for example, such requirements as the acquisition and translation into foreign languages of all laws and explanations related to the mining industry, which were also issued one after another, then with the abolition of some of them and with the explanation and addition of others.

Fulfilling such requirements in the shortest possible time was beyond the power of Russian citizens, who could not always study all these new laws. while doing all the colossal work conscientiously as a foreigner.

Thus, there is absolutely no evidence to conclude that Shigeru Sano deliberately stubbornly violated the law, all the material speaks of his extremely attentive and conscientious attitude to the implementation of laws and orders.

In view of the foregoing, I have the honor to ask you to give your kind attention to the materials of this case as soon as possible, since the case is being heard in court on July 10 of this year, and to render your authoritative objective opinion on it. For my part, I believe that the most objective assessment of this case is not only possible, but also necessary, since it may have great fundamental and practical consequences in the sense of the further development of business and economic relations between the USSR and Japan..

As a result, on July 21, 1926, the session of the Vladivostok Regional Court, having heard the cassation appeal of Sano Shigeru, ruled that the arguments of the complaint "have no respect", but at the same time, when reviewing the case, it turned out that there was no defense lawyer of the accused at the trial, which was a violation of Article 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR. As a result, the verdict was overturned, and the case was sent for a new trial.

However, the threat of criminal punishment did not improve the work of the concession manager. Already on July 29, 1926, during the inspection of the Duisky mine by labor inspector G.M. Poplavsky, the latter found that the company's office books were kept inaccurately, there were no internal regulations for workers and employees, some workers did not have paybooks, employees worked 1.5 hours a day, and workers worked 10 hours a day on watercraft, and seven days a week. Vacations were not granted to workers and employees for 1926, and 12 Japanese workers did not receive compensation for unused vacation for 1925. Many workers were not given overalls, and 300 loaders were given white cotton gloves instead of the prescribed mittens. The survey found that residential barracks number 30-32 were absolutely unsuitable for habitation, and the houses under construction could not accommodate all those living in the above-mentioned barracks.

In connection with this act, the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Northern Sakhalin, M. Mikhailov, addressed a message to the Deputy Consul General of Japan in Alexandrovsk, Muraso Teiji, in which, in particular, he wrote: "... this is not the first time that cases of violation of the labor legislation of the USSR at the coal enterprise in Douai have been discovered, and therefore I, my dear sir, am compelled to draw your attention to the need for appropriate instructions to the trustee of the society, Mr. Sano, to eliminate the violations that have been discovered... I would like to note that our authorities found it possible to satisfy Mr. Sano's petition to relieve him of penalties solely because of the recent term of the concession agreement, insufficient assimilation of Soviet labor legislation and, mainly, because of the unwillingness to introduce dissonance into friendly relations (emphasis added).

The repetition of violations of Soviet labor legislation at the Douai plant in more prominent forms indicates that the company's trustee, Mr. Sano, has not taken any measures to comply with the instructions of the labor inspectorate given to him on June 26 of this year to eliminate the violations, and that the violations are becoming protracted.

Respected Mr. A. Suzuki, who left for Japan, the former Acting Consul General of Japan in Alexandrovsk, in a conversation with me, expressed a desire to eliminate the second case of violation of the Labor Code in the Dui enterprise by administrative means, without subjecting Mr. Sano to legal responsibility, assuring me that the Consulate General of Japan entrusted to you, Sir, would make the necessary explanations. I cannot but agree with Mr. Suzuki's desire to put an end to violations of the Labor Code in the Dui enterprise in a milder and mutually beneficial way....

After the conclusion of concession agreements, the norms of Soviet labor legislation, an 8-hour working day, social insurance were introduced at concession enterprises, and the Soviet side proposed to the Japanese to immediately begin to develop and conclude a collective agreement, which was signed on September 13, 1926 by the authorized concessionaire Kato Isoso and representatives of the Union of Coal Miners of the USSR. The agreement applied to all workers and employees of the concession, regardless of their citizenship. The preamble stipulated that it did not apply to the director of the concession, the head of mines, the power plant, the store, the chief accountant and his deputy, legal advisers and the director's personal secretary.

In case of violation of the contract, the company undertook to compensate for the resulting damage incurred by the company's employees, stipulated the terms of hiring and dismissal, all kinds of benefits and compensations to workers and employees.

In the documents of the central party and state structures, it was emphasized that wages at the Japanese coal concession were much less than at Soviet state enterprises. For example, on January 1, 1926, the average salary in concessions barely reached 30 rubles per month. Workers demanded a 70 percent wage increase, threatening to go on strike if they refused. In the end, the concessionaire agreed to increase wages by 30 percent. By April 1, 1926, the average salary at the concession enterprise was 40.5 rubles, while the average salary at the mine of the Communal Services was expressed in the amount of 87 rubles 41 kopecks.

After the conclusion of the collective agreement, all employees of the enterprise were divided into 12 categories, assigned depending on the complexity of the work performed and the level of qualification. Employees of the 1st category included messengers; the 2nd category included watchmen, lamp carriers; Employees of the 3rd category included bath attendants, wind racers, water and coal carriers, breed selectors, sealers, cleaners, laborers; The 4th category included diggers, lamp makers, haulers, plate diggers, brakemen-guides; The 5th category was assigned to sailors, helmsmen on kungas, sawyers, grooms; The 6th category was received by loaders, road trackmen, stokers, loggers, hammer breakers, rakers. Starting from the 7th category, highly qualified workers went. So, the 7th category was assigned to underground wagoners, bonkers, horse drivers and machinists; The 8th category was awarded to carpenters, masons, camerons, bolters, pawnbrokers on steeply dipping seams, coopers, blacksmiths; the 9th category included the professions of locksmiths, electricians; the 10th included drillers, boilermakers, lugers, metal turners; Category 11 was awarded to firers and miners of the highest qualification. No one received the 12th category.

Among the administrative and economic personnel, the 3rd category included sellers, the 4th category - clerks, typists, timekeepers and translators, the 5th category - clerks, statisticians, draftsmen; The 6th category included foremen, cashiers, assistant warehouse managers, accountants; in the 7th category there were warehouse managers; Grades 8 and 9 included experienced translators; The 10th category was assigned to accountants and the 11th category was awarded to mining technicians. However, the concessionaire did not transfer workers from one category to another in a timely manner, which led to conflicts. It should also be noted that when hiring workers on the mainland, the concessionaire established a personal category for each worker. Upon arrival at the enterprise, the category was lowered. To the requests of the workers to the labor department to clarify this situation and transfer them to the category indicated in Vladivostok, they received the answer: "There is no other work, the one we give, work on it." The situation was similar in the case of secondments of workers to work, where there were cases of using workers not in their specialties.

In 1927, the monthly salary of an employee of the 1st category was 19.5 rubles, for a hauler of the 6-7 categories 48.5 and 54.6 rubles, respectively, for a miner of the 8-9 categories 60.45 and 68.35, for an underground foreman of the 10th category 81.96 rubles. Thus, the earnings of a slaughterer were 120-140 rubles, a hauler - 80-90 rubles.

In 1929, after the conclusion of a new collective agreement, wages increased slightly. Thus, the average earnings of a slaughterer amounted to 5.93 rubles, a worker in the enterprise 3.83 rubles and an employee 4.06 rubles per day.

It should be noted that in the second half of the 1920s, the Soviet government decided to financially support workers going to work or moving to the outskirts. On May 11, 1927 and May 26, 1928, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued decrees "On Benefits for Employees of State Institutions and Enterprises in Remote Areas of the USSR" and "On Benefits for Workers Sent to Work in the Kamchatka and Sakhalin Districts. Okhotsk and Olsky districts of the Nikolaev district and the Selemdzhinsko-Bureinsky district of the Amur district of the Far Eastern Territory." These decrees established for workers the abolition of income tax and military service, the right to use free timber for personal needs, free hunting and fishing, as well as percentage supplements to wages in the amount of 10% for each year of continuous work experience, with the condition that the total amount of allowances could not exceed 100% of the salary. In the summer of 1930, the Sakhalin Labor Inspectorate tried to extend these decrees to concession enterprises. The Japanese side was directly ordered not only to start paying percentage increases to employees, but also to recalculate all those who worked on concessions at the time of the adoption of these resolutions. On June 18, 1930, the trustee of the company sent a letter to the Mining Committee No. 90, in which he stated the following: "If the interpretation of the resolution given in your letter is approached superficially, without taking into account the comprehensive circumstances, then we can come to the conclusion that in certain cases and to certain workers this decree can be applied at our concession enterprise. On the other hand, considering Article 7 of Protocol B of the basic Japanese-Soviet Peking Convention, which is based on our concession, it is clear that the enterprises will not be subject to such taxation as would actually make their profitable exploitation impossible, and that the Doues concession, although it has existed for 4 years and has no profitability at all, seems to us to be well known to you and no confirmation is required. It is therefore quite natural to conclude that, so far as the past is concerned, the question of the future will be left open for the present, the Society should be exempt from all taxes or restrictions, to say what form or name they may have, apart from those already imposed on it. The society does not admit the idea that the Government of the U.S.S.R. would wish to take a one-sided position on the path of belittling certain principles provided for in the Japan-Soviet Convention or to ignore this Convention to any extent, since such a state of affairs would naturally affect the international confidence in the U.S.S.R., and, on the other hand, would especially undermine confidence in the Japanese-Soviet friendly rapprochement, and since the Government of the U.S.S.R. has no intention of violating the concluded treaty, then it is quite understandable and I would like to believe that, in accordance with the spirit of the above-mentioned Convention, it will not allow our Concession Society, recommended by the Japanese Government, to be overloaded with unbearable taxes that could lead to a complete collapse. Thus, we are deeply convinced that only for this reason, not to mention others, this regulation on %% allowances is not applicable to the Company. If the Mine Committee demands the application of this resolution at all costs, then, recognizing this issue as very important and of a fundamental nature, the Society finds it necessary to submit it by diplomatic means to the Center for resolution."

On August 6, 1930, the secretary of the special commission for the supervision of concessions, Uralsky, sent the following document to the coal enterprise: "The Commission received a statement from the District Labor Inspectorate about the refusal of the concession to pay 10% of the preferential allowance to the workers of your enterprise, in accordance with the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 11/V-27, and of 26/V-28 Concession enterprises, with the exception of persons who do not belong to the number of citizens of the USSR, if they are brought to work from abroad, and also that the question of a 10% surcharge has already been considered in relation to the Oil Concession KKCKK /Okha/, and in this case the center has resolved the issue in the plane of the obligation for the concession of this payment, - the Special Commission proposes that you immediately make a calculation for the payment of a 10% surcharge to the employees of the concession, suitable for the action, paragraph I of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. I ask you to urgently notify the Special Commission about the following."

On August 9, the company replied to the special commission: "As far as our concession enterprise is concerned, the latter categorically cannot recognize itself as obliged to pay preferential allowances... On July 16 of this year, our head office in Tokyo referred the solution of the question to the Main Concession Committee in Moscow....

On August 28, 1930, a telegram came from the Main Concession Society that the decree of May 26, 1928 applied to the enterprises of the concessionaire, this decision was final and reasoned and would not be considered in view of the indisputable nature of the issue.

Meanwhile, on August 12, 1930, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted Resolution No. 42/2046 "Regulations on Benefits for Persons Working in Remote Areas of the USSR and Outside Large Urban Settlements". It abolished the regulations on benefits of 1927-28, and with them disappeared the benefits for free material benefits in the form of hunting, fishing, and free timber. But income tax and military service returned to the island. But the obligation of employers to pay salary supplements has migrated to the new resolution. And now it applied to employees of concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin, with the exception of foreign workers.

On July 23, 1931, the Japanese embassy in Moscow appealed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with the following note: "The Far Eastern Regional Committee of the Trade Union of Miners informed the Japanese concessionaires on Sakhalin that the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 12, 1930 also applies to workers at concession enterprises on Sakhalin. The Japanese Government is of the opinion that the application of the said Regulation to Japanese concession enterprises is contrary to the provisions of Clause 7 of Protocol B annexed to the Convention on Fundamental Principles of Relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. on the following grounds:

1. If the said Decree is also applied to persons employed by the Japanese concession enterprises on Sakhalin, Soviet, Chinese, and Korean workers employed by the above-mentioned enterprises, other than the Japanese ones, shall enjoy privileges during the period before the entry into force of this Decree, which will impose unforeseen obligations on the Japanese concession enterprises. According to the calculation of the Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha Joint Stock Company, the costs that it has to bear due to the application of the said decree amount to an enormous amount. As these expenses will increase from year to year, the Society, now as well as in the future, can have no advantage whatsoever if it has to bear such heavy obligations. The application of this resolution, therefore, deprives the Company of the possibility of profitable operation of its enterprise.
2. Further, this provision on benefits establishes discrimination between Soviet and foreign citizens and will upset the unified management of employees carried out by the Society, as a result of which the concession enterprises will be deprived of the possibility of proper conduct of business. Such discrimination between Soviet and foreign citizens is established precisely by the instruction of the NKT of November 1, 1930, issued in furtherance of the above-mentioned provision, according to which Japanese workers currently working and Japanese, Chinese and Korean workers hired in the future do not enjoy any benefits at all. In practice, this will inevitably cause discontent among employees who do not enjoy benefits, which naturally hinders the management of employees at concession enterprises, and will be an obstacle to the normal operation of the enterprise. To remove such an obstacle, the concession company will have to provide employees who do not enjoy benefits with appropriate benefits. However, it goes without saying that the material condition of the Society does not allow it to bear such a burden. Therefore, the Society only has to refuse to hire such workers. Thus, the above-mentioned provision can be regarded as excluding foreign workers, and having the purpose of replacing them with Soviet workers. Concession enterprises, for which it is necessary to have Japanese, cannot carry out their activities under such circumstances.
3. As can be seen from the history of the establishment of this provision and its contents, it aims at encouraging access to work for the development of industry in remote places of the USSR. If there is a reason why the obligations arising from this provision should be imposed on government organs, enterprises, institutions and social organizations under full material protection, it is by no means fair that such a provision, which has the special purpose of encouraging earnings, should apply to Japanese concession enterprises and thereby force them to bear very heavy obligations. as a result, they will not be able to operate profitably.
4. As is known, Japanese concession enterprises are not simple, but are based on the Beijing Convention concluded between Japan and the USSR. It goes without saying that in applying any laws to Japanese concession enterprises, the Soviet Union must first and foremost take into account the provisions of Clause 7 of Protocol B annexed to the said Convention. As can be seen from the above considerations, the application of such a special law as the provision on benefits serves to gradually oppress enterprises and to hinder profitable operation, which ultimately deprives them of the opportunity to carry out their activities. In view of this, it is impossible not to consider the application of this provision to concession enterprises as a clear violation of the provisions of paragraph 7 of Protocol "B" annexed to the Beijing Convention.

In bringing to the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the foregoing, the Japanese Embassy has the honour to request that it take urgent measures to ensure that the above-mentioned provision on privileges, which is contrary to the provisions of the Peking Convention, is not extended to the Japanese concession enterprises."

In the meantime, the company's accounting department made calculations and determined that for 9 years of operation of the Duisky mine, from 1927 to 1936, the employees of the enterprise would be paid only percentage increases in the amount of 1015755 rubles. Therefore, the Japanese administration, without further ado, began to conclude employment contracts with employees for a period of 1 year. Everything was logical here. For the first year of work, allowances are not paid. And in the second and subsequent years of work, an employment contract was not signed with the worker, but a new one was hired, who had not yet "earned" the allowances. As a result, the concession lost experienced workers from among Soviet citizens. Japanese and Chinese citizens did not receive allowances, so the concessionaire did not attempt to "oust" them from the enterprise.

In the Japanese archival documents there is a copy of the collective agreement signed on August 26, 1930 in Khabarovsk by representatives of the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the Union of Miners of the USSR I.T. Glavatsky and P.G. Lomakin and the representative of the society "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha" Ozawa Ninosuke. According to it, in 1930/31 the tariff rates of the categories were set according to the following tariff scale:

TABLE XVII

Tariff scale established at the Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha enterprise in 1930

For all underground tunnelers, miners and drillers, 20 working days per month were established, for bolters 22 days, for other underground workers - 23 working days. It should be noted that after 3 years, the number of working days for underground workers was reduced, and at the same time there was a significant increase in wages, which can be seen from the table below.

TABLE XVIII

Concession wages for 1933 (excluding Japanese workers)

At all jobs, piecework payment was provided, and where this was not possible, time-based wages. A 6-hour working day was established for underground work, workers on the surface and employees worked 8 hours a day. For overtime work, an allowance of 50% was established for the first 2 hours of overtime work and 100% for subsequent hours.

In the documents stored in the former party archive of the Sakhalin Region, there is information that in 1934 the average monthly salary of a miner was 150 rubles, a hauler - 80, a locksmith - 70, a surface worker - 50 rubles. For comparison, let's say that the earnings of a hauler in Soviet mines at that time were about 360 rubles per month. The Labor Inspectorate noted that the concessionaire systematically reduced wages, due to the lack of fixed prices and firmly established rates for piecework. The concessionaire maneuvered payment by the piece, chord and daily, and the results of these "maneuvers" were always in favor of the concessionaire. For example, if during piecework, in the opinion of the concessionaire, the earnings of workers turned out to be excessively large, they were transferred to daily surface work. After a while, the concessionaire offered the workers to return to the "piecework", but on different terms, with less pay. Workers who did not agree to the concessionaire's terms were kept in menial, superficial work, thereby forcing them to agree to new working conditions.

However, the Far Eastern researcher N.V. Maryasova notes that it is impossible to accurately determine the real and nominal amount of wages due to the fact that foreign citizens received part of their earnings upon returning to their homeland, and in the reports of Soviet and concession monitoring bodies, there is a clear tendency to understate it, which also applied to domestic workers. For example, in 1927, the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Northern Sakhalin, V. Aboltin, reported to the center: "Although I am sending you data on the average level of wages, I would not advise you to use them, since they are unlikely to give a real picture. For example, Chuprikov (chairman of the District Trade Union Committee) himself admits that only a group of Chinese unskilled workers was taken to Douai to derive the average wage. Therefore, it is not possible to derive average wages and compare them with other mines, as is done in the reports. The figures do not reveal the actual earnings at all, since the supply of concession workers with consumer goods relatively cheaply is not taken into account, which significantly increases their wages in comparison with the komkhoz, etc."

According to the collective agreement, the Company undertook to supply employees with good-quality food and consumer goods in the amount and at prices as shown in the table below.

TABLE XIX

Commodity products and clothing allowance purchased by the concession workers at the rates and prices established by the collective agreement for 1930.

Clothing allowance

In addition to the above-mentioned norms, the Company provided employees of Eastern nationalities with the following commodity products and consumer goods: a) workers of Japanese nationality were entitled to 20 kg of rice, 1 3/4 kg of soybeans, 2 kg of beans, as well as 2 pairs per year of three types of national Japanese shoes (tobi, geta and takajo);

b) workers of Chinese and Korean nationality were entitled to 20 kg of rice, 1 1/2 kg of soybeans, 4 kg of beans, 200 grams of garlic, and 3 pairs of shoes and one summer and one winter national costume per month.

With regard to supply, it should be noted that in the second half of the 1920s there were interruptions all the time and there was a shortage of certain goods. In 1927, the main interruptions were observed in the supply of meat, which, from early spring to the 25th day of August, was issued 2-3 times a week in insufficient quantities and not enough for everyone. There were always queues near the butcher shop, and part of the queue left with nothing. For example, on July 27, 1927, more than half of the mine workers were left without meat, the next sale of which was only on August 1-2. There were systematic interruptions in the supply of vegetables used by Russian workers, there was no lard, fish, herring, caviar, etc.

The supply system was quite complex, so if a worker needed to get a particular product, he had to spend 3-4 hours for this. The workers' settlement stretched along the Dui valley for 2 versts. The shop was located at the end of the village where the administration lived. This situation forced the workers to carry food on their backs for 2 versts, making 4 versts back and forth to buy something. Since the workers ate artels of up to 50 people, they had to carry food weighing up to 60 poods weekly, which was extremely inconvenient for them. An all-Japanese administration could not properly accommodate the needs of European workers. In order to change the situation, on November 10, 1927, an employee of the office, A.F. Frank, was seconded to the material department of the concession, who tried to take into account the needs and requirements of Soviet workers in food requests.

However, supply tensions persisted. For example, in the summer of 1929, the concessionaire intended to bring up to 300 heads of cattle from Korea to Sakhalin in order to provide workers with fresh meat. However, this delivery could be carried out no earlier than the middle of August, and therefore on June 5, 1929, representatives of the society raised the issue of reducing the monthly norm of supplying workers with meat to 4 kg, and replacing the rest with corned beef and dried meat, which was available in sufficient quantities. The Union did not object, but at the same time proposed to reduce the price of a can of corned beef by 0.5 kg from 58 to 42 kopecks per piece, as well as to increase the supply of workers with fresh fish, which was sold at that time extremely rarely. As a result, 200 heads of cattle were brought in during the navigation of 1929, which arrived in an exhausted state, and after slaughter the meat turned out to be of poor quality.

In 1930, the problems with the supply of workers with commodity products continued to grow. On March 3, 1930, the concessionaire announced that in March and up to April 15 there would be no fresh meat, and the society proposed to issue canned meat only to workers in the amount of 5 kilos underground and 4 kilos to other workers, the families of workers were deprived of canned meat altogether. The society also announced the need to reduce the issuance of cow butter, which was running out. Canned milk was relied on 6 cans for a child under 8 years old, and from March 1, the society began to give canned milk only to children under 2 years old and only 4 cans. Salted fish was not on sale at all. However, as compensation, the concessionaire proposed to increase the issuance of sugar by 500 grams per person and lard by 1 kilo per underground worker.

The Mine Committee suggested that the regulatory authorities urgently bring the concessionaire to justice and allow the workers to be absent from work at the expense of the concessionaire, using Article 5 of the collective agreement; The workers suffered from malnutrition from exhaustion, which could lead to various diseases, especially since there was an outbreak of typhoid fever at the concession.

The chairman of the Mining Committee wrote: "It should be taken into account that for each kilogram of meat not given to the worker, the concessionaire puts more than 2 rubles in his pocket (more than 2000 eaters), because 1 kilogram of meat costs the concessionaire more than 3 rubles. In our opinion, the fear of the Okrug Party Bureau that the local Sakhalin authorities would be to blame for the lack of meat from the concessionaire is completely unfounded, since as early as July 1929 the company knew that it had been denied the procurement of meat both on the DCK market and on Sakhalin, and it told us that it would take measures to provide the mine with meat through the Japanese market (see copy of the minutes of negotiations No. 39 of July 5, 29). In conclusion, I inform you that the mood of the workers, if they learn about the proposals of society, may result in a strike. They did not have time to inform the workers."

In the opinion of local party and economic bodies, in the matter of supply, the concessionaire pursued a policy of systematically reducing the import of essential goods and food and increasing the import of luxury goods and perfumes.

For example, in 1927, the concessionaire submitted an application for the import of leather bags, watches, postcards, wristwatch straps, watch chains, wallets, stationery, drawing tools, drawing paper, etc.

And if in 1928 goods worth 800 thousand rubles were imported from Japan for the concession, then in 1930 the delivery of goods amounted to 1200 thousand rubles.

Japanese archival documents give a slightly different breakdown of the amounts spent on the purchase and delivery of products and goods for concession.

TABLE XXX

The expenses of Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha for the purchase of essential goods, wages to employees, share deductions to the Soviet side and tax payments.

"The trading talent of the Japanese is reflected in the diverse selection of the imported assortment. Respect for the product. The size of the room helps to hide the constant crowd of buyers-workers, caused by the incredibly complex procedure for controlling the pick-up books, which exceeds the patience of the Soviet consumer... A set of products in concession stores is 30 rubles. This set fully meets the food standards, but is released according to the collection books under strictly strict control. You can't buy anything beyond it. And with the high cost of the Sakhalin free market, the rest of the earnings of the concession worker does not give him any opportunity to replenish his table and somehow improve his life at the expense of purchases on the side," P. Slyotov wrote about the concessionaire's trade.

At the same time, a terrible food crisis broke out in Northern Sakhalin. All stocks of flour were reserved. But even in this case, "the monthly norm per eater was 800 g of bread, 850 g of sugar, 1 kg of fat, 1.9 kg of cereals, 330 g of pasta, 2 kg of corned beef, 100 g of tea." However, fish and venison saved ...

The same butter, which was not available on the island, and in the stores of the European part of the country it was sold for 50 rubles per kilogram, was sold at the concession for 1.90 rubles per kilo. So the workers of the concession enterprises, with their norms of supplying cheap Japanese goods, had to feel "like under communism."

In the first half of the 30s, supply issues became the main reason for friction between the coal concession enterprise and the administration of the West Sakhalin Mining District (UZSGO), since according to the concession agreement, the prices for goods received from abroad were approved by the head of the mining district. He also signed a permit to the Soviet trade mission in Japan to import a certain amount and names of commodity products and clothing allowance for concession.

In February 1931, a trustee of the society in a letter to the head of the UZSGO drew attention to the fact that "what is especially striking and runs like a red thread through all the correspondence about the delivery of commodity products is the restriction of the import of those items that are vital consumer items for the Easterners, from the point of view of their customs and entertainment. The Society hopes that the UZSGO will not refuse the courtesy to consider our request again in the sense of lifting the restriction or prohibition of importation, and in addition, it will take into account that sake, whiskey and wine, which you have also banned from import, are absolutely necessary not only in terms of items necessary for medicinal purposes, but at the same time, these drinks, especially sake, are consumed not only for the taste of the Japanese table. but they are not yet replaceable both from a religious point of view and by the traditions of Japanese custom in certain occasions of Japanese life (New Year, funerals, religious rites, illness, etc.).The boss did not give the "go-ahead" for the delivery of sake and whiskey, but it is known for sure that the Japanese workers used part of the ration of white rice given to them to make homemade sake. In this they did not differ from the Soviet workers, who were also very good at distilling moonshine from wheat or potatoes obtained on concession.

On June 19, 1933, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR sent I.K. Leonhardt, who was also a special representative of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, to the post of head of the UZSGO. It was granted the right to resolve all current issues of mutual fulfillment of the concession agreement by the parties and to negotiate with representatives of the concession company on all emerging issues. Well, in fact, the old-school Bolshevik was sent to Sakhalin to "rake the Augean stables" left by his predecessors. With the appointment of a special commissioner, there was no need for a special commission to supervise concessions, which was disbanded in July 1933.

Ivan Kondratievich began his activity quite briskly and precisely with the issues of supply. On July 26, 1933, he wrote to the trustee of the Society: "Your commissioner F. Baba was promised to provide information in yen for the approval of prices for commodity products. Please speed up the sending of this data."

On July 29, the company in its response number 80 indicated that "we provide you with calculation sheets for the approval of prices and the company cannot provide you with anything else."

"In this case," wrote I. Leonhardt on August 17, 1933, "when approving prices, I am forced to use the only source available to me, the Cargo List, which you submit to our trade mission in Tokyo, indicating the value of CIF Sakhalin goods in yen. Thus, the prices for commodity products exported from the ship "TSURUGI-SAN-MARU" are approved by me in the following order: the cost of commodity products CIF Sakhalin in yen is based on the price indicated in the cargo list, to this cost is added the % of the surcharge on trade expenses in yen, these two components make up the total trade value in yen. In order to determine the selling price of commodity products in chervon calculation, the yen is recalculated at the official exchange rate announced in the newspaper "Izvestia" by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the day of sale of these goods...

And then it became clear that the newly minted head of the mining district stepped on the "most sore callus" of the Japanese. In a reply letter dated August 19, Gomamoto's confidant of the company, Tsuta, wrote that "such a decision is absolutely unacceptable for the Society for the clearest and simplest reason, namely, that it in its essence directly threatens the Society with the impossibility of the further existence of the enterprise, not to mention its profitable operation."

It was precisely the exchange rate of the yen against the ruble. In 1925, at the then introduced official rate, 1 yen was equal to 79 chervon kopecks. After the initialing of concession agreements, disagreements arose between the Soviet and Japanese sides over payment for concessions. In an attempt to control financial transactions in order to prevent the fall in the value of the ruble in the Far East, the Soviets tried to change the provision that the transfer and conversion of funds could be carried out either through the Soviet State Bank or through a branch of a foreign bank (i.e., the Vladivostok branch of the Bank of Korea), and to limit all transactions to the Soviet State Bank. As a result, when importing goods from Japan, companies began to face the problem of converting Japanese and Russian currencies, which put them at a disadvantage. The Japanese regarded this as discrimination against concessionaires and accused the Russians of bad faith. In the end, a compromise was reached: the main part of the contract was amended to meet Soviet demand, but a memorandum was made public in which the Main Concession Committee stated that concessionaires could use the services of the Bank of Korea as long as it continued to carry out money transfers and exchange rubles (a right that the Soviet government could revoke if it felt the value of the currency was threatened). It should be noted that in 1928 the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin sold goods to local workers, based on the Japanese yen exchange rate of 87.7 sen per ruble until September and 89.4 sen from October of the same year, and this rate was 34% higher than the rate of the State Bank.

It should also be borne in mind that the course of forced industrialization announced at the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 18, 1925 led the USSR to an economic and financial crisis. The lack of budget funds for capital investments in the construction of new plants and factories was compensated by increasing retail prices and emissions. Between 1928 and 1932, the money supply increased fivefold. Mass-market goods disappeared from stores, where they were sold at state fixed prices. The standard of living of the population was declining.

In a secret telegram No. 103 dated May 31, 1930 addressed to Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, the Consul General in Alexandrovsk, Sasaki Seigo, wrote: "The Russian foreign exchange market is falling from year to year, and the current "chervonets" is now not much different from the Russian currency at the beginning of the First World War... People complain about the lack of food, clothing and supplies, they are almost starving...

On February 17, 1931, the Vladivostok branch of Chosen Bank received an order from the Finance Department of the Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee to draw up reports for the liquidation of its activities within 3 months. In addition, the bank received an order to immediately pay an additional tax to the treasury in the amount of 2,610,000 rubles. In March, the branch of the Korean Chosun Bank in the USSR was closed, and its final liquidation on the territory of the Soviet Union took place on July 15, 1931.

As a result, Japanese concessions could not convert yen into rubles at the market rate. And if the market price of the ruble in the Chosen Bank in 1928 was 58.2 sen, in 1929 35.3 sen, in 1930 25.7 sen, then the "official" value of the yen in the State Bank of the USSR in 1930 was 1.1 yen per 1 ruble, in 1933 1.04 yen per 1 ruble. Thus, the official exchange rate of the ruble exceeded the market rate by 5-6 times.

As a result, in the conditions of transition from the market economy of the NEP to the administrative-command planned economy, the chervonets turned from a bank note into an unsecured Soviet banknote, supported within the country by administrative measures.

In connection with the ban on the free sale and purchase of ruble currency by agreement with the Soviet side (agreement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan K. Shidehara and the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Japan A.A. Troyanovsky of April 26, 1931), Japanese fishing concessions were allowed to purchase bonds of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Company at the rate of 32.5 sen per 1 ruble and subsequently use them to pay off various payments. The coal concession of Northern Sakhalin decided to take advantage of this opportunity and acquire shares of ASO by analogy. However, the Soviet side did not support this idea.

Naturally, the currency crisis directly threatened concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin. Already in 1931. The Japanese Consul General wrote to the Japanese Foreign Ministry: "The receipt by the Soviet Union of yen at the official rate has recently become more and more obvious, and this trend, combined with the payment of payments to the Soviet side in foreign currency, will intensify in the future. In the current working conditions, we must pay for wages, vacations of workers, the cost of hiring labor and the purchase of local materials. It is necessary to pay the costs of concluding contracts, various insurance premiums, fees to trade unions, public fees and other expenses in the amount of about 700,000 rubles per year (according to the estimate, 200,000 yen, based on the market exchange rate of the yen). Thus, the cost of the concession project will increase by more than 500,000, and it will fall into the category of unprofitable." And indeed, when calculated, it turned out that the company's costs in the 1931-1932 financial year increased by 522,150 yen only due to the difference between the official and market exchange rates of the yen! And this is not counting fines, compensations, legal costs and other unforeseen fees and payments.

Workers need to be paid wages, but where can they get them? It is necessary to exchange yen for rubles in a state bank at an extortionate rate! Fortunately, the bulk of the workers received most of their wages in food and clothing allowances according to the norms of the collective agreement.

The concessionaire had the last means of obtaining Soviet currency in cash on the territory of Northern Sakhalin and paying with the money received the cost of rent, insurance premiums and other mandatory deductions - marketable goods brought to supply workers from abroad, which he sold at the market price and at the market rate of the yen. Of course, this did not include basic necessities, for which fixed prices were set under the collective agreement, and they did not change for a decade and a half. But all kinds of ladies' toilets, perfumes, powder, tweed suits and other consumer goods were safely sold by the concessionaire to his employees, and they just as happily resold them to their friends and acquaintances, not disdaining to sell Japanese goods on the "black market" and at prices that were sometimes 10 times higher than the purchase price in the concession store.

And so, the "speculative" policy of the Japanese came to its sad end, because these goods also had to be sold at the "official" exchange rate of the yen to the ruble, as a result of which the goods cost 2-3 times cheaper than their cost in Japan, excluding delivery!

It must be said that the Soviet government did not fight against speculation in Japanese goods on the island. Fought. On March 30, 1931, in the village of Douai, a group of OGPU officers broke into the house of the worker Vasilenko and searched there until 2 a.m., as a result of which a large batch of Japanese-made goods was seized, and the worker was taken into custody. The next day, similar searches were carried out in two dozen other houses, and their owners were also arrested. Soon after that, an employee of the administrative department of the concession, the head of the warehouse, A.F. Frank, was arrested, who was suspected of aiding and abetting speculators (on January 14, 1932, he was sentenced to three years of exile under Article 58-6). Together with him, the translator of the concession G.N. Zhuravlev was detained (on 14.01.1932. sentenced to 3 years in prison under Article 58-6). Arrests were also made in the settlements of Korsakovka, Mikhailovka and Oktyabrsky. However, rumors soon spread that the real reason for the arrest was not at all speculation in Japanese goods, but the fact that a few days before the GPU action in the club of the village of Mikhailovka, unknown persons painted a message to the Japanese government "to overthrow the Soviets on Sakhalin."

On April 11, 1931, the Consul General of Japan in Alexandrovsk, S. Sasaki, addressed the Agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in Alexandrovsk with a message: "I have the honor to inform you that the many simultaneous arrests that have recently taken place among the workers and employees in the Duya Concession Society have really dealt a great blow to the production work of the concession, as well as among the workers and employees. In this regard, the difficult situation of the Concession Company, which has recently been experiencing in terms of the operation of the concession, is further aggravated. I ask you not to refuse the courtesy of appealing to the appropriate authorities, to finish the interrogations of the arrested as soon as possible and to alleviate the situation of the enterprise."

May 28, 1931 Consul General in Alexandrovsk S. Sasaki in a secret telegram No. 84 addressed to Baron Shidehara informed the latter that since September 1930, strict checks of the luggage of arriving workers had been carried out at the concessionaire's enterprises in order to stop the transportation of contraband, and since the closure of Chosen Bank, the GPU bodies "day and night have been conducting inspections aimed at suppressing the illegal outflow of currency from the concession."

They tried to fight Japanese goods in Northern Sakhalin not only with a "stick", but also with a "carrot" - with the help of bringing Soviet goods to the island. Thus, on August 15, 1933, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), it was decided to establish the following annual norms for supplying the population of the island.

TABLE XXI

Annual Supply Rate for the Inhabitants of Northern Sakhalin in 1933

But even these seemingly significant norms were incomparable with the norms on oil and coal concessions.

TABLE XXII

Comparison of prices for goods sold by the concessionaire in Douai, the store of the Sakhalin Trading Trust and the bazaar of Alexandrovsk (January 1934)

As can be seen from the table, the prices for the concessionaire's goods were lower than in the prices in the Sakhtorg store, not to mention the sky-high market prices. And at the same time, the management of the UZSGO accused the concession enterprise of regularly raising prices for imported goods without raising the wages of workers.

At the same time, it was the disorder and inconsistency in the actions of the Soviet authorities that disrupted the plans for the delivery of Japanese goods to the concession enterprises of Northern Sakhalin. In 1934, I. Leonhardt wrote: "There was a directive from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Trade Mission gave permission for import within the limits of the average annual wage fund, and the Trade Mission refused to issue a license for a steamer with goods that left Japan on May 14, 1934 on the grounds that that he does not have a plan for the delivery of commodity products approved by the Head of the Mining District. The steamer arrived today with 700 tons of cargo, of which: 111 tons of perishable goods (potatoes, fresh fish, green greens, fresh apples, eggs, etc.) The customs arrested this cargo, but the Trade Mission, despite the telegraphic instructions of Comrade Lyubimov, who referred to the directives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, did not answer. It turns out to be another scandal. The concessionaire is running around, indignant, and I don't know anything."

In 1934, a trustee of the society wrote: "The main reasons why the society has been able to make a profit to this day are as follows: the right of the head of the mining department to approve the prices of food products is limited by the prices of essential goods, and this right should not extend to other goods that are not essential goods and imported from Japan."

It should be noted that from the legal point of view, the concession agreement was drawn up so ugly that it allowed the interpretation of its clauses in a way that was beneficial to each of the parties. Thus, paragraph 17 of the contract stated that the supply of goods and products of prime necessity was carried out by the concessionaire at prices approved by the head of the mining district. And the Japanese rightly interpreted this paragraph in such a way that the boss could only approve the prices of basic necessities. For everything else, the concession can set prices freely. But the contract did not spell out what exactly is considered essential goods. And the Soviet side, taking advantage of this, decided that from now on absolutely everything that is imported by the concessionaire will be considered essential goods.

In 1935-1936, the situation in supply matters became even more aggravated with the arrival of V.I. Andzelevich as the head of the UZSGO. On November 15, 1935, he abolished all prices for goods previously approved by his predecessors, and in fact revalued them. The concessionaire stated that he, despite such actions, would release the goods for sale at previously approved prices, because the actions of the head of the West Sakhalin Mining District were illegal. However, the concessionaire explicitly indicated to the concessionaire that the goods were being brought to the island by him to supply the workers of the concession at cost, and not for commercial sale. Of course, said V. Andzelevich, the mining district agrees to revise prices upwards on the condition that the company provides it with certified invoices confirming the cost of imported goods. For trading at unapproved prices, he threatened administration employees with criminal prosecution, and promised to confiscate illegally sold products and goods.

And here we see a violation of the Concession Agreement on the part of the head of the mining district. He could only approve or not approve the prices submitted by the society, but he could not arbitrarily set his own prices for goods.

A representative of the company said that goods at the newly approved prices will not be sold at all. In this case, the Company can take these goods back to Japan, in accordance with the concession agreement, the head of the mining district told the concessionaire.

Concessionaires' enterprises were equated in status to state trusts. But although they were granted privileges in the use of forests, in duties and share deductions, concessionaires were not exempt from deductions for social insurance, the maintenance of medical care centers at enterprises, the organization of vocational training, etc.; Providing benefits for timber, the Soviet side counted on free apartments for workers and families, the construction of houses, hospitals, clubs, etc. by concessionaires.

At the first district Congress of Soviets, E.V. Lebedev noted that "the concessionaire invests considerable sums in production, in the capital equipment of production itself, but when the question of the need for housing construction, protection of mineral resources is asked, then the concessionaire tries in every possible way to evade our vigilance... We must counteract this desire of the concessionaire, achieve 100 percent of the fulfillment of the concession agreement, which provides for the necessary costs for housing construction and for the satisfaction of other needs of the workers..."

However, the living conditions under the concession in the mid-1920s were the most difficult. The workers were provided with housing only for 50 percent of their needs. Many lived in tents and barracks built by the workers themselves. On February 1, 1927, 1 worker had 1.2 square sazhens (5.46 sq.m.) of living space, and in the dormitories of Chinese workers there were double bunks. There were no houses for family workers at all. By May 1, 1927, the size of the living space, despite the construction of houses and dormitories, was reduced to 0.78 sq. sazhens (3.55 sq.m.) per 1 employee.

According to the concluded collective agreement, no later than July 1, 1927, the society had to provide its employees and family members with serviceable and equipped housing with an area of 8 sq.m. for 1 person, equipped with kitchens and washbasins. Each dormitory had to be equipped with a warm dryer for drying wet clothes and shoes. The company undertook to repair the premises at the request of the residents, as well as to carry out internal whitewashing of the walls at least 2 times a year, and in family dormitories at least 1 time a year. Each family apartment had to have a dining and kitchen table, 1 stool for each tenant, a dustpan, a box for coal, 2 buckets and 1 poker, as well as a ladle for drinking, 1 wooden tub or iron tank (123 liters) for water and 1 washstand.

In the dormitories for single workers, there was 1 table and 1 bench for 10 people, 1 locker and 1 bed with a mattress for each resident, 1 stool for 3 residents. Each kitchen at the dormitory was allocated 1 cauldron for cooking, 1 cube for boiling water, 1 stove, 1 tank for raw and 1 tank for boiled water with a mug, a box for coal, a scoop, a poker, as well as a brush or a Chinese broom for cleaning. Utilities were provided free of charge.

But, alas, in the dormitories the workers lived in crowded conditions, there was no proper cleanliness, there were no garbage pits and garbage bins near the dormitories, as well as storerooms for storing things and food, which polluted the dormitories even more. There were no houses for family workers at all, so they huddled in dormitories, so to speak, "on a common basis".

The concessionaire was well aware of all these points, but he did not pay much attention to them and continued to receive new workers, knowing full well that the workers would live in an even more crowded environment. Therefore, the trade union bodies and local authorities forced the administration of the coal concession on Douai to build new premises for workers. In 1927, 12 residential buildings were put into operation and work began on the construction of 3 barracks. And no measures were taken to insulate the premises, as a result of which it became cold in the dormitories with the onset of cold weather. On October 13, 1927, at a meeting of the RKK, the concessionaire was asked to start insulating and repairing the barracks, and in agreement with him, the deadline for this work was set at one month. But this decision was not executed by the concessionaire. In 1929, one concession worker already had 5.8 sq.m. living space, but in 1930-31 the situation with living space deteriorated again. According to the inspection report of the housing inspectorate, in 1930 there were 4.54 sq.m. for each tenant and there were cases when 3-4 families lived in one room. The manager Murayama Shikonasuke explained this by the fact that "when starting a job, the worker appears alone and is given an apartment, that is, an established living space, but then he discharges the family from the mainland, there have been many such cases. By the time of the inspection by the labor inspector, according to our calculations, there was a surplus of living space among bachelors of 258 m'. The audit report of the inspection of the living space by the labor inspector was provided to the trustee, which indicated that the shortage of living space was expressed in 1200 m', but when the trustee did not agree with this, this figure was redone by a thousand square meters. There were dryers and storerooms near each barrack."

Japanese archival documents show that at the beginning of 1933 the concessionaire had 135 buildings with a total area of 20,875.8 square meters.

TABLE XXIII

Number of buildings, structures and area of housing stock of the coal concession in 1933

Thus, the living area under the concession amounted to 13,468.5 sq.m. That is, 1 employee should have had at least 11 sq.m. However, many of the workers lived with their family members. As well as completely "uninvited" tenants. Namely, employees of mine committees, clubs. The premises of the concessionaire were occupied by the police department, the food cooperative, the OGPU department, the school, the post office and the hospital and other outsiders, and their families (a total of 917 sq.m. in 1931). Thus, on August 1, 1928, there were 38 people, on 01.04.1929 - 63 people, on 01.08.1929 - 100 people, on 01.04.1930 - 95 people, on 01.04.1931 - 113 people, on 01.08.1931 - 87 people, on 01.04.1932 - 141 people.

According to the documents of the former Sakhalin party archive, by 1934 the total living area on the concession was 3500.2 sq. m. "It's completely incomprehensible. Thus, each of the 863 employees of the concession had 4 sq. m. According to the collective agreement, 6288 sq. m. was required. There were no common areas in the barracks themselves (laundry rooms, storerooms). As a result, all this led to overcrowding, dirt, storage of things in the corridors, laundry in the kitchen, etc.

The society maintained baths at its own expense, purchased consumable medical materials, there was even a round-the-clock medical carriage to deliver seriously ill patients to the Duya hospital, and when the latter recovered, back to the apartment. Despite the fact that, under the terms of the concession agreement, the concessionaire made special deductions for social needs, he maintained at his own expense a hospital with 10 beds and 9 medical workers in Douai. The head of the hospital in Douai received 300 rubles a month, 3 paramedics-obstetricians 120 rubles each, 4 orderlies 60 rubles each.

The society also undertook to build various kinds of cultural and educational institutions on its territory: clubs, red corners, etc. The concessionaire also repaired the hospital building, and a club was built.

According to the contract, the company provided certain categories of employees with a set of overalls free of charge. Namely, trousers of light or canvas fabric, canvas or leather mittens, rubber gloves, respirators, goggles, knee pads, waterproof suits, wadded jackets, leather boots or boots, canvas hats, canvas or leather aprons, in winter additionally fur coats, felt boots with galoshes. The period of use of various items of workwear was determined from 6 months to 3 years or until wear and tear.

According to the concession agreement, the company was supposed to hire students of the city industrial school. The collective agreement stated that the number of teenage apprentices should be at least 6% of the average number of concession workers. After graduation, students who passed the final exam were hired by the company for permanent work.

With regard to apprenticeship, it should be noted that there was no actual training, apprentices were not attached to individual skilled workers for training and worked independently according to their own understanding. (Apparently, the concessionaire saved a 5-10% bonus to workers for training). Also, students were not given theoretical training. The trustee of the company, S. Murayama, promised to fulfill the promises made earlier, to fulfill the relevant clauses of the collective agreement. But, in his opinion, among the students sent to the enterprise by the allied bodies, there were many who were distinguished by a very bad character and bad behavior.

Workers dismissed by the company (with the exception of those dismissed at their own request or for absenteeism), as well as the families of deceased workers or those mobilized into the Red Army, were not subject to eviction from the apartments they occupied and enjoyed all utilities during the period of lack of navigation and inability to leave the island. Workers were granted 12 days of vacation annually and an additional 6 days of leave for each year of uninterrupted service.

It should be noted that the Japanese occupied a privileged position in the enterprise, because they lived in relatively better premises, were paid 50-100 percent higher than Chinese workers, not to mention the attitude of the administration towards them.

I would like to say that many researchers mainly write about life on the concessions of Soviet workers, paying little attention to the Japanese who came to the island. Even during the occupation of Northern Sakhalin, the military administration signed contracts with Japanese workers from the city of Karatsu in Saga Prefecture, Kyushu Island. After arriving on the island, due to climate change, some men often fell ill and could not work. It is worth emphasizing that the Russian population of the island has long used the term "karatsu" as a synonym for the word "workaholic" or, in modern terms, "workaholic".

In order to recruit Japanese workers and administrative personnel, the joint-stock company entered into a recruitment cooperation agreement with three government recruitment agencies (one might say, recruitment agencies) in the Saga, Aomori, Iwate, and Hokkaido regions. Every employee who signed an employment contract with a firm was also required to take a written oath of office to the following effect before leaving for the island:

A written oath for those going to Northern Sakhalin.

I_______________________________ entering into an employment contract with Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha Company, solemnly swear:

1. Do everything in my power to carry out the orders of my superiors.

2. Sincerely engage in labor ministry and refuse to trade unions, ideological issues, etc.D.

3. I pledge not to say or do things that may tarnish the honor of our country abroad.

4. Going to Sakhalin, I must have weapons, maps, medicines and, of course, personal belongings, money, as well as a supply of clothes, bedding, etc.

5. If I, working on Sakhalin, decide to leave before the expiration of the contract of my own free will, then the payment of travel is at my expense.

6. During my service in Northern Sakhalin, I hereby undertake to purchase only Japanese-made goods.

7. If the Soviet side tries to recruit me during my work in Northern Sakhalin, I undertake to immediately inform the company's management.

Signed_______________________

Date___________________________

It must be said that in social terms, Japanese and Chinese workers and employees even had a certain advantage over the Soviets. On July 3, 1932, the CNT of the RSFSR sent a circular explanation to all territorial and regional social insurance funds, which indicated that foreign citizens had the right to receive social benefits for disability in the maximum amounts, regardless of the duration of employment. A foreign worker who is a member of a trade union received 100% of his salary, and a non-union member receives 75% of his earnings for the first 15 days of being on sick leave, and 100% of his earnings for the rest of the time. Moreover, in the first three months of work, foreign workers had to receive 100% sick pay, regardless of whether they were members of a trade union or not.

The Soviet authorities also paid pensions and benefits to victims of a work-related injury or occupational disease, and in the event of the death of an employee, a survivor's pension was assigned to his family. For example, the pension for the family of the Japanese employee Munemas, who was killed in a concession, was established by a decree of the Pension Sector Commission of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, namely: Munemas' wife Hisan until July 1, 1933, daughter Takalo until 1936 and daughter Kodushi until 1934.

From the messages and telegrams of the Japanese diplomatic staff of the Consulates General of Japan in Okha and Aleksandrovsk, we tried to compose a kind of short essay about the life of the Japanese workers of concession enterprises in the northern part of Sakhalin Island.

"Although the question arose in Japan of the adoption of trade union laws based on the spirit of cooperation between labor and capital, the "Soviet" labor code, which was entirely based on the interests of the workers, regulated all working conditions in the USSR. However, among the Japanese workers there is not a single worker who is a member of a trade union organization whose members are subject to the benefits of these labor laws, increased wages, an eight-hour day, vacations, social insurance, and other conditions comparable to those of Soviet workers. This should be enough to hammer into the minds of Japanese workers how strong the "Soviet" Labor Code is, and yet they do not demand that their companies comply with the "Soviet" labor law or collective agreements, do not ask them unreasonable questions. Why? Japanese workers are afraid that they will be rejected by the company's authorities, blacklisted, and not hired anywhere after returning to Japan, so they have no other choice...

The advantages of the labor legislation of the USSR are visible only on paper, so they do not have any psychological impact on Japanese workers. And even despite the numerous vacations, short working hours and a large amount of free time, there are no permanent entertainment or comfortable facilities in the concession area that could be used, and there is no place for walks outside the territory of concession enterprises. The lack of a place to walk outside the house forces Japanese workers to spend their leisure time in dark and cramped dormitories...

Many Japanese came to the island for the "long yen", hoping to work well and earn decent money during the contract. And suddenly... The working day is 8 hours, overtime work is allowed only in agreement with the labor inspectorate. And what kind of earnings can there be?

"We have come to work, and not to lie down in barracks unsuitable for life," said the Japanese workers.

"The daily life of workers is extremely monotonous, as there are no amenities for comfort and rest in the vastness of nature, and after the allotted eight hours of work, there is nowhere to stay except in dormitories, chat, play homemade chess or sleep. The only entertainment venue for the workers is the club building, which is run by the Mine Committee, which is usually reserved for Russian workers.

Due to the shortage of goods on the island, many Russians working at neighboring enterprises come to the Japanese workers, looking dirty and bringing small items with them, asking to exchange them for flour, bread, sugar and canned food. And despite the fact that the Russians have excellent propaganda, it is clear that it is not effective when directed directly at the Japanese workers. Because propaganda slogans are completely shattered by the unsightly reality. The "pawns of Soviet propaganda" often visit the homes of Japanese workers and talk to them. Alas, the Japanese are forced to listen to all this, even though they are bored. The Japanese workers keep each other in check, and there is no one with whom they would speak directly.

In addition, Japanese workers living in the area during the winter months are forced to spend time in dormitories for Russian workers and, naturally, walk back and forth between dormitories, and Russian workers often treat them with contempt and ridicule. The only negative consequence for Japanese workers who came into contact with Russian workers was that they memorized a few Russian swear words.

Fatigue from exhausting wintering greatly reduces labor efficiency and outwardly the workers look as if they are cheerful, but in their hearts they think only about when the time will come to return to their native Japan. I have heard that many young workers who led an abstinent life on the island on their return to Otaru or Hakodate ran out into the streets joyfully, only to find that life in the city had not disappeared in a year, and that it was not a dream.

The amount of money that a seasonal worker earns per day can be as high as 10-15 yen. Most seasonal workers are those who come from Japan every year or every two years and are relatively familiar with local conditions, including from regions other than the above-mentioned employment areas. Some of them are well educated. Hatters, coopers, builders, electricians, diggers, track workers, workers of geological parties, laborers, etc... Everyone wants to make good money..."

The administration of the concession enterprise has always been ready to meet such hardworking workers. Thus, despite numerous warnings and instructions from the District Labor Inspectorate, the working hours of permanent Japanese workers were often 10-12 hours a day, and seasonal workers were 16-17 hours.

Having got a taste for it, the concessionaire decided to "introduce Russian workers to Japanese labor values" as well. For example, in the summer of 1927, when exploratory work was carried out at a distance of 6-7 versts from the workers' homes, the time spent by the workers on the transition to the place of work was not counted in the number of working hours, although the collective agreement obliged the employer to do this, in connection with which the actual working day was incomparably longer. At mine number 3, foremen Mori and Kulikov managed to lengthen the working day by changing the clocks. When the workers went to the mine in the morning, the clock was moved forward, and then the hands were moved back, and thus the working day was artificially lengthened. In the Chinese Tanifuse cooperative, the working day for earthworks was approximately 10-11 hours. (The artel worked on a piece-rate basis, but the day was lengthened without the knowledge and consent of the workers by the sole order of the contractor Tanifuze). In 1934. A group of 214 Japanese seasonal workers, working on loading operations, began the working day at 5 a.m. and ended at 9 p.m.

On the basis of non-compliance by the concessionaire with the rules of labor protection for July-October 1927, there were 344 accidents at the concession, and some of these cases must be attributed to the negligence of the workers themselves, since this figure includes such as burns, hammer bruises, finger, etc.

There were no paths from the workers' dwellings to the place of work on the sides of the narrow-gauge railway, due to which there were fatal accidents, since the workers were forced to go to work almost on rails, and the slightest imprudence could lead to an accident, since every minute trolleys loaded with coal were launched from the mine to the pier, which, going downhill on their own, developed high speed.

Improper fastening of the ceiling of the tunnel in shaft number 3 caused a collapse on September 3, 1927, as a result of which workers Kolokoltsev and Zagorulko received severe bruises. Due to the neglect of safety, in 1933 alone, 218 accidents occurred in the concessionaire's mines.

Safety regulations were regularly violated during the operation of transformer and compressor chambers, pumping and underground power grids, installation of explosive motors and starters in tunnels.

On June 8, 1932, the Sakhalin District Labor Inspectorate pointed out to the concessionaire that the steam boilers installed on his narrow-gauge steam locomotives had not yet been certified and their operation was carried out without the sanction of the labor inspectorate, and 2 of them had been in operation since 1926 and 1 since 1929.

However, the company ignored this instruction and continued to operate the locomotive fleet, and on July 9, 1932, it sent message number 55 to the labor inspectorate, in which it asked to postpone the tests of the boilers until the end of the navigation period due to the possible disruption of coal transportation. On July 14, the Labor Inspectorate, in its letter number 23-B-5, indicated that technical tests could be carried out at a time when there were no ships in the roadstead of Douai and the concessionaire's steam locomotives were inactive.

The regulatory authorities also noted the incorrect storage and accounting of explosives for demolition. Dynamite was issued on the basis of a note from the foreman, and the latter hid its remains in empty galleries, in the cabinets of mine offices and other places that were not suitable for this.

On January 16, 1936, the newspaper "Izvestia" published an article "Flagrant violations of safety and labor protection rules at the Japanese coal concession" "Local authorities," the newspaper wrote, "are extremely concerned about the fact that work on the Japanese coal concession located in Douai is being carried out, despite repeated warnings from the mining supervision, with a gross violation of elementary safety rules. As a result, further work in the mines threatens the lives of workers in many places. For example, in mine number 6, all the drifts and human passages have a height of 1.40-1.50 meters. The main haulage drift has been passed in a very narrow section, there are no niches, and the workers are under direct threat of being crushed by loaded wagons. There are no human walkers in the existing bremsbergs, and workers follow the wagons along the bremsberg. Repeated instructions of the mining district on the need to bring the drifts to a height of 1.75 meters, equip human walks and arrange beggars, despite the promise to fulfill these instructions, are not fulfilled by the concessionaire under various pretexts. Ignoring the mining rules at mine number 3 led to extremely strong general pressure of the entire field, as a result of which on December 7, 15 and 21 there were collapses of the drifts, and once the workers were left collapsed and saved solely thanks to personal resourcefulness. For the same reasons, there are a large number of severe accidents both at mine number 6 and at other mines. In spite of the repeated orders of the mining district to eliminate these criminal, life-threatening abnormalities, they have not yet been eliminated. The Mining District, proceeding from the need to protect the lives of the workers, also intends to put an end to the endless appeals to the concessionaire, which remain unheeded, and in the event of further stubbornness on the part of the concessionaire, who has apparently forgotten that he is working in the USSR, where the interests of the protection of the labor and life of the workers are sufficiently protected by Soviet legislation, to apply the necessary and legally provided for measures of influence, up to the closure of a number of mines. First of all, mine number 6, as the most dangerous for the lives of workers.

Powder depot in Douai

The equipment of the underground dynamite warehouse of mine No. 6 has not yet been completed, and the dynamite is stored in the old unsuitable and dangerous warehouse. A similar situation with dynamite warehouses is observed in other mines. As a result of non-compliance with the rules for handling explosive materials, on January 3, an explosion of 127 kilograms of dynamite occurred in the heater of the central surface warehouse... As a result, in the village of Douai, about 40 windows flew out of the windows of houses. The case of the dynamite explosion will go to court."

One of the measures of influence on the concessionaire was the filing of a statement of claim with the court. This measure of influence was repeatedly used by the Soviet side. Thus, in 1928-1929, at the coal concession, the heads of mines were twice brought to criminal responsibility and twice to administrative responsibility. The concessionaires were accused of violating safety rules in underground work. The punishment was expressed in a fine of 3850 rubles and imprisonment for 1.5 years (in total in all cases considered).

In the first half of the 1930s, prosecution became widespread. We will cite only some of the sentences.

On December 15, 1931, at the visiting session of the Alexandrovsky People's Court, consisting of the presiding judge Raspopov and people's assessors Kosolapov and Starodumova, in an open court session, the case was considered on charges of the Trusted Concession Company "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha" Murayam Shikanosuke, 40 years old, a native of Tokyo, with a higher technical education, of a crime under Article 133, Part II of the Criminal Code. In the course of the judicial investigation, the court found the guilt of S. Muroyama proved in the following: the company, represented by the accused, in violation of the Labor Code (Articles 104, 105 and 106), allowed overtime work in the amount of 11688 hours from October 1929 to March 24, 1930 without the permission of the labor inspectorate. The company violated the food standards for the supply of concession workers. From December to February 5, workers were supplied with meat at a reduced rate, and later meat was no longer issued at all. The company also did not comply with the order of the labor inspectorate to build sinks and dryers at mines No. 2 and No. 7, as a result of which the workers were unable to dry their clothes. And finally, the company did not provide some of the employees with living space in accordance with the approved standards. Based on the foregoing, the court sentenced Muroyama Shikonosuke to be found guilty under Article 133 Part 2 and fined 8000 rubles.

On January 31, 1934, at a meeting of the plenum of the Sakhalin Regional Court, on the protest of the Sakhalin Regional Prosecutor, the case of S. Murayam was reviewed and the sentence was changed to 1 year of corrective labor with a monthly deduction of 25% of the salary in favor of the Bureau of Engineers.

On June 17, 1932, the visiting session of the People's Court of the Sakhalin District at the Due mine, consisting of the presiding judge Raspopov and people's assessors Rozhkova and Petrova, having considered in an open court session the case on charges of citizen Fukai Aikitsa, of a crime under Article 133, Part Two of the Criminal Code, found guilty of the following: on September 9, 1931, in mine number 2, as a result of a coal collapse, the murder of the miner Redkin took place. This event occurred due to the fact that the mine administration, represented by the acting head of mine number 2, Fukai Aikitsa, did not comply with the relevant safety rules for mining operations, approved by the NCT and the Supreme Council of National Economy on November 25, 1924. due to inexperience, they carried out inept work on the collection of the seam, thanks to which Redkin was knocked down by a broken lava about 30 poods in size and covered with coal. As it turned out later, Redkin's death followed due to a violation of the narrowness of the entire brain substance, while the miner Lyaskalov, who worked with Redkin, was injured. The court sentenced Fukai Aikitsi under Article 133, Part Two of the Criminal Code to a fine of 2000 rubles to the republic.

On July 19, 1932, the People's Court of the Sakhalin District, consisting of the presiding judge Raspopov and people's assessors Novoselov and Zenkevich, having considered in an open court session the case on charges of mining technician Kaneko Yoshio and the head of mine number 2 Hasuda Sizduo of a crime under Article 133, Part Two of the Criminal Code, established: on January 28, 1931, in mine number 3, during work, worker Rusakov was poisoned by gas formed after demolition. This case occurred due to non-compliance with the safety rules for mining operations, approved by the CNT and the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on November 25, 1924 by the head of safety Kaneko Yoshio and the head of the mine Hasuda Sizduo as persons directly responsible for safety. It should be noted that the last case of gas poisoning in the mine is not an isolated one, the same gas poisoning took place with the workers Zakharchenko and Mazur, who worked in the 6 1/2 stoves, on January 28, 1931, shortly after the demolition work. Thus, the administration did not comply with all safety rules, was indifferent to this. After carrying out demolition work by kicking off or stopping the face for a long time, according to paragraph 193 of the safety regulations, where asphyxiating, harmful and especially poisonous gases can accumulate, before sending workers to work, they must first be inspected by a steiger and a foreman and, in appropriate cases, equal in order to achieve purity of the air, which was not observed in this case. The described actions are qualified under Article 133, Part Two of the Criminal Code. Therefore, the court sentenced Kaneko Yoshio and Hasud Sizduo under Article 133 of Part Two of the Criminal Code to a fine of 3000 rubles each.

On March 12, 1933, the visiting session of the Sakhalin Regional Court in the village of Due, consisting of the presiding judge Bely and people's assessors Shishkin and Shalimov, having considered the criminal case of Kaneko Yoshio under Part 3 of Article 133 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, found: on September 25, 1932, at mine number 4, the machinist on the Shirochenko pump died of gas poisoning. It was established that no one worked in the mine constantly at that time and only pumped out water. Three days before the accident, foreman Hashigao informed the defendant that there was an accumulation of gas in the mine, and the cigarettes and matches that were being lit did not burn. Thus, the defendant knew about the gas accumulating in the mine in large quantities. Ventilation was natural: on September 25, 1932, on the day of Shirochenko's death, the temperature inside the mine and outside was approximately the same, as a result of which air ventilation was weak and could not ensure normal exhaust of the accumulating gas. The non-extracted gas rose in a dodge, and when Shirochenko sat down near the pump, she quickly lost consciousness, and then died, poisoned by the gas. The guilt of the defendant in negligence in the adoption of safety measures in mine number four is fully established: negligence led to a death. For violation of safety regulations, the defendant is tried for the second time. Therefore, recognizing the charges under Part 3 of Article 133 of the Criminal Code as proven and guided by Articles 319, 320, paragraph 3, Article 326 of the Criminal Procedure Code, sentenced citizen Kaneko Yoshio to labor at his place of service with the deduction of 25% of his salary for a period of 1 year.

In the absolute majority of cases, the concessionaires were convicted, but this cannot serve as an indicator of the true state of affairs and proof of their malicious and systematic violation of the fundamentals of Soviet legislation and the terms of the concession agreement, since the courts were guided by the directive of the center, transmitted through Daltrud and the supervisory commission, that if the Soviet side wanted to resort to the help of the court, the latter must be won.

The convicted Japanese citizens themselves said about the judicial "procedure" that when the prosecution witnesses spoke, the court listened to them carefully. But when witnesses began to speak in favor of the accused, they were immediately "silenced".

So, low wages, shortages in supplies, industrial accidents, poor housing conditions - all these factors led to an annual increase in labor turnover. Thus, in 1932, 157 people resigned, and for 11 months of 1934 - 515 people.

On the other hand, the situation at the enterprises of the Soviet coal industry in Northern Sakhalin was even worse. The living space for 1 person was 2.5-3 square meters, the supply was disgusting, there was nowhere to buy the money earned, as a result of which the turnover of labor from the Sakhalin mines was 1.6 times higher than the turnover from the concessionaire's mines.

The fact that the working conditions of the concessionaire were more acceptable to the workers than at the state-owned enterprises is confirmed by the "voting with their feet": Dalugol annually brought workers from Vladivostok for the state coal trust, and every year the bulk of the workers "due to poor housing, and most importantly poor supplies, go to the concession."

In the second half of the thirties, the production activity of the Japanese coal concession began to decline. One of the reasons was the fact that coal mining in South Sakhalin was developing at a super-intensive pace. In 1936, 30 coal mines in South Sakhalin produced 2075 thousand tons of coal.

The conclusion of the Japanese-German "Anti-Comintern Pact" on November 25, 1936 worsened relations between Japan and the USSR and accelerated changes in the Soviet concession policy in Northern Sakhalin. Subsequent events - the battles near Lake Khasan near Khalkhin Gol aggravated the situation. With the tacit approval of the center, attempts are being made by the local authorities to oust the Japanese concessionaires from Northern Sakhalin by economic means. On April 1, 1936, the contract concluded by the Central Committee of the Coal Miners' Union and Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha expired. At the insistence of the Soviet side, the following changes were made to the new treaty: 1) an increase in tariff rates by 40 percent; 2) the concessionaire undertook to provide a room for each family worker; 3) the concessionaire undertook to build a school for 320 children at the Douai mine and a school for 160 children at the Vladimir mine; 4) to build a club in Douai and red corners at the Vladimir and Mgachinsky mines.

On June 17, 1936, representatives of the concession Gomamoto Tsuta and Toshio Wada met with representatives of the trade union of coal industry workers of the USSR Koshkin and Vagin to discuss the situation. However, negotiations on the conclusion of a new collective agreement ended in nothing.

In 1937, repressions dealt a colossal blow to the activities of the coal concession. On May 5, 1937, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N. Yezhov wrote in a memorandum addressed to Stalin that the residents of Japanese intelligence Baba Fedusuke and Kawase Fenntaro, who had been engaged in espionage and training of insurgent cadres since 1933, were operating at the Douai concession. However, the head of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, did not sanction the arrest of the above-mentioned spies and asked to raise this issue with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). As a result, in the early morning of May 19, 1937, a search was carried out in the building of the concession office in Aleksandrovsk, and the acting director of the concession, F. Baba, and the head of the Mgachi mine, F. Kawase, were arrested. The reason for the arrest was the protocol of the interrogation of a certain "Trotskyist" who had acquaintances with both Japanese. In addition, there was a Soviet military training ground near the Mgachi mine and, according to the "organs", it was there that F. Kawase recruited agents for his spy network. On July 15, 1937, a confidant of Sakai Kumiai, K. Majima, was arrested, who was also accused of "anti-Soviet sentiments" and espionage activities (he was released and exiled to Japan in 1940).

In addition to "imprisonment" on charges of espionage and sabotage and insurgency, Japanese citizens began to be imprisoned under ordinary criminal articles, under which they were previously subject only to a fine.

For example, on April 25, 1937, engineers Ojima Shuji and mining technician of mine number 8 Kobayashi Daisuke were sentenced to 2 years in prison for violating safety rules because of a gas explosion in the mine on January 24, 1937, as a result of which the Chinese worker Li Chang-zha was injured. Moreover, D. Kabayasi, who was awaiting the decision of the appellate instance and being on his own recognizance, was arrested on January 9, 1938 on charges of counter-revolutionary activity (Article 58-6) and subsequently sentenced to deportation from the USSR.

On April 29, 1937, in connection with the violation of safety regulations, mining engineer Aimi Tomidze and steiger Sugawara Seiichi were prosecuted and imprisoned under Article 108 Part 1 for an accident with the miner F.I. Rosimovich, who was buried by rock as a result of poor fastening of beams in the drift.

On December 7, 1937, the Alexandrovsky People's Court sentenced the head of the safety department of the Due mine, Shuji Ojima, under Article 108, Part 1, to 3 years (the previous term of 2 years was absorbed by the new punishment), and the foreman of mine number 6, Shigemasa Asada, to 2 years in prison in the case of an accident that took place on June 17, 1937 at mine number 6. Due to a violation of safety regulations, the mine workers were forced to follow the trolleys along the bremsberg,* due to the fact that the human walker was littered with rock and garbage. At 6:30 p.m., worker Nazarov was crushed by empty trolleys and died of his injuries on June 19, 1937. Attempts by the lawyer to prove that it was the murder of Nazarov disguised as an accident by other workers, who hit him several times on the back of the head with a wooden board and then put him on a trolley, were unsuccessful in the Soviet court.

Much "lighter" for the Japanese was Article 146 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR "Intentional infliction of a blow, beatings and other violent acts associated with the infliction of physical pain" or, as the Japanese called it, "Russian labor beatings". Below is a chronological list of cases of assault at the concessionaire's enterprises.

TABLE XXIV

Criminal prosecution of employees of the KKKKK enterprise under Article 146 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR for 1927-1939.

Compared to cases of detention on suspicion of espionage and other charges, the scale of prosecution under this article was much smaller, and the consequences for employees were expressed in a fine.

In Japanese diplomatic correspondence there is information that "the organs of the NKVD detained Japanese, Russians, and Chinese suspected of committing crimes, threatened them with imprisonment and lured them with various persuasions so that they would eventually become secret agents. The fact that the intelligence services are now acting in this way is proof that they have received orders from the central government."

Starting from 1937, various Soviet state bodies and economic enterprises, fearing repression, began to arrange various "large and small dirty tricks" for the concessionaire. For example, on May 4, 1937, the deputy head of the Alexandrovsky port administration, Dydyk, in a letter number Ya-37, notified the "KKKKK" that the People's Commissariat of Water Transport recognized the practice of not collecting port and ship duties from its ships as wrong. From the beginning of navigation in 1937, ships chartered by the concessionaire were obliged to arrive at the roadstead of the Alexandrovsky port to undergo formalities and register the arrival, providing the port authorities with 1 copy of the manifest for the cargo on board. Then the vessel proceeded to the roadstead of Douai and, upon completion of the cargo operation, was again to proceed to the port of Alexandrovsk to register the departure of the vessel. Simultaneously with the letter, an invoice for the ship and cargo dues from the ship "Kosaku-maru" in the amount of 362.70 rubles was also sent.

On May 14, 1937, N. Ozawa, a trustee of the company, wrote in a letter to the Alexandrovsky port: "The Island hereby informs on the issue raised by you that from the time of the conclusion of the concession agreement, the Island was allowed to receive and outflow steamships for coal directly to the DUE and from the DUE, and the Island was sure that this year you will also allow the above procedure. At the beginning of this year, the company entered into a freight contract with this expectation. Now, quite unexpectedly, before the arrival of the steamer, you demand the arrival and departure to Alexandrovsk and from Alexandrovsk. This, as you know, not only requires extra time, which may have a very bad effect on the loading of coal, but also requires a renewal of the freight contract. We ask you to take into account the above arguments and not to refuse the courtesy to allow the island to directly arrive and depart steamers for coal to and from the DUE. As for the collection of ship and cargo dues by you, 0 is exempt from the collection of these dues under paragraph 16 of the concession agreement, which is also confirmed by the Main Concession Committee in its telegram of April 4, 1926, number 6431611. On the basis of the foregoing, the 0-vo asks you to cancel your decision to collect tonnage and cargo dues from us."

The head of the Alexandrovsky port, Aseev, replied to the concessionaire that the practice of not collecting fees from the concessionaire's vessels was contrary to paragraph 28 of the concession agreement and warned the trustee that non-payment of such fees would force it to apply sanctions against chartered vessels.

On May 27, 1937, a trustee of the company sent a telegram to the INO sector of the People's Commissariat of Transportation with a complaint about the illegal actions of the port authorities. At the same time, Japanese Ambassador to Moscow M. Shigemitsu in a conversation with Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs B.S. Stomonyakov also touched on this painful topic for the concession.

As a result, on June 19, 1937, the head of the port, Aseev, in a letter to the trustee of the society, said that the collection of fees from the concessionaire's ships was canceled. The concessionaire won a victory, albeit small, but still a victory.

The second blow was dealt by the Soviet side in the matter of supplying the concession with food and industrial goods imported from Japan. On February 8, 1937, M.F. Vovchenko, who replaced V. Andzelevich as head of the UZSGO, carried out a thorough inspection of the concession's commodity warehouse and found that there were 14 blankets in the warehouse, which had completely fallen into disrepair, and instead of cow butter, the workers were sold margarine, which, in his "competent" opinion, the workers had been supplied with for 11 years. And here the question involuntarily arises, is it possible that the concessionaire's products have not been checked for quality by the relevant services for such a long time? Or is it still possible to congratulate M.F. Vovchenko for "lying"?

On February 26, during an inspection by the head of the UZSGO transport department of the company, it was established that the head of the department, K. Ogata, sold hay to private cabbies for 10 rubles per kul, bran for 13.5 rubles and oats for 16 rubles per kul. On March 17, the head of the UZSGO set prices for oats 16 kopecks, hay 15 kopecks and bran 14 kopecks per kul. It can be said that with one stroke of the pen he arranged "communism" in the concession, reducing the price of fodder by 100 times!

On April 5, labor inspector L.A. Feldman found 22,200 kg of peanuts for sale at a price of 2.7 rubles per kg and 2,777 kg of chocolate bars weighing 225 grams in the Company's store. each worth 1.54 rubles, which are sold by the head of the store P. Sekiguchi. The Mining District offered the store to sell nuts for sale at a price of 50 kopecks, and chocolate at a price of 40 kopecks. In the inspection reports, it was noted that many products in the company's store were sold to employees not according to the approved norms, but in unlimited quantities. Calculations showed that only the sale of nuts and chocolate at unapproved prices brought the company 69274 rubles.

Therefore, the case of the "saboteur sellers" was transferred to law enforcement agencies. The investigation into the criminal case initiated in accordance with Article 128-B of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR established that in addition to the illegal receipt of "excess profits" from the sale of nuts and chocolate, the company received an extra profit of 15,060 rubles from the sale of 15,853 kg of margarine instead of butter, starting from April 1936.

In this regard, on December 27, 1937, the Japanese Consul General Tanaka Bunyichiro appealed to the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs S. Kashirin with a message number 22, in which, in particular, he pointed out that the issue was the discrepancy in the interpretation of paragraph 17 of the concession agreement, since the Japanese side, as before, interpreted it in the understanding that prices were approved only for imported and sold basic necessities. On September 5, 1937, the representative of the Society in Moscow filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the USSR to resolve the issue of interpretation of paragraph 17 of the treaty. On this basis, the case scheduled for hearing in the Alexandrovsky Court was postponed until the decision of the Supreme Court. But on October 3, 1937, the case was suddenly considered and the defendants were found guilty, moreover, under Article 134, Part 2. and sentenced to a fine of 3000 rubles each, without waiting for the decision in the case of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Consul General refused to recognize the decision of the local People's Court and protested.

In May 1937, the company received a response to its application for the delivery of goods for the concession in the amount of 2.53 million rubles, which indicated that the delivery of goods in the amount of 1 million rubles had been approved. engaged in the production of the Concession, through their food and consumer stores. Recently, the Company's stores have not had a number of necessary food products, such as: various cereals, onions, fresh cabbage, potatoes, fresh and salted fish, as well as shoes for adults and children, blankets, linen, clothes and other items in the store. The Mining District categorically proposes that you immediately provide workers and their families with all kinds of food and consumer goods provided for in the collective agreement. Otherwise, we will be forced to consider this provision as a violation of the Concession Agreement on the part of the Concession Company." Thus, when the Soviet authorities cut the concessionaire's estimate for the import of commodity products by 2.5 times, the same authorities "categorically" demand that the concession provide the workers with products and consumer goods.

In his reply to the mountain district of August 11, 1937, S. Murayama, a trustee of the society, wrote that the customs did not allow the sale of onions and vegetable oil, all other goods, with the exception of sprouted potatoes and missing cabbage, were sold by the society, only butter was replaced by margarine by agreement with the Mine Committee. The trustee also pointed out to the head of the UZSGO, that under the concession agreement the Company is not obliged to supply workers with products. And from a legal point of view, this was absolutely true, because according to the concession agreement, the company had the right, and not the obligation, to duty-free delivery of products and goods for the supply of workers. The obligation to supply stemmed from the collective agreement concluded with the Union of Coal Miners , in which the norms of supply and prices for essential goods were clearly described.

On October 8, 1937, the Society's manager in Tokyo, I. Tojo, addressed a letter to the USSR Trade Mission in Japan: "On October 1 of this year, our company addressed you with letter number 70 on the issue of approving the import of clothing, various kinds of fabrics and other things into the territory of our Sakhalin concession enterprise for their supply to the workers and employees of the concession, as well as members of their families during the upcoming winter season. On the same day, a member of the trade mission orally informed our representative, Mr. Ikeda Shiro, that an official written answer would be given to our letter, but asked us to bear in mind that permission would not be given for the import of the above-mentioned items. We have telegraphed to our concession about the foregoing, and have received a telegraphic reply from there, informing us that the Chief of the Mining District has approved the importation of the following articles into our concession and has informed you of it: leather boots, children's shoes, calico, paper cloth, cloth, woollen blankets, sole leather, woollen fabrics, cotton wool, and Japanese geta shoes. Not receiving any answer from you to my letter, and considering the necessity of taking hasty measures for the purchase of clothing and other things in view of the impending closure of navigation to Northern Sakhalin, the company sent its representative S. Ikeda to you on October 6 this year in order to inquire about the permission to import. Having received an answer from you that you have no information about the permission to import us, we telegraphed about it a second time to the concession. I call your attention to the fact that a certain period of time is required for the procurement of clothing and other articles for the importation of which the administration of the Douai mine insists on the importation, and that the company will in fact be deprived of the possibility of sending these articles if your permission for import follows a few days before the departure of our last steamer. The company imposes all responsibility on you in the event that, due to the circumstances set out above, it is impossible to send clothes and other things."

On October 21, 1937, a trustee of the company in a letter to the People's Commissariat of Commerce and Industry of the USSR indicated that it was necessary to bring pickled ginger, bottled ketchup, canned meat, fruit, as well as chum salmon caviar and sesame seeds for the concession before the end of navigation. In total, in the amount of 1100 thousand yen. Well, what was the answer? The USSR neither yes nor no. It was a good tactic. On the one hand, there is no direct ban on imports, and there is nothing to complain about, on the other hand, no one gives permission. All letters and requests are followed by deathly silence.

Since the organization of the concession enterprise, it rented land from the local collective farm, where it was engaged in the cultivation of vegetables and potatoes. In 1937, the management of the collective farm was arrested, and the leased land was taken away from the Society as illegally obtained. In addition to the subsidiary farm, the Society received a fishing permit every year in order to provide the workers of the concessions with fresh fish. On March 22, 1937, the Society submitted an application to the Sakhalin department of the Far Eastern Fish Trust for a permit to fish in the area of Due at the mouth of the Postovaya River for 300 centners, in the area of Mgachi near the mouth of the Bolshaya Mgachi River for 100 centners and in the area of the Vladimirsky mine near the mouth of the Noyami River for 100 centners. It was planned to catch herring, flounder and pink salmon. However, in 1937 and subsequent years, the application was invariably rejected.

The third "dirty trick" of the Soviet side was the reduction of the concessionaire's application for the delivery of labor for the navigation of 1937. However, such "fortels" were thrown out by the labor recruitment departments earlier. Nevertheless, during the navigation of 1937, 490 Soviet and 40 Japanese workers, as well as 5 Japanese and 2 Soviet employees, arrived at the concession enterprise. A total of 537 people.

But the most painful problem in the work of the concession was the issue of bringing explosives and detonators to the island. Coal mining technologies required more and more explosives, and without them it was almost impossible to work in the mines. It should be noted that the delivery and storage of explosives was carried out with the permission and under the strict supervision of the Sakhalin Mining District and the NKVD bodies.

This problem became most acute after the explosion at the Society's dynamite warehouse in January 1936, and in the same 1936, the Society asked the leadership of the mining district to approve the purchase of 3 tons of dynamite and 6 tons of grisutine, as well as 40 thousand pieces of electric detonators from Soyuzhimsnabsbyt. However, the head of the UZSGO V. Andzelevich flatly refused to give his permission, arguing that 4 dynamite warehouses of the Company did not comply with paragraphs 189-226 of the safety regulations. Only if the dynamite warehouses were put in order, permission to import explosive materials could be obtained. In 1937, the detonators were sent to concession at the beginning of April and arrived on the island in June, so the company had to borrow a number of detonators from the Sakhalinugol Trust. The ship with the purchased explosives arrived at the concession only on August 20, as a result, due to a lack of dynamite, the implementation of the coal mining plan was disrupted.

In the case of ordering explosives from the USSR, it took at least 6 months to deliver them, and their import from Japan was not allowed. The Mining District, aware of these peculiar conditions and in spite of monthly inspections, in the spring of 1940 unexpectedly demanded the elimination of the entire quantity of explosives stored in the concession due to the expiry of the shelf life. The Japanese side considered this to be a deliberate obstruction of the activities of the enterprise, stating that it was necessary to warn the Concessionaire in advance so that he could bring in new explosives.

On August 4, 1937, a member of the House of Representatives of the Japanese Parliament, Ryuichi Okano, sent a written request to Foreign Minister K. Hirota, in which, in particular, he wrote: "After the signing of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact last fall, the policy of the government of the Soviet Union against our North Sakhalin commercial enterprises has become extremely threatening. The mining company has faced serious difficulties in its operations and is seriously considering abandoning its interests. On August 2, a general meeting of Japanese residents was held in Douai in response to the unjust persecution of engineer Ojima by the government of the USSR, and a demand was sent to the Japanese Foreign Ministry to ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese citizens in Northern Sakhalin. As an example of the harassment of Japanese citizens by Soviet officials, 30 fines totaling 2,615 yen were imposed by Soviet labor inspectors on the North Sakhalin Mining Company during the six-month period from January 1 to July 1 of this year. These are indeed cases of unlawful oppression, and the Foreign Ministry must make a resolute protest to the Soviet Union."

All these facts led to the fact that the concessionaire was forced to curtail its activities as much as possible and began a mass dismissal of Soviet workers in Douai.

On August 26, 1937, the concessionaire dismissed 250 people from work, indicating "absenteeism" as a motivation for dismissal. The mining committee protested this decision. On August 29, by the decision of the board of the company, mine number 3 was closed, and all its employees were transferred to surface work. On August 31, a list of 162 people whom the concessionaire wanted to dismiss for absenteeism was submitted to the mining committee.

On September 11, 1937, the manager of the mine, Due S. Murayama, wrote to the head of the UZSGO: "Japanese workers and employees working at the company's enterprise have recently announced for various reasons, without exception, to resign and leave for Japan altogether. The society took all sorts of measures and persuaded them to stay at the enterprise. Despite persuasion, a very small part of the workers changed their minds. In particular, the technical staff for mining work almost all quit and leave. In connection with these circumstances, as well as for other various reasons, the Company is forced to reduce its work and finally decided to reduce production on the following principle, which circumstance asks to be borne in mind:

1. After September 15, 1937, half of the Soviet, Chinese and Japanese permanent workers will be dismissed.

2. After October 1, until the end of seasonal loading work, by October 10, 1937, the rest of the permanent Soviet, Chinese and Japanese workers, as well as seasonal loaders, will be dismissed.

3. After the reduction of production, Japanese workers up to 40 people and Soviet workers up to 100 people will remain at the enterprise.

4. After the reduction, mine number 7 will be operated and the remaining mines will be closed.

5. The workers to be left will be agreed with the Mine Committee.

6. The reduction is made in accordance with the current collective agreement of the Company with the Union of Coal Miners.

On September 12, 1937, Mitsui Yonematsu, chairman of the board of the Kita Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, cabled the Japanese Foreign Ministry: "Due to the imprisonment of many people and the fear of a further increase in the number of prisoners in the future, the mine administration is extremely concerned and is trying its best to explain the situation to the workers, but still many have quit and are going home, and there are almost no applicants to continue the project this winter. Therefore, I will report on the situation to the state authorities, and after discussion with the board of directors, we will temporarily curtail the project and decide on the possibility of its resumption in the future. To date, this is the only way out, and I ask for your understanding."

On September 15, 1937, negotiations were held between representatives of the mining district M. Vovchenko, L. Feldman and I. Vagin and representatives of the Society S. Murayama and N. Ozawa on the issue of reducing the activities of the concession enterprise from October 10, 1937.

The report of the representatives of the Society was taken into account that mine number 7 remains in working condition, mine number 3 has already been decommissioned, mines number 6 and number 8-2 will have natural drainage and do not need conservation measures, mine number 8 was supposed to be flooded. The company undertook to develop a detailed technical and surveying plan for the conservation of these mines by September 25 and submit it to the Mining District for consideration.

On September 21-28, labor inspector L. Feldman examined the condition of mines No. 6 and No. 8-2 and drew up inspection reports, which indicated that due to the shutdown of some of the pumps, the drifts were gradually filled with water, and many fastening frames were broken. The Mining District suggested that the representative of the Kano concession urgently start pumping water from the mines, as well as repair and reinstall the broken fastening frames.

On October 1, 1937, the head of the mining district wrote in a letter to the director of the concession S. Murayama: "Receipt from you of plans for the conservation of the Douai mines shows that the Island intends not to support underground mine workings, i.e. to stop drainage, maintenance of mine workings by fastening, as well as ventilation. This provision is also confirmed by the practical actions of the Island, which is confirmed by the acts drawn up by the Mining District together with the representative of the Island, for mine No. 6 of September 21 of this year, for mine No. 8-2 of 2I/IX. of this year and for mine No. 6 of September 25 of this year, as well as despite a personal conversation with you, Mr. Director, held on I5/IX of this year in the Mining District, where you promised that the mines would be maintained, as well as according to the protocol of our joint conversation at Douai on 27/IX of this year.

The Mining District categorically protests against the above-mentioned actions of the Island and considers the above-mentioned actions of the Island as a unilateral violation of the concession agreement.

The Mining District offers you to carry out daily maintenance of mine workings, fastening, drainage and ventilation for the entire period of conservation.

On October 3, 1937, another round of negotiations was held between representatives of the concessionaire and the mining district, at which the application of the head of the mining district was considered to leave the dismissed workers and their families in the housing of the concessionaire until the beginning of spring navigation. The representative of the society objected because of possible complications in relations between Soviet and Japanese workers, as well as since such a decision would contradict the collective agreement. The head of the mining district proposed to the administration of the Douai mine to bring all the mines to normal technical condition by October 7, providing them with drainage, ventilation and putting in order the fasteners. In case of non-compliance, he promised to request permission from Moscow to bring the manager S. Murayam to criminal responsibility. The Company took note of this instruction.

On the same day, the manager of the company sent letter number 1002 to the mining district, in which he indicated that he could not agree with the opinion of the mining district that the actions of the company violated the concession agreement, since the concessionaire could at his discretion both increase and decrease production. The company also refused to pay benefits to the dismissed workers for the waiting time for the steamship, since when they were dismissed due to redundancy, it gave them absolutely all the benefits due to them under the collective agreement and Soviet legislation.

Out of 1800 workers, the concessionaire dismissed more than 1500 people and left less than 200 workers and employees for the winter, which in practice meant a complete cessation of work on the coal concession. Unemployment among Soviet workers and a reduction in state revenues became the reason for charging the concessionaire with violating the terms of the concession agreement.

TABLE XXV

Information on the number of people working on the concession for 01.02.1935-30.03.1944

Meanwhile, the attitude of the Soviet authorities to the Japanese concession continued to deteriorate. In July 1937, the Sakai Kumiai company applied for permission for Japanese workers to enter Northern Sakhalin in order to begin work on the development of the mine on the territory received as a concession. However, instead of permission, on September 28, 1937, the Soviet side, represented by the First Deputy People's Commissar of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR A.P. Zavenyagin, terminated the concession agreement with the Sakai Kumiai company and prohibited the Japanese from operating a mine in the Agnevo area. The reason was that the concessionaire had not carried out exploration and production of coal for 12 years from the date of the conclusion of the agreement, which caused significant damage to the interests of the Soviet Union. In November 1937, all the workers of the concession who remained in Agnevo were deported to Douai, and their real estate was confiscated.

On December 1, Japanese Ambassador to the USSR M. Shigemitsu visited the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and expressed a strong protest against the illegal actions of the Soviet side in relation to the coal concessionaire. On December 20, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan summoned the Soviet ambassador to Japan and also handed him a note of protest from the Japanese government. A representative of the Sakai Union visited the Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Union in Japan, K.A. Smetanin, and demanded that the document on the termination of the concession agreement be withdrawn, referring to its illegality. On January 26, 1938, Sakai Ryuzo sent a written protest to the People's Commissariat of Commerce of the USSR and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, as well as the Japanese embassy in Moscow. In response to the complaint filed, the head of the Second Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, B.I. Kozlovsky, informed the applicant that in case of disagreement with the decision taken by the Soviet side, he could file a lawsuit with the Supreme Court of the USSR.

At a meeting of the 73rd Sejm of the Diet of Japan, Foreign Minister Hirota Koki, when asked by parliamentarians about the situation with the termination of the concession agreement, said: "The government attaches great importance to the normal development of the commercial project in Northern Sakhalin and believes that this type of profit, arising from the Japanese-Soviet Convention, will become unrealistic due to unreasonable restrictions. This is something that the imperial government cannot tolerate."

Meanwhile, on December 29, 1938, the newspaper "Soviet Sakhalin" published an article "Plan for the Development of the Coal Industry in Northern Sakhalin" signed by the engineer of the Sakhalinugol Trust Yeremeev, which, in particular, stated that the Agnevsky mine was currently transferred to the Sakhalinugol trust and in 1939-1940 preparatory work would begin there to open the mine and the construction of housing for workers and employees of the new mine.

After long diplomatic negotiations, statements, complaints and notes of protest, the Japanese side did not come to terms with the loss of Agnevo. The last mention of this lost concession is in the note of the Japanese Foreign Ministry dated January 27, 1943, where paragraph 17 was the cancellation of the decision of the Soviet Government to liquidate the Sakai Kumiai concession.

By the end of September 1937, the Japanese began to complete work on the mines in Douai. Coal mining was carried out only for immediate needs on the spot, the main attention was paid to the export of accumulated coal reserves to Japan.

It should be noted that the wave of arrests of Japanese citizens on oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin caused great indignation in broad circles of the Japanese public. In January 1938, Shigemori Yuji's book "Let's Protect Our Rights and Interests in Northern Sakhalin!" was published. starting with an attack on Japanese enterprises in Northern Sakhalin ... The economic and personnel pressures exerted on both companies from the beginning of 1937 became increasingly blatant, and both companies faced serious obstacles in their operations, forcing them to drastically reduce their operations. In particular, the KKKC had been hit so hard that it could no longer operate and had no choice but to make drastic cuts, which could be seen as a temporary suspension of operations. Of the five mines in operation, with the exception of part of mine number 7, all other coal mining activities have been suspended and the number of workers has been reduced from the usual total of 1,700 to just under 10%, or 158. The reasons for such results can be explained by two main factors, one of which is the arrest and imprisonment of many people by the GPU, and the other is the safety of life and property. The Soviet government completely trampled on the Soviet-Japanese treaty, imposing restrictions and suppressing enterprises so that their profitable activities became almost impossible! Due to the threat to security, Japanese workers lost the desire to work conscientiously, and many of them expressed a desire to return to their country. The Japanese were forced to take responsibility for accidents caused by force majeure or sheer negligence, they were accused of serious crimes, sentenced to two to three years in prison, and sometimes even imprisoned for espionage. It is only natural that they want to return home. Can our Government devise effective and adequate countermeasures in the face of such a grave situation and implement them?.

Japanese diplomats did not lag behind the "indignant Japanese public", constantly bombarding the Soviet embassy in Tokyo and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in Moscow with notes of protest.

Therefore, at a meeting of the Politburo on September 26, 1937, it was decided that the arrest of Japanese citizens on the Sakhalin concessions could be carried out only with the permission of the Prosecutor General of the USSR or the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in coordination with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

But the Japanese government proved determined to act by the same vile means and methods as the Soviet government. On November 22, 1937, a storm brought the Soviet fishing schooner Vympel to the shore of South Sakhalin, on board of which there were 4 crew members and 13 passengers, including one woman with a baby. Instead of providing assistance to the victims of the accident and returning everyone to the USSR, the Japanese authorities detained everyone and offered to exchange them for the Japanese. arrested in the Soviet Union for various crimes, including espionage.

On December 21, 1937, in a conversation with Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs B.S. Stomonyakov reported that the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, on the basis of appeals from convicts and concessionaires, had requested all the cases of convicted concession employees and other Japanese citizens arrested on Sakhalin by way of supervision and transferred them to the Supreme Court of the RSFSR for review. The Supreme Court of the RSFSR, having considered some of these cases, decided to replace the imprisonment of the lower courts with expulsion from the USSR in respect of the following persons: Kobayashi, Aimi, Sugawara and Kosugi.

However, officially, the Soviet government categorically rejected the proposal for the exchange of detained citizens. Then the Japanese staged a trial, very similar to those that were held in the USSR, and on March 1, 1938, the captain of the schooner Vympel was sentenced to one year of hard labor, the rest of the crew and passengers also continued to be held.

On February 19, 1938, the Soviet cargo steamer Kuznetskstroy, traveling with passengers and mail from Petropavlovsk to Vladivostok, called for coal in the Japanese port of Hakodate, where it was arrested by the Japanese naval police. There were 35 crew members and 37 passengers on board, including women and children.  The Japanese police beat and intimidated the crew and passengers of the ship and tried to recruit them for espionage activities.

On April 2, 1938, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, M.M. Litvinov, wrote in a memorandum addressed to Stalin that both sides had accumulated a sufficient number of claims in relations with Japan. And the repressions on the part of the USSR in relation to Japanese citizens cause counter-repression on the part of Japan in relation to Soviet citizens. He proposed to release the ships "Vympel" and "Kuznetskstroy" in exchange for the release of Japanese citizens who had already been amnestied by the Supreme Soviet, to release the detained fishing schooners and to cancel the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the cancellation of the concession with the "Sakai Kumiai" society. He pointed out that he had already invited the Japanese side to file a lawsuit with the Supreme Court, hinting to them that the decision would be favorable.

The People's Commissar's proposal on these issues was approved and, obviously, accepted by the Japanese side, since on April 9, 1938, Kuznetskstroy returned to Vladivostok. Thus, Japan showed the USSR that it was capable of retaliatory measures and would stop at nothing to protect its interests. Shigemori Yuji wrote, "The Japanese people are not the kind of people who like to make a mess out of the blue. But we are not a nation of cowards who are willing to give up our vital national interests. Today the Soviet Union must clearly realize that there is a limit to its insolence and that we will no longer tolerate it. We will firmly defend our great power and our interests in Northern Sakhalin!.

In April 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued a directive in which it was proposed to all Soviet, trade union and party bodies dealing with Japanese concessions on Sakhalin, in their attitude to Japanese concessions, to proceed from the provision that the USSR was not going to liquidate Japanese concessions and that, demanding from them and from their employees and workers to comply with concession agreements and Soviet laws, but at the same time it is necessary to avoid any actions and statements, unauthorized by the center, which may unnecessarily cause aggravation between the Soviet Union and Japan. All decisions on issues that could complicate relations with Japan were proposed to be submitted to the Politburo. Questions of importing technical equipment, materials and products from Japan for the supply of workers and employees were subject to the permission of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, in agreement with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

The directive confirmed that the prosecution and arrest of Japanese employees and workers on the Sakhalin concessions could be carried out, if necessary, only with the permission of the Prosecutor of the Union or the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

During April, the People's Commissariat of Commerce was to consider all applications from concessionaires for additional deliveries of Soviet and Japanese workers in 1938, proceeding from compliance with the percentage between the number of Soviet and Japanese workers and employees established by the concession agreements. The People's Commissariat for Water was supposed to ensure the timely delivery of a steamship to Vladivostok to transport workers sent to Sakhalin, according to the requests of the Japanese concessionaires.

Since 1938, there is no information in Japanese archival documents on accusations of Japanese citizens of speculation, neglect of safety rules, etc., perhaps because the concession practically did not function and there was no one and nothing to blame. So, on January 28, 1939, a search was carried out in one of the former warehouses of the concessionaire and several pistols, ammunition and a radio station were found under the floor boards. In early February, the chairman of the Mine Committee invited the manager of the concession, N. Ozawa, to his office, but instead of the chairman he was met by an NKVD officer, who began to threaten him, calling him a "spy". On February 17, two Japanese, Sawada and Kaneko, suspected of "espionage and sabotage," were invited to the labor inspector, but NKVD officers were found in his office. They began to intimidate the workers, demanded that they testify about the presence of regular officers among the workers of the concession, about the relationship between the administration of the enterprise and the Consul General. At the end of the interrogation, they were required to sign a document stating that they would no longer engage in "espionage" activities. But both Japanese categorically refused to sign anything, after which they were arrested. The Consul General of Japan in Alexandrovsk immediately appealed to the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs S.K. Tsarapkin with a protest against provocations against Japanese citizens. As a result, on July 20, 1939, the Japanese citizen Kaneko Mokuyo was sentenced by the court to 5 years in prison for... attempted rape. Who was he trying to rape, pistols, a radio station or NKVD officers... History is bashfully silent about this. On December 26, 1939, an appeal hearing was held and the sentence was changed to 2 years in prison.

Having moderated their ardor towards the citizens of Japan, the "valiant Chekists" directed all their energy to expose the enemies of the people on their compatriots. A striking example on this topic is the story of the Japanese resident Baba Fudesuke. When he was arrested, the head of the Sakhalin NKVD, V. Drekov, gave the operative Shmurak an idiotic, from a normal point of view, order: "Take testimony against the residents of Aleksandrovsk that they are also spies." With the help of such a valuable "whistleblower" as an enemy resident, it was possible to draw up "beautiful" cases with great effect and count on the praise of the superiors.

Shmurak got to work. But then an unforeseen complication arose: Fudesuke could not name the required number of his imaginary agents for the sole reason that he knew almost no one in the city. What should I do? Drekov suggested a simple way out, like everything ingenious: they brought house registers, the Japanese had to poke his finger at this or that name. Little? Let's do it again. No pity! Fusesuke had a good time doing this. And at the same time, he included some NKVD employees in the list of his "agents". And, of course, he got a great opportunity to hide his real agents, if there were any.

The Japanese resident, not without humor, expressed the wish that his testimony would be sent by the NKVD to the Land of the Rising Sun, which would be the best evidence of his successful work in the USSR. Perhaps he will even be given a samurai title...

The Book of Victims of Political Repression in the Sakhalin Region contains 204 forms of persons arrested and repressed in Douai. They were accused of "engaging in counter-revolutionary Japanophile agitation," "visiting a Japanese concession and smuggling," "conducting Japanophile and defeatist agitation," "associating with Japanese engaged in espionage activities," and being a "secret agent of Japanese counterintelligence." If a Soviet person engaged in a concession enters into a conversation with a Japanese (and how can you work in silence?) or, God forbid, receives a cigarette from him, then the accusation of espionage is ready. According to the documents, it came to jokes: for example, a person was enlisted as a spy on the grounds that he took garbage from the Japanese kitchen to feed livestock. Or his pig was in the same puddle with Japanese pigs.

Those who were with the concession "in contras" did not escape arrest either. Thus, in 1937-38, the former heads of the UZSGO I. Leonhardt, V. Andzelevich, M. Vovchenko, labor inspector L. Feldman, chairman of the Mining Committee I.N. Vagin, head of the customs department Kletchenko were arrested... Only one cunning Jew Feldman, who in 1939 was... Acquitted.

The Japanese press wrote about the concessions and repressions: "In the Far East, many key figures from among those who were associated with the concessions of Northern Sakhalin were arrested and shot on suspicion that they were Japanese spies and Trotskyites. The Chairman of the Severo-Sakhalinsk District of Oil Fields, the President and Vice-President of the National Oil Trust, the Diplomatic Representative, the Head of the Customs Department, the Acting Chairman of the Provincial Executive Committee in Yaganga (Aleksandrovsk), the President of the National Coal Trust, the Chief Engineer, the Mine Manager and the Head of the Mining Department were detained...

During the mass arrests of 1937, the special group of NKVD Lieutenant Gershevich carried out an "operation" that was not only cruel, but also particularly despicable. Gershevich, Dubkov and Dyatlov undertook to arrest girls aged 16-17 on Japanese concessions. They were qualified as Japanese spies and at the same time prostitutes, brothel keepers. The "Holy Trinity" savored delusional "piquancy" in the offices of the NKVD administration. She boasted that she managed to uncover entire spy groups created by Japanese intelligence from underage prostitutes. It called them "Duya Group of Bixo-Trust No. 1" and "Alexandrovskaya Group of Bikso-Trust No. 2". They were high school girls. In his report, Kuchinsky writes that they were brutally abused. All the girls were sentenced by the "troika" of the NKVD not only to death, but also to unheard-of shame.

The Japanese press of those years wrote: "The only way to protect yourself from suspicions of friendship with the Japanese in Northern Sakhalin is to harass and "crush" the Japanese. The anti-Japanese sentiments of the inhabitants of the USSR and the anti-Japanese education of the population are so thorough that even in children's quarrels the worst thing they can say is "You are a Japanese henchman!" State officials used the youth of the Soviet Union in their own interests, committing all kinds of dirty tricks and attacks with their help. Soviet youth had public sex with Japanese workers, secretly threw horse manure into wells, broke the windows of houses and warehouses to commit thefts."

As early as 1933, during the passportization, those working on Japanese concessions were put in a particularly strict framework. They were marked "concession" in the social status column. Certificates of residence were kept in a special card index. Their lists were transferred to the OGPU for eviction to the mainland in the event of their dismissal and transfer to the court. In accordance with the directive of the NKVD Directorate of the USSR for the Far Eastern Territory of August 28, 1938, the territorial divisions of the NKVD - NKGB of the USSR collected information about those who worked on Japanese concessions, checked them and, if necessary, limited access to work at defense enterprises. Therefore, Soviet citizens did not have a special desire to work on the Japanese concession during the period of mass repressions. Even strawberry jam and orange jam, which were available in the concessionaire's warehouse, did not tempt me. Not to mention fresh pears, apples, watermelons, bananas and plums...

On May 19, 1938, at a meeting of the society's board in Tokyo, a project for the "reset" of the coal concession was presented. During the navigation of 1938, it was planned to bring 600 Japanese workers and 150 employees, as well as 1000 Soviet workers and 150 employees to Northern Sakhalin, for which the estimate provided for 240 thousand yen. The cost of importing goods from Japan was 1,437,000 yen, and the cost of purchasing goods from the USSR was to be 1,113,000 yen. The payroll was supposed to be 1,154,000 yen. It was also planned to spend 25,000 yen as royalties and 13,000 yen in rent. It was also necessary to pay premiums to the insurance fund, to pay money to the state insurance for property insurance, to pay the freight of ships for the transportation of coal... The total amount of the estimate was 2.6 million yen.

Alas, these plans were not destined to come true. For during the navigation period, only 50 people were brought to the concession on July 25 and another 50 people on August 12, 1938. Trying to extract coal on an industrial scale with only a hundred workers was unrealistic. Therefore, the concession had only to maintain its existence, extracting less than 10 tons of coal per day only for its own needs and simultaneously finding funds to pay the salaries of its employees. To maintain the life of the coal concession, the Japanese government allocated it a monetary subsidy in the amount of 112440 yen. In 1939, the subsidy was increased to 1.61 million yen.

At the beginning of June 1938, the Soviet side decided to build a narrow-gauge railway from the Makarievsky mine to the coast through the concession area. Such an attempt was already made in 1931, but ended unsuccessfully.

On July 5, 1938, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a secret resolution "On the construction of a narrow-gauge railway on Sakhalin by the Sakhalinugol trust of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and the expansion of the warehouse area of the Makaryevka mine". It was decided to allow the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry to immediately begin the construction of a narrow-gauge railway from the Soviet mine Makaryevka (on Sakhalin Island) to the Beregovoy loading point, a distance of 1.5 kilometers, on the territory of the concessionaire, and also to allow the Sakhalinugol trust to expand the coal warehouse of the Makaryevka mine at the expense of the vacant areas of the concessionaire.

The second issue discussed at the meeting was the question "On allowing the North Sakhalin coal concessionaire to export harvested and unused timber to Japan and on the sale of Soviet coal to him."

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ordered: "1. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry to make it clear to the concessionaire that a favorable solution to the problem of the export of timber harvested by him and not used at concession enterprises will be made dependent on his consent to transport our coal along his branch (Makarievsky mine) on last year's terms. 2. To refuse to sell him Soviet coal."

On July 13, 1938, negotiations were held between the head of the UZSGO N.G. Mikhalev and the director of the Douai mine, Ando Seysi, on the issue of exporting coal from the Makarievsky mine by the Sakhalinugol trust, for which he planned to start building his own railway, but the negotiations led to nothing. As a result, on July 29, 1938, Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha represented by its trustee N. Ozawa and the Sakhalinugol Trust represented by its manager A. Kozlov signed an agreement on the lease of the Company's loading equipment by the Trust. The company leased a "decoville" with brakes, trolleys, 2 steam locomotives, a tipper, a creeper, a pier, a conveyor, electricity and barriers. This list did not include kungas and tugboats. The trust provided the Society with 500 electric detonators and 150 tons of coal, and for the work of 2 steam locomotives another 50 tons of coal per month. The company also provided the trust with 2 foremen at the wharf, 2 locomotive drivers, 1 foreman on the tipper and 1 trolley counter. The Trust provided the Society with 3 stokers for the power plant and 2 stokers for steam locomotives. In case of any damage to the loading facilities through the fault of the trust, the trust carried out restoration work at its own expense. The weight of one trolley loaded with coal was 690 kg. Equipment rental fee was set at 4.40 rubles per ton of exported coal. The treaty came into force on August 5, 1938.

The concessionaire continued to have problems in supplying employees with commodity products. On May 4, 1938, the first batch of goods from Japan was brought to the island, but only on May 22, the newly appointed quarantine officer Ivanenko showed up at the concession warehouse, who suddenly discovered that 4800 kg of potatoes unloaded from a Japanese ship were infected with cancer (potato nematode). Moreover, the Company did not receive a copy of the inspection report. The paradox of the situation was that in Japan, both potato cancer and potato nematode were completely absent! On May 25, these potatoes were ordered to be buried in the ground near the concession. However, potatoes from the same batch, sent to Okha, successfully passed all checks and no "infection" was found in it. Moreover, it is interesting that according to the rules, contaminated products must either be immediately sent to the point from which they came or burned. In this case, the potatoes were simply buried in the ground. It is likely that the unscrupulous inspector and his accomplices subsequently simply dug it up and sold it on the local market. This is where the real enemies of the people have settled!

On June 9, 1938, the second batch of Japanese goods arrived on the island, in the vegetables and fruits of which some mysterious "diseases" were also found, and for this reason 5200 kg of cargo was sent back to Japan. Beef also "floated away" with vegetables and fruits, as it turned out to be of poor quality and with an unpleasant smell. There were even rumors that a batch of beef frozen in 1904 was brought to the concession.

Meanwhile, the leadership of the Duya Mine Committee did not slumber either. As early as December 15, 1937, its chairman I.N. Vagin demanded that the management of the concession transfer the work of the enterprise to a 7-hour working day by December 19 in accordance with the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of January 2, 1929 underground workers listed in the decree of the Government of the USSR on transfer to a 7-hour working day and other workers and employees to a 7-hour working day. Ts. Gomamoto, a trustee of the concessionaire, replied to the representatives of the Mining Committee that this issue was being resolved between the Government of the USSR and the Japanese government and until its final resolution the company would not switch to a 7-hour working day.

On December 17, 1937, the Inspectorate of the Mining District for the second time demanded that the concession manager switch the enterprise to a 7-hour working day from December 19, "as a matter of self-discipline."

On December 19, 1937, the director of the concession, S. Ando, informed the inspectorate that the company could not make such a decision until a final decision was reached between the governments of the two countries. In addition, the director pointed out, such a period in such a short time is simply impossible and contradicts the spirit of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of 15.10.1927, which clearly states that such a transfer should be carried out gradually. In addition, according to the decree of January 3, 1929, the transfer to a 7-hour working day should be carried out according to the list approved by the Government Commission for the preparation of the 7-hour working day for the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, while in relation to the concessionaire's enterprise such a list has not been approved until now.

On March 8, 1938, Director S. Ando wrote to representatives of the Mine Committee: "The Island hereby informs you that the question of transferring our enterprise to a 7-hour working day has not yet been fundamentally resolved in the Center.

And from the practical side of the matter, the implementation of shortened working hours inevitably requires a certain increase in staff. Meanwhile, as you are well aware in connection with the continuing mass arrest, which has already reached 30% of the total number of workers in the enterprise, our enterprise now has a great shortage of manpower in every branch. limited food supplies, as well as the obligation to supply many family members of the arrested workers, the 0-vo is actually deprived of the opportunity to fill even the necessary staff. In such a situation of circumstances, the demand made by you, in our opinion, cannot but be considered as clearly disrupting the normal course of work of the enterprise, and thereby ignoring the interests of the Island.

Taking into account that the promotion of the normal course of work of the enterprise is one of the tasks assigned to the Union organizations, the 0-vo will be able to hope that such a requirement to disrupt the work of the enterprise will be removed by you."

On March 23, the chairman of the Mining Committee, P.V. Kournikov, in the presence of labor inspector I.N. Vagin and store manager K. Mitani, drew up an act on the undersupply of workers with food and consumer goods. The act stated that there were no eggs, butter, fish, potatoes and cabbage on sale, and therefore the workers were forced to purchase all this in the Sakhtorg store. The representative of the concessionaire added in the act that the company's store was closed on March 15 and no goods were released at all from that moment. The Mine Committee proposed to the Society to issue the full amount of products to the workers of the concession no later than April 5, 1938 according to the norms of the collective agreement.

On May 23, 1938, another act was drawn up, which indicated that since February the workers had not received 4300 eggs, 1214 kg of fish, 599 kg of butter, 7150 kg of potatoes, 2409 kg of cabbage. From the clothing allowance, one pair of boots and cotton wool were issued, the rest of the items were not allowed to be sold, explaining this by too low prices approved by the mountain district.

As a result, on June 5, 1938, the mine committee of the Due mine filed a claim with the people's court to recover 18810.79 rubles from Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha in favor of the workers of the Duya mine, who, due to the concessionaire's failure to comply with paragraph 24 of the concession agreement, were systematically undersupplied with goods and products and were forced to purchase them in the stores of Sakhtorg at significantly higher prices. than provided for by the collective agreement. Clarifications and additions to this lawsuit were filed several times in 1938.

On December 8, 1938, the Alexandrovsky People's Court of the Sakhalin Region, consisting of the presiding judge Pasternak and the narassessors Pavlova and Kosnikov, having considered in an open court session the claim of the Mining Committee against the joint-stock company, found it proved that the concessionaire had not fulfilled its obligations under the collective agreement in terms of supplying workers with food for 5 months. Taking into account the average monthly salary of an employee of the company was 49.01 rubles, while the average monthly salary of a worker of the Sakhalinugol trust was 606.35 rubles, the difference in wages was 557.52 rubles. And therefore, guided by Article 118.5 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 15 of the Labor Code (as well as the lack of conscience), the court decided to recover from the defendant in favor of the Mining Committee 44836.88 rubles.

Inspired by the successful experience, on February 19, 1939, the Mine Committee drew up another act, which indicated that in 1937 and 1938 the workers of the enterprise and their families did not receive 2 pairs of rubber boots, 4 meters of cloth, a pair of boots, 48 meters of calico, 10 meters of linen and 5 meters of woolen fabric.

On May 5, 1939, the chairman of the Mine Committee, Glazov, filed a new lawsuit with the People's Court in the amount of 374,928.00 rubles. On May 31, 1939, the same "legal prostitute" Pasternak and people's assessors Gulyaev and Kosenkov satisfied the claim in full.

The concessionaire filed an appeal. In this regard, the Vladivostok newspaper "Red Banner" wrote: "In Northern Sakhalin in Due, near the city of Alexandrovsk, there is a Japanese coal concession owned by the company "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha".

The concessionaire is obliged, in accordance with the coal concession agreement, to supply the workers and employees of his enterprise, their families with products and consumer goods. This supply of workers in the coal concession and their families must be carried out in accordance with certain norms provided for in the collective agreement of the trade union of coal miners and the Japanese concession society.

Starting in the autumn of 1937, the coal concessionaire began to curtail the activities of the concession. At the same time, the administration of the concession took the path of systematic deterioration of the economic situation of the workers, in order to force them to leave the concession of their own free will. The administration of the concession first of all went along the line of arbitrary and illegal reduction of commodity production rates and reduction of wages. In 1937, the workers did not receive from the concessionaire 9 out of 14 items according to the norm of consumer goods. From February to July 1938 inclusive, the society did not issue potatoes to workers and their families at all, in February, March and April meat, cow butter, fish, cabbage, eggs and other products were not issued. In addition, the concessionaire reduced the wages of workers. The same picture was observed in the following months.

In connection with the situation that had arisen, the mining committee of the trade union of coal miners in Douai repeatedly appealed to the administration of the concession with a demand to resume the issuance of commodity products to the workers and employees of the concession at full rates. However, all these demands of the trade union did not give the desired results, although the concessionaire did not skimp on promises to begin in the coming days the full supply of workers.

After repeated but unsuccessful attempts by the trade union to obtain from the concessionaire the fulfillment of its obligations to supply commodity products, the mine committee of the trade union of coal miners, Douhet, filed, on the basis of paragraph 65 of the concession agreement, a monetary claim against the coal concession company as compensation for the shortfall in commodity products by workers and employees, in the amount of 374,928 rubles 60 kopecks. On May 31 of this year, the People's Court of the Alexandrovsky District, having considered the claim of the Mine Committee of the Union of Coal Miners in Douai, recognized it as correct and sentenced the concessionaire to pay the said amount. In connection with the appeal of the concessionaire of June 26 of this year, this case was considered in the regional court of the city of Aleksandrovsk, which confirmed the decision of the district court to recover from the concession company for the undersupply of workers and employees of the concession enterprise from September 1937 to September 1938 374 thousand 928 rubles 60 kopecks.

The decision of the Soviet court is a serious warning to those who think that in the USSR it is possible to disregard the laws and the rights of workers with impunity."

It should be noted that in June-July 1939, the Japanese ambassador Togo Shigenori in telegrams number 662 and number 810 to the Japanese Foreign Ministry pointed out: "In the court session, the Soviet court completely ignored the arguments of our mining company. There is no precedent for such a trial in any other country. In reality, the content and procedure of this case do not resemble ordinary court cases, and it is clear that the Soviet side is using this case to implement a policy of squeezing concession enterprises out of the territory of Northern Sakhalin ... The Soviet bailiff said that if Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha did not pay compensation by July 19, 1939, under this court decision, the company's assets would be seized. In such a case, the Japanese Government will be compelled to take such measures as it deems appropriate to protect the rights of our concession enterprises. In that case, we would like to make it clear that all responsibility will lie with the Soviet side.

In order to protect our interests in Northern Sakhalin, we decided to mobilize a significant number of Imperial warships to be in the vicinity of the territorial waters of the USSR on both the eastern and western sides of Northern Sakhalin from the end of June to the end of September to exert psychological pressure on the authorities of the USSR. The local Soviet authorities and the general population were extremely embarrassed and nervous about the dispatch of warships and took such actions as setting up observation posts on the coast, conducting numerous demonstration flights over our warships anchored on the high seas, and loitering Soviet patrol boats near our warships. However, the execution of the judgment against the coal company was suspended, the appeal process against the oil company was postponed indefinitely, and other lawsuits involving Japanese nationals also began to be resolved favorably."

More than a year passed before the cassation appeal of the society against the decision of the appellate instance on August 20, 1940 was considered by the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, consisting of the presiding judge Nikolaev and members of the collegium Andrias and Kuzmenko. The company's complaint was rejected. However, the concessionaire refused to pay this fine and, at his insistence, the Japanese Embassy in Moscow demanded that this issue be brought to negotiations between the two countries.

The imported quality of products was also deteriorating. On December 28, 1938, the head of the UZSGO, N. Mikhalev, sent a letter to the director of the "KKKC" Ozawa, in which he pointed out that on the basis of the analyzes of the State Sanitary Inspectorate carried out in the laboratory of the city of Aleksandrovsk dated November 21, 1938, the following products: flour of the first grade in the amount of 1038 bags of 22 kilograms each, flour of the 2nd grade in the amount of 1097 bags of 22 kilograms each, 28 cans of 16 kg each and one can weighing 4.8 kg were declared unfit for consumption. The Mining District proposed not to release the said products for sale, to isolate them in a separate warehouse and, with the opening of navigation, to bring them to Japan in accordance with the Concession Agreement 18.

On January 4, 1939, the director N. Ozawa sent a letter to the head of the UZSGO number 2, in which he stated that the society wanted to analyze the above-mentioned products itself and asked the mining district not to refuse to receive samples of flour and lard in the presence of a state inspector.

On January 5, N. Mikhalev, in letter number 196, expressed surprise at the concessionaire's desire to carry out an independent analysis of the products and stated that "for us, the analysis of the laboratory is beyond doubt, and therefore we do not need to carry out any other analysis, and we cannot satisfy your request in this regard." But the letter was accompanied by the conclusion of the state sanitary inspector L. Zaslavskaya, which stated, that tested products are prohibited for sale due to their poor quality. Nevertheless, on January 8, 1939, the Sakhalin regional laboratory re-analyzed new samples of flour, and on January 19, inspector L. Zaslavskaya confirmed the decision not to allow these goods to be sold, threatening with criminal liability for violation.

During the navigation of 1939 and 1940, the concession enterprise was prohibited from importing cloth, ferns, bay leaves, seaweed, canned meat in soy sauce to Northern Sakhalin due to their allegedly poor quality. Medicines, enamel dishes, table knives, kitchen utensils and much more were also banned. In August 1940, the head of the mining district sharply reduced the selling prices for almost all goods imported under the concession.

Table XXVI

Price list for goods of the concession store on August 7, 1940

Starting from November 1936, the leadership of the mining district repeatedly underestimated the selling price of products in the company's store, as a result of which it was forced to sell these goods at a loss. Each time, the Society protested against the incorrectly approved prices and demanded a retrial, but the answer of the head of the UZSGO was that if the Society was dissatisfied, it could send the goods back to Japan. However, if the society refused to sell goods at ultra-low prices, then the workers were undersupplied with products and goods and the concession was immediately accused of violating the collective agreement, filed lawsuits in court, and as a result, a large amount of compensation was recovered from the company. As a result, the company suffered huge losses when selling goods.

The firm was also informed that from August it was not allowed to sell more products and goods to workers than the amount of employees' wages. But since it was technically problematic to do this, the Society asked to postpone the entry into force of this decision from November 1940.

Soviet organizations also decided to financially "pluck the feathers" of the concession company. For example, on June 14, 1938, the Sakhalin forestry of the Khabarovskles Trust appealed to the KKKK society with a demand to bring the company's forest plots into a sanitary condition, to introduce temporary fire and guard guards on the plots and to place fire-fighting equipment. The head of the Aleksandrovsky forestry station Shiryaev warned the trustee of the concession that in case of non-compliance with the requirements of the forestry enterprise, the company would not be allowed to carry out logging operations. The "breathing on incense" Society, of course, could not do this. There were no people, no equipment, no finances... As a result, on August 17, the head of the forestry enterprise N. Govrilov filed an application with the Alexandrovsky People's Court to recover a fine from the company for forest violation in the amount of 152419.52 rubles, and also asked to withdraw the timber harvested, but not exported by the concessionaire from the logging sites and transfer to the disposal of the forestry enterprise.

On October 3, 1938, the People's Court of Aleksandrovsk under the chairmanship of Judge Timofeev and narassessors Popov and Kiseleva, having considered in open court the case on the claim of the Sakhalin forestry enterprise against the society "Kita Karafuto Kogio Kabushiki Kaisha" determined that the concession company, having at its disposal logging areas in Bolshiye Mgachi and Yamy, systematically violated the rule of normal conditions for logging, did not provide guard protection for the forest plot. there was no fire-fighting equipment. During logging, logging areas were not cleared, timber was not exported. The court ruled to recover from the company a fine of 152,419.52 rubles, as well as a court fee of 8% of the amount of the fine 12,193.52 rubles.

On December 29, 1938, another trial was held on the claim of the forestry enterprise to recover a fine of 41115 rubles from the Society for violation of normal forest management. The court found the company's argument that it did not have a workforce that could bring the logging sites to a normal condition and recovered the fine. On February 20, 1939, the defendant's cassation appeal was again dismissed.

In 1940, the concession was completely denied timber supplies, as a result of which the company announced that it was now unable to maintain the mine workings, since it did not have wood for fastening.

On April 4, 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a new law on income tax, as well as a law on the tax for the needs of housing and cultural construction from the population subject to income tax. On its basis, the concessionaire was instructed that from now on he had to pay tax on the lease of premises, the sale of electric energy, as well as on the rent received from the Sakhalinugol trust for the use of the concession equipment in the export of Makariev coal. income in the amount of 190 thousand rubles. 88262.52 rubles of income tax and 11769.12 rubles of tax for cultural and housing construction were calculated. The concessionaire, as always, indicated that under the concession agreement he is not obliged to pay these taxes and fees. In addition, the law says that all this is levied from the population, and a Japanese joint-stock company is a legal entity.

Labor inspectors also continued to "terrorize" the concession. In 1940 alone, they imposed fines on the Society for inaccurate calculation of wages, unsanitary conditions in dormitories and mines, violation of mining safety rules, failure to provide workers with overwork, unauthorized overtime, violation of fire safety rules, leaving equipment unattended, selling goods at prices not approved by the mining district... In total, in the amount of 7850 rubles.

If you add up all the fines and payments that were paid by the society as a result of both civil lawsuits and criminal and administrative fines for 1938-1939, you get the sum of 342,210.90 yen.

Thus, the activities of the North Sakhalin Japanese coal concession were almost completely paralyzed. Starting in the spring of 1939, the shareholders of KKKK began to search for coal mines suitable for development in South Sakhalin and Hokkaido, and on June 27, 1940, a meeting of shareholders was held on the creation of a new joint-stock company, Minami Karafuto Industrial Co., Ltd. The new company was supposed to concentrate its coal mining efforts on South Sakhalin, but at the same time, the coal mines of Northern Sakhalin continued to remain on its balance sheet.

Beginning in 1940, concessions became the subject of dispute and friction between the governments of both countries. In August 1940, the Japanese Embassy sent another note of protest to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in which, in particular, it was noted that "the Japanese side considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the following:

1) Despite the fact that the Japanese concessionaires themselves never intend to suspend or reduce their operational work, in fact they are forced to reduce their operational work every year precisely because of the illegal pressure of the Soviet side. The Japanese concession enterprises, "the profitable exploitation of which is guaranteed by the Beijing Convention," are now experiencing a seriously critical moment, which serves as a concrete example of the illegal pressure of the Soviet side and its violation of the Beijing Convention.

(2) The Soviet side declares that the Japanese concessionaires are deliberately violating Soviet laws, but such a statement does not in the least correspond to reality. The Soviet Government, before demanding that the Japanese concessionaires comply with Soviet laws, look back at whether it itself is complying with the Peking Convention or not. all "reasonable protection and relief." In spite of this, it exerts such pressure on the Japanese concession enterprises that the latter are practically deprived of the possibility of continuing their existence, not to mention the possibility of their profitable exploitation, which must be considered a clear violation of the Peking Convention by the Soviet Government. The Soviet side, in justification of its actions, may declare that, in accordance with the requirements of its laws, it only supervises the concession enterprises, but the Soviet laws which violate the Peking Convention are laws contrary to an international treaty, and the Soviet Government is obliged to compensate for the losses inflicted on the concession enterprises by the enactment of such laws, and such an obligation to compensate for losses is also provided for in the concession agreement. In view of this, the Japanese side, as recently announced, will demand compensation from the Soviet side for the heavy losses caused to Japanese enterprises.

(3) However, the Japanese Side now solemnly declares that the Japanese enterprises intend to sincerely observe Soviet laws, which do not contradict the spirit and letter of the concession and collective agreements, as well as the Beijing Convention. It must be considered unjust that the Soviet Side, having made the operation of enterprises virtually impossible by taking all active and passive measures of prohibition, restriction or delay, etc., should be considered unfair. subsequently refers only to the results of the impossibility of operational work and accuses the enterprises of violating the concession and collective agreements, as well as other laws. In connection with this, the Japanese Party declares that the Japanese enterprises will make even greater efforts to comply with the concession agreement and Soviet laws if the Soviet side tries to treat Japanese enterprises fairly and reasonably.

It is necessary to emphasize the fact that the Soviet side has been conducting actions in an organized manner for a long time that seriously violate the Beijing Convention and the Treaty, namely:

(1) In 1937, 1938 and 1939, the Soviet Government placed a serious restriction on the exercise by the concessionaires of their rights arising from the Concession Agreement with regard to the question of the recruitment and delivery of labour for the oil and coal concessions.

(2) Beginning in 1937, the Soviet Government created an unjust restriction on the right of the Concessionaires to import commodity products and articles of technical equipment for the oil and coal concessions.

(3) Since 1937, the Soviet authorities have subjected the Japanese employees and workers of the oil and coal concessions to such an illegal regime as is not to be found in constitutional states, and especially in recent times agents of the NKVD have openly compelled these employees and workers (in particular, those who know Russian) to become spies for the USSR. Such an attitude of the Soviet authorities should be considered an illegal action, to which the Japanese side cannot be indifferent.

4) Beginning in 1937, the Soviet Government took away from the concessionaires the right to cut forests free of charge.

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the Japanese concessionaires have not violated the concession and collective agreements, and that the Soviet authorities are deliberately exerting pressure on the Japanese concession enterprises, openly ignoring the concession agreement and the Peking Convention, in order to deprive the enterprises of the possibility of exploitation, and it is necessary to emphasize the significant discrepancy in the application of the same Soviet law to Japanese and Soviet enterprises.

In view of all the above, the Japanese side once again declares to the Soviet side a resolute protest against the obvious violation by the Soviet Government of the Beijing Convention and the Concession Agreement, and at the same time it demands that the Soviet Government remove pressure on Japanese concessions."

The Soviet side was interested in the removal of the foreign body of foreign concessions from Northern Sakhalin as soon as possible. This is evidenced by the diplomatic practice of the Soviet leadership. When the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov visited Berlin in November 1940, he was offered to familiarize himself with the draft agreement between the powers of the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union.

Commenting on the content of this project, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop offered his mediation for the normalization of relations between the USSR and Japan. He admitted that in the event of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Japan, the latter, in his opinion, could meet Soviet wishes regarding oil and coal concessions on Sakhalin.

On April 11, 1941, in Moscow, at the reception of the Japanese Ambassador Yoshihide Matsuoka, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov discussed the upcoming signing of the neutrality pact and the protocol on the liquidation of Japanese oil and coal concessions. In the draft protocol, the Soviet side confirmed that all the costs of the Japanese concessionaires would be reimbursed to them by agreement of the parties, and the Soviet government undertook to supply Japan with 100,000 tons of oil products annually for five years. Concessions were to be transferred to the Soviet side within a month, but it was also possible to extend it by 1-2 months.

On April 13, 1941, a neutrality pact was signed with Japan, which served as the basis for an important agreement regarding oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov exchanged special letters in which the issue of liquidating Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin was resolved within a few months.

On May 31, 1941, the Japanese ambassador to the USSR, Tetekawa Yoshitsugu, handed Molotov a special letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshi Matsuoka, in which he declared his firm intention to resolve the issue of liquidating Japanese concessions within 6 months from the date of signing the neutrality pact.

While the diplomats were dealing with the issue of the existence of the concession, on January 9, 1941, the society submitted to the mining district for approval the next 5-year plan for coal production for 1941-1946. and in 1943-1946 - 200 thousand tons per year. Coal production at the coastal mines of Mgachi and Vladimirsky in 1942 was supposed to be 10 thousand tons, in 1943 - 35 thousand tons, in 1944 - 50 thousand tons, in 1945 - 75 thousand tons and in 1946 - 100 thousand tons.

In order to implement this plan, the concessionaire intended to begin the development of several new mines, install new mine equipment, fans and drainage pumps. It was planned to build 2 power plants with a capacity of 600 kW, to start the construction of new houses with a total area of 2143 sq.m. The concessionaire also planned to apply for the delivery of 900 Soviet and 400 Japanese workers and employees during the navigation period.

Of course, after the signing of the neutrality pact and the protocol on the liquidation of concession enterprises in Northern Sakhalin, no one took this plan seriously. But the concession continued to live its own life during this period... On February 5, 1941, the Society's sawmill burned down from a short circuit at the Douai mine. The cost of losses was estimated at 11 thousand rubles for the building and 9230 rubles for the equipment. The investigation found that the fault was the old, not repaired, despite the order of the fire inspection, electrical wiring. On October 11, 1941, the society received permission from the mining district to restore the sawmill building.

On May 9, 1941, the Society was allowed to import 45100 pieces of chicken eggs, 17.5 tons of cereals, 3 tons of fruit, 25 tons of daikon, ferns, dried mushrooms, dried seaweed, ginseng, beans and vegetables, 16 tons of fresh and frozen fish, 26.6 tons of dry and salted fish, jam, instant coffee, bar chocolate, grape wine, 1820 meters of woolen fabric. 170 pairs of boots and 210 pairs of lace-up boots. It was also planned to obtain permission to import beef, white rice, canned fruit, vegetables and fish, sweets, as well as clothing, fabrics, overalls and rubber boots from Japan. On June 30, 1941, the application for additional delivery of food and consumer goods (except beef and rice) was approved. It is possible that the Soviet side gave such permission, hoping that after the liquidation of the concession, the goods and products it imported would remain in the USSR and there would be "something to profit from". But the products brought to the island were once again found flaws. In the flour of the 2nd grade, the State Sanitary Inspectorate found midges, larvae and worms, and the herring of Japanese salting was completely unfit for consumption. It was also established that the worker Ignatiev was hung by 100 grams. when selling him meat, and the worker Borodkin for 40 grams. Another employee received a box of Montpensier in the concessionaire's store, in which there was wrapping paper instead of lollipops. Workers were also undersupplied with chrome boots, cloth and cheviot. But the wages of workers for night work were increased by 20%. From July 1, 1941, the wages of Japanese workers were increased from 3 to 10 yen per month. Since December 1, there has been another such increase.

The German attack on the Soviet Union delayed the decision on the closure of Japanese concessions. Considering that in the conditions of waging war in the West, the USSR would not want to risk opening a second front in the Far East and forcibly expelling the Japanese from Northern Sakhalin, the Japanese concessions continued to operate in violation of the neutrality pact. At that time, their calculation turned out to be correct. The Japanese themselves, working on the coal concession, noted that since the beginning of the war between the USSR and Germany, the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards them had improved.

On December 12, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs asked the Japanese embassy whether the agreement on the liquidation of Japanese concessions was still in force, but did not receive a satisfactory answer.

On June 4, 1943, receiving Japanese Ambassador Sato Naotake, V. Molotov once again protested Tokyo's failure to fulfill its obligation to liquidate Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin. Handing over the protest of the Soviet government, the People's Commissar regarded the departure of the Japanese side from the timely fulfillment of this promise twice given in writing as a violation of the terms of the neutrality pact.

Ambassador N. Sato said that, according to the above-mentioned letters of Yoshihide Matsuoka, a personal promise to liquidate the concessions was given in the hope of an early conclusion of fishing and trade agreements, which have not yet been signed through no fault of the Japanese side.

Molotov was not satisfied with this answer and, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador on June 15, began to demand even more insistence that Matsuoka's promise be fulfilled.

Not many documents have survived about the period of existence of the coal concession in 1942-1944. It is known that the concessionaire continued to systematically violate the collective agreement in matters of supply and provision of normal housing conditions to employees. In 1942, inspections of the mine committee of the Douai mine established the undersupply of workers with melted lard, and the 1st grade flour was no longer sold in full, replacing it with 2nd grade flour. Butter imported under the concession was recognized as of poor quality, and its sale was allowed only in melted form. Small worms were found in the pearl barley flour, and stale bread was sold in the society's store. From March 1943, the concessionaire did not supply the workers with onions at all, stopped issuing salted fish, and the rate of vegetable oil was cut by 70%.

The concession also did not fulfill its obligations to repair the apartments of the company's employees in a timely manner, did not provide the families of employees with normal living conditions.

On March 1, 1942, in connection with the abolition of free accommodation and other housing benefits for Japanese employees, their salaries were increased. Thus, the salary of the deputy head of the concession Ozawa was increased from 210 to 255 yen, engineer Ando from 110 to 170 yen, engineer Shimadate from 115 to 220 yen, engineer Kono from 88 to 143 yen.

Of the minor troubles, the theft of 70 meters of telephone cable on the Douhe-Alexandrovsk line on July 5, 1942 was noted. On July 8, 1942, Japanese citizens who had recently arrived in Douai and applied for a residence permit increased the fee for this procedure from 5.5 to 15 rubles, and the fee for "registration" increased from 1 to 3 rubles.On November 25, 1942, the State Disinfection Department of the People's Commissariat of Health demanded 5 thousand rubles from the concession for the mandatory extermination of rats and disinfection of the Society's territory.

For example, in the 1942 fiscal year, the concession received 1.7 million yen from the Japanese government as a subsidy. In the article "It Is Difficult to Establish Who Is the Owner, We or the Japanese," its authors, G. Tkacheva and S. Tuzhilin, wrote: that "the unprofitable coal concession that existed only at the expense of state subsidies in the village of Douai, where the cost of coal was 173 rubles per ton, and at the Soviet enterprises of Sakhalin - a maximum of 34 rubles, was preserved in the interests of intelligence activities." But it was quite difficult for Japanese workers and employees to conduct such activities since 1937, since they were limited in their movements exclusively to the territory of the concession and could not even special passes to go to the coast and go to Aleksandrovsk. The only "espionage" information was reports to the Consulate General of Japan that on the hill behind the concession, Soviet military units had installed 5 field guns, dug trenches, blackout exercises had begun, and the construction of bomb shelters had been completely completed. There is not much useful information for Japanese intelligence to justify the maintenance of the concession.

It seems to us that the most probable reason for the preservation of concession enterprises on the island was that Japan had not yet decided on the question of attacking the USSR. In the event of such an attack and the seizure of the northern part of Sakhalin Island by Japan, the workers of the concession enterprises, who were well acquainted with the local conditions, could in a short time carry out the reactivation of coal mines and oil wells, quickly establish coal production and increase oil production for the needs of the Japanese armed forces and navy. Moreover, they could prevent the Soviet side from mining and destroying mines and oil rigs in the event of an offensive operation by Japanese troops from South Sakhalin.

But, starting with the turning point in the Great Patriotic War from the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, the chances of an attack on the Soviet Union practically disappeared. And now it was not the USSR, but Japan that was vitally interested in ensuring that the Soviet Union did not withdraw from the neutrality pact.

In an effort to prevent the USSR from withdrawing from the neutrality treaty, on June 19, 1943, the Coordinating Council of the Japanese government and the imperial headquarters made a fundamental decision to liquidate the concessions.

On July 3, 1943, N. Sato informed V. Molotov of his readiness to enter into negotiations on the submitted issue, since the statements of the parties made on May 21, 1943 about their intention to comply with the neutrality pact paved the way for the liquidation of the said concessions. At the same time, Sato linked the solution of this issue with the achievement of an agreement on the signing of a fishing convention as vital for Japan, putting it forward as the reason for Tokyo's concession on the issue of concessions.

Sato brought to the attention of the Soviet People's Commissar the following Japanese conditions for the liquidation of the concession:

1. Compensation for equipment and liquidation costs of the Japanese companies concerned (96.1 million yen, of which the debts of the companies alone amounted to 45 million yen, i.e., more than the value of the Chinese Eastern Railway sold to Japan).

2. Compensation for loss of profits from concessions from the moment of their liquidation until the expiration of the period for which they were received, i.e. up to 1970 inclusive (42.5 million yen).

3. Payment of compensation in goods of the USSR preferred by Japan.

4. Sale of Sakhalin oil (200 thousand tons per year) and Sakhalin coal (100 thousand tons per year) to Japan at inflated prices for ten years.

The negotiations were slow. The draft agreement of the Japanese side was presented on February 7, 1944, and the draft of the Soviet side on February 19. On March 10, the agreement on the liquidation of Japanese concessions, formalized by a special protocol, was initialed.

On March 30, 1944, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs S.A. Lozovsky and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the USSR Sato Naotake signed a protocol in Moscow, according to which oil and coal concessions were transferred to the USSR. This protocol canceled all the rights of the Japanese to develop the North Sakhalin coal reserves, which were to be preserved until 1970. According to the protocol, all the property of Japanese concessions was transferred to the Government of the USSR, which agreed to pay compensation to the Government of Japan in the amount of 5 million rubles, as well as to provide Japan with 50,000 tons annually. oil on normal commercial terms for 5 years after the end of the war. The Soviet side undertook to exchange 5 million rubles of compensation to the Japanese government for gold bars at the rate of 5.96396 rubles per 1 gram of pure gold and to transfer it at the Manchuria station to a representative of the Japanese government, as well as to pay the costs of its transportation and sale on the world market in the amount of 5%. The government of the USSR guaranteed the unimpeded export of oil and coal in the warehouses of the Japanese concessions, and the latter were to be exported within 4 months from the date of the opening of navigation, and the payment for labor provided by the Soviet side for loading Japanese ships was paid by the Government of Japan. The government of the USSR renounced all legal and monetary claims against the Japanese concessionaires. Upon the return of Japanese workers and employees to their homeland, the Soviet side was to provide them with all possible assistance for unhindered departure after the opening of navigation in 1944. This treaty ended the 26-year Japanese presence in Northern Sakhalin.

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